Spalding v. City of Chicago, 24 F. Supp. 3d 765

Background

Plaintiffs Spalding and Echeverría are CPD officers who allege First Amendment retaliation and Illinois Whistle-blower Protection Act violations against the City and eleven CPD officers.
Plaintiffs reported criminal misconduct by CPD officers to the FBI and spoke to the media about the retaliation, leading to a sustained retaliatory campaign within CPD.
During Operation Brass Tax, Plaintiffs were detailed to non-Narcotics assignments and then repeatedly reassigned, harassed, and denied opportunities (overtime, take-home cars, promotions) after their whistleblowing.
Key actors included Defendants O’Grady, Roti, Kirby, Rivera, Pascua, Mills, Cesario, Barnes, Salemme, and others within CPD’s Narcotics and Organized Crime bureaus.
Plaintiffs alleged meetings where officers discussed retaliation and described Plaintiffs as “rats,” with statements about undermining their careers.
The suit was filed November 1, 2012; Chicago media coverage and Plaintiffs’ own media appearances later publicized the retaliation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Monell liability via policy or custom	Plaintiffs allege final policymaker authority delegated to CPD officials; widespread retaliation shows custom.	Auriemma limits city policymaker to the City Council; subordinates cannot be final policymakers.	Monell claim survives; alleged delegation and patterns show policymaker conduct.
Pre-suit First Amendment retaliation protection	Pre-suit reporting to FBI was protected citizen speech; not pursuant to official duties.	Speech occurred within job duties; not protected.	Pre-suit speech protected as citizen speech; retaliation plausibly caused by that speech.
Post-suit First Amendment retaliation and public-concern	Media statements about retaliation addressed public concerns and may be motivated by reform.	Post-suit speech lacked public-concern relevance and was personal grievance.	Post-suit speech addressed a matter of public concern; retaliation plausible from such speech.
Section 1983 conspiracy viability	Multiple officers engaged in a pattern of retaliation; intra-corporate doctrine exceptions apply.	No pleaded, explicit agreement; conspiracy claim should fail.	Conspiracy claim survives; pleads a pervasive pattern and meeting discussions implying agreement.

Key Cases Cited

Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738 (7th Cir.2011) (applies Monell policymaker analysis to whether CPD chief is policymaker for the challenged action)
Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397 (7th Cir.1992) (City Council is sole policymaker for employment decisions if tied to unlawful ordinances; otherwise, extend Monell to officials with final authority)
Chaklos v. Stevens, 560 F.3d 705 (7th Cir.2009) (public employee speech to outside body or jury may be protected; filing as citizen source of protection depends on reporting channel)
Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743 (7th Cir.2012) (conspiracy pleading may rely on pattern of acts and inferences of collusion under Twombly/Iqbal)
Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.2004) (First Amendment rights violated when officials facilitate transfer in retaliation for whistleblowing)
Hobgood v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635 (7th Cir.2013) (clearly established right regarding retaliation for assisting in a case related to government misconduct)
Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir.2008) (reporting misconduct to designated oversight body and the scope of official duties)
Vose v. Kliment, 506 F.3d 565 (7th Cir.2007) (policy/context for official reporting within established channels)
Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, 487 F.3d 506 (7th Cir.2007) (public concern and police misconduct reporting as protected activity)
Chrzanowski v. Bianchi, 725 F.3d 734 (7th Cir.2013) (distinguishes protected speech when reporting to proper channels)
Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills, 712 F.3d 979 (7th Cir.2013) (speech to FBI could be public concern even when motive includes self-interest)