Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. City of Philadelphia
2017 Pa. LEXIS 947
| Pa. | 2017Background
- Seven administrative complaints were filed with the Philadelphia Commission (2007–2009) alleging violations of the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance (FPO) by SEPTA, including categories not covered by the PHRA.
- SEPTA sued the City and Philadelphia Commission seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing it is a Commonwealth agency/instrumentality and thus exempt from FPO enforcement and local jurisdiction.
- Commonwealth Court initially held Philadelphia lacked jurisdiction because SEPTA is a Commonwealth instrumentality; this Court (SEPTA III) remanded for application of the Ogontz statutory‑intent test rather than a status‑based rule.
- On remand the Commonwealth Court (SEPTA IV) found the MTAA’s language—particularly the sovereign immunity provision—shows legislative intent to exclude SEPTA from FPO jurisdiction; the Commonwealth Court concluded the PHRA’s waiver of immunity applies to state Commission enforcement only.
- This appeal presents whether the legislative scheme reveals an intent to exempt SEPTA from the FPO (Ogontz analysis) and whether the PHRA or other principles require local concurrent enforcement against SEPTA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (City/Appellants) | Defendant's Argument (SEPTA) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the legislature intend to exempt SEPTA from the FPO / Philadelphia Commission jurisdiction? | Home‑rule powers and PHRA’s allowance for concurrent local ordinances show intent to subject SEPTA to local anti‑discrimination law. | MTAA makes SEPTA an agency/instrumentality with sovereign immunity; no express waiver in MTAA or Home‑Rule Act to permit FPO suits. | Court: Ogontz first prong favors exemption — the statutory scheme (sovereign immunity in MTAA + PHRA waiver limited to PHRC) shows intent to exclude SEPTA from FPO jurisdiction. |
| Was remand for Ogontz analysis required (versus status‑based approach)? | City: earlier holdings and home‑rule presumptions support municipal enforcement; remand unnecessary. | SEPTA: legislative text, including sovereign immunity, controls. | Court: SEPTA III correctly required Ogontz analysis; remand was proper. |
| Does the PHRA’s waiver of immunity (and authorization of local commissions) import a waiver permitting FPO enforcement of Commonwealth agencies like SEPTA? | PHRA contemplates concurrent and possibly broader local enforcement; PHRA waivers and Section 962 series authorize local enforcement akin to PHRA. | PHRA’s waiver specifically contemplates PHRC jurisdiction and must be narrowly construed; it does not import a waiver of sovereign immunity for local ordinances creating private suits/damages. | Court: PHRA waiver does not extend to authorize FPO enforcement against SEPTA; waiver is narrow and applies to PHRC jurisdiction. |
| Does sovereign immunity bar only money/mandatory‑injunctive relief or also administrative/other non‑monetary enforcement actions under FPO? | City/Dissent: sovereign immunity does not shield SEPTA from non‑monetary administrative processes (investigations, cease‑and‑desist, prohibitory injunctions). | SEPTA/Concurrence: MTAA sovereign immunity reflects legislative intent to limit SEPTA’s exposure to litigation burdens imposed by FPO enforcement. | Court: Majority treats sovereign immunity and MTAA scheme as dispositive of legislative intent to exempt SEPTA from FPO enforcement; concurrence emphasizes practical consequences; dissent stresses immunity does not bar all non‑monetary enforcement (disagrees with outcome). |
Key Cases Cited
- Dep’t of Gen. Servs. v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass’n, 483 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1984) (establishes two‑step test to determine legislative intent between competing instrumentalities)
- Hazleton Area Sch. Dist. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 778 A.2d 1205 (Pa. 2001) (applies Ogontz framework for resolving inter‑governmental statutory conflicts)
- County of Venango v. Borough of Sugarcreek, 626 A.2d 489 (Pa. 1993) (governmental entities derived from legislature are not inherently hierarchical; intent analysis required)
- Frazier v. W.C.A.B. (Bayada Nurses, Inc.), 52 A.3d 241 (Pa. 2012) (recognizes MTAA sovereign immunity effects in related contexts)
- Dean v. Dep’t of Transp., 751 A.2d 1130 (Pa. 2000) (exceptions to sovereign immunity are construed narrowly)
- Sci. Games Int’l, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 66 A.3d 740 (Pa. 2013) (discusses public‑fiscal and policy rationales for sovereign immunity)
- Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 812 A.2d 1218 (Pa. 2002) (expressio unius principle in statutory interpretation)