OPINION
In this intеrlocutory appeal by permission, we consider the contours of the Board of Claims’ exclusive jurisdiction pertaining to procurement litigation against Commonwealth agencies. More specifically, we are asked to determine whether such jurisdiction forecloses original jurisdiction proceedings in the Commonwealth Court, challenging a Commonwealth agency’s cancellation of a request for proposals and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
I. Background
A. Relevant Statutory Provisions
The procurement of supplies, services, and construction for the public in Pennsylvania is governed by the Commonwealth Procurement Code.
The Procurement Code, as substantially rewritten via 2002 amendments,
Also of special relevance here, Section 521 of the Procurement Code allows for cancellation of solicitations by a Commonwealth agency or purchasing agent, as follows:
An invitation fоr bids, a request for proposals or other solicitation may be canceled, or any or all bids or proposals may be rejected, at any time prior to the time a contract is executed by all parties when it is in the best interests of the Commonwealth. Bids may be rejected in part when specified in the solicitation. The reasons for the cancellation or rejection shall be made part of the contract file.
62 Pa.C.S. § 521 (emphasis added). Moreover, the right of protest is expressly cab-ined so as to exclude cancellations per Section 521. See id. § 1711.1(a) (establishing a right of protest for bidders, offerors, and certain others aggrieved in connection with the solicitation or award of a contract, “except as provided in section 521 (relating to cancellation of invitations for bids or requests for proposals)”).
The 2002 amendments to the Procurement Code also reconstituted the Board of Claims,
(d) Nonmonetary relief. — Nothing in this section shall preclude a party from seeking nonmonetary relief in another forum as provided by law.
Id. § 1724(d).
B. Factual and Procedural Background
In 2010, DGS, on behalf of the Department of Revenue, issued a request for proposals for design, development, implementation, and maintenance of a computer control system to monitor slot machines at gaming venues across the Commonwealth. See 62 Pa.C.S. § 513(b).
Several months later, an agreement on contract terms was reached. Draft contract documents were exchanged between DGS and SGI, and DGS’s Office of Chief
Please confirm that all of the documents are accurate. If so, please sign the Cover Contract and mail the original to me and email a scanned version for us to enter into our contracting system to route for Commonwealth signatures. It will likely take at least 60 days [to] get all of the required Commonwealth signatures.
Petition for Preliminary Injunction, Ex. D (emphasis added). SGI returned a signature page executed by its president, along with the following observation: “As you confirmed, the Commonwealth will affix the necessary signatures electronically and send a fully executed copy back to [SGI].” Id., Ex. E.
The Commоnwealth signature and approval process proceeded at least to the stage of development where the cover contract was signed by the Secretary of the Department of Revenue, but the documents were not yet approved as to form and legality by the Offices of General Counsel and Attorney General. In terms of the effectiveness of the contract documents, a contract term was that SGI “must be granted a manufacturer’s license from the [Gaming Control] Board as a condition precedent to the commencement of this Contract.” IT Contract Terms and Conditions ¶ 1(d).
GTECH was informed that the contract had been awarded to SGI and submitted a protest in May 2011. See 62 Pa.C.S. § 1711.1(b). Two months later, DGS’s Deputy Secretary for Administration issued a final determination denying GTECH’s protest, in material part, with prejudice. See id. § 1711.1(f). GTECH appealed from the determination, see id. § 1711.1(g), and requested, among other things, that the request for proposals be cancelled.
Subsequently, SGI commenced an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Departments of Revenue and General Services in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction and petitioned for a preliminary injunction. SGI invoked the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction under Section 761(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a) (“The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings ... [ajgainst the Commonwealth government,” subject to enumerated exceptions).
In the substantive averments of the complaint, SGI advanced two counts, both entitled “Violation of 62 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 521 (Declaratory Judgment).” Complaint at 10, 13. SGI alleged that DGS and SGI had executed an enforceable contract, and, therefore, cancellation was not available under Section 521. See 62 Pa. C.S. § 521 (establishing the right of best-interests cancellation “at any time prior to the time a contract is executed by all parties”). To the extent the contract was not executed by all necessary persons, parties, or entities, SGI asserted, DGS’s cancellation was unauthorized, arbitrary, and capricious. In this regard, it was SGI’s position that the cancellation derived from a meritless and abusive protest pursued by GTECH, and that the cancellation plainly was not in the best interests of the Commonwealth in any event, given SGI’s superior and more cost-efficient proposal. The
GTECH intervened in the proceedings before the Commonwealth Court, and both it and the Commonwealth agencies involved filed preliminary objections. Among other things, these asserted that SGI’s claims sounded in contract and fell within the exclusive jurisdictiоn of the Board of Claims. According to the Commonwealth agencies and GTECH, SGI’s assertion of a statutory violation (of Section 521) was obfuseatory, in that the complaint hinged on contract execution. See, e.g., Brief of GTECH in Support of Its Preliminary Objections in Scientific Games Int’l, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue,
SGI’s response to these contentions is summarized in its responsive brief as follows:
SGI claims that DGS acted beyond its statutory authority in seeking to cancel supposedly in the best interests of the Commonwealth a Request for Proposals and contract award after the execution of the contract document and resolution of a bid protest. These claims fallsquarely within the Court’s original jurisdiction under Section 761 of the Judicial Code and the Declaratory Judgment Act....
