Southern Atlantic Companies, LLC v. School Board of Orange County, Florida
699 F. App'x 842
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Southern Atlantic (electrical subcontractor) submitted a bid protest to the School Board after losing a subcontract; it posted a $127,920 protest bond issued by IFIC in favor of the Board.
- The School Board, invoking an indemnity clause in its contract with Wharton‑Smith (construction manager), tendered the defense to Wharton‑Smith; an administrative judge found Wharton‑Smith—not the Board—selected the winning bid, ending Board standing in the protest.
- The Board then sought reimbursement for fees/costs from IFIC; after IFIC denied the claim, the Board assigned its bond claim to Wharton‑Smith, which promptly sued IFIC; Southern Atlantic intervened as a defendant.
- Southern Atlantic sued in federal court, asserting First Amendment retaliation claims by the company and by two officers (Hutchins and McIntosh), alleging the Board’s bond claim/assignment retaliated against speech about bidding irregularities.
- The district court found (1) Southern Atlantic’s retaliation claim might have merit on the merits but granted summary judgment because it failed to prove municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (no final policymaker); and (2) the individual officers lacked a retaliatory act directed at them and awarded the Board attorney’s fees under § 1988 against the officers.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed: it held the general counsel was not a final policymaker whose actions could be imputed to the Board, and the fee award against the officers was not an abuse of discretion (majority); Judge Jordan concurred in part and would have reversed the fee award.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the School Board is liable under § 1983 for the general counsel’s assertion and assignment of the bond claim (Monell final‑policy question) | The general counsel had final policymaking authority by custom (settlements under $50,000), by an alleged delegation at a pre‑agenda meeting, or de facto because review was unavailable after assignment | The Board retained ultimate authority over legal policy; any delegation was reviewable and not plenipotentiary; no evidence the Board was powerless to review or that counsel blocked review | The Board is not liable: general counsel was not a final policymaker and no municipal policy established liability (affirmed) |
| Whether a custom of delegating settlement authority made the general counsel a final policymaker | Custom of permitting counsel to settle/assign under $50,000 equates to final policymaking for such matters | Even if customary, the Board retained power to overrule; delegation was not unreviewable or unconstrained | Custom did not confer final policymaking authority (affirmed) |
| Whether the chairman’s pre‑agenda remarks delegated final policymaking authority over the bond to general counsel | The chairman’s referral constituted an express delegation of final authority over the bond | The referral was procedural (avoid ex parte contact) and did not strip the Board of review power | No express delegation of final, unreviewable authority (affirmed) |
| Whether Hutchins and McIntosh’s individual First Amendment claims were frivolous and subject to § 1988 fees | Officers argued an actionable injury (reputational, non‑economic) from the Board’s actions against the company; other circuits provide support for individual claims based on acts against a business | The actions targeted Southern Atlantic (the company), not the individuals; no evidence fees or suit were aimed at them personally | Majority: not an abuse of discretion to find claims frivolous and award fees; concurrence: the claims were not frivolous and fee award was improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires that the unconstitutional act represent official policy by a final policymaker)
- Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (municipal liability depends on whether the individual had final policymaking authority to set policy)
- Praprotnik v. City of St. Louis, 485 U.S. 112 (1988) (limits on imputing subordinate’s actions to municipality; failure to supervise does not automatically create policy)
- Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2004) (final‑policymaker and de facto policymaker analysis under Eleventh Circuit precedent)
- Scala v. City of Winter Park, 116 F.3d 1396 (11th Cir. 1997) (mere acquiescence in subordinate decisions does not delegate policymaking authority)
- Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) (standard for awarding attorney’s fees against plaintiffs in civil rights litigation)
- Holloman‑related Eleventh Circuit decisions and related municipal‑policy precedent cited for final policymaker principles (e.g., Manor Healthcare Corp. v. Lomelo, 929 F.2d 633) (illustrative of reviewability and policymaker analysis)