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SGI’s claims do not sound in assumpsit. It also does not claim that the Agencies have violated any specific terms of the contract, or seek an interpretation of any contract term or provisions. Rather, ... SGI[ ] seeks to enforce rights accruing as a result of the limited authority granted under Section 521 of the Procurement Code to cancel a procurement in the best interests of the Commonwealth.
SGI’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants/Respondents’ Preliminary Objections in Scientific Games Int’l, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue,
In a published decision, a Commonwealth Court panel overruled the preliminary objections. See Scientific Games Int’l, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue,
Because Scientific Games is only seeking to validate the contract between it and DGS and is not seeking monetary damages, DGS’ and GTECH’s preliminary objection that Scientific Games’ complaint fails for failure to bring the matter before the Board of Claims pursuant to 62 Pa.C.S. § 1724(a) is overruled. Scientific Games is correct that pursuant to [the Declaratory Judgments Act,] 42 Pa.C.S. § 7532, “[c]ourts of record, within their respective jurisdictions, shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” Consequently, this Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 62 Pa.C.S. § 1724(d) and the Declaratory Judgments Act.
Id.
The Commonwealth Court panel recognized that the Procurement Code provides a procedure for those who have attained
The panel also acknowledged that SGI’s complaint, in effect, sought specific performance of the аsserted contract with the Commonwealth, see id. at 308, and that this Court has long held that specific performance generally is not available as a remedy against the Commonwealth government. See, e.g., XPress Truck Lines, Inc. v. PLCB,
because the Board of Claims Act ... has been repealed and, among other things, the General Assembly in Section 1724(d) of the Procurement Code allowed a party to bring an action involving a state contract seeking relief for non-monetary claims, which would necessarily include specific performance. Of course, courts have discretion whether to grant specific performance of the contract.
Scientific Games,
Reargument was requested, which the Commonwealth Court refused; however, per Appellants’ request, the panel ultimately certified its order for interlocutory appeal. This Court granted Appellants’ petitions for permission to appeal centеred on the jurisdictional question, while allowing the Board of Claims to file an amicus brief, which it has done.
C. Arguments
In the briefing, Appellants maintain that the longstanding decisional law interpreting the Board of Claims Act (for example, the Shovel Transfer and XPress Truck opinions) pertains equally to the Procurement Code, and that, under such caselaw, the parties’ factual dispute as to the existence of a contract belongs exclusively before the Board of Claims. Appellants observe that Section 1724(a)(1) of the Procurement Code is “substantively identical” with the core jurisdictional prescription of the former Board of Claims Act, and that this Court has continued to recognize the Board of Claims’ “expansive jurisdiction to decide disputes concerning contracts involving the Commonwealth” in cases decided post-amendment. Empr’s Ins. of Wausau v. PennDOT,
It is Appellants’ position that Section 1724(d) changed nothing in this regard, but rather, merely protected the status quo relative to express and specific statutory remedies and procedures “as provided by law.” 62 Pa.C.S. § 1724(d). In the absence of an express and specific provision, Appellants contend that Section 1724(d) simply does not apply. Accord New Foundations,
Appellants explain that the requirement of an express and specific provision conferring jurisdiction is consonant with the Legislature’s clear desire for sovereign immunity to apply in the Procurement Code setting, except as otherwise specifically provided. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310; 62 Pa.C.S. § 1702. In this regard, Appellants elaborate extensively on the interrelationship between sovereign immunity and attendant constraints on Commonwealth Court jurisdiction. Accord XPress Truck,
In terms of Section 521, Appellants maintain that it confers no rights whatsoever upon offerors such as SGI but, rather, merely permits the Commonwealth to cancel procurements. Indeed, Appellants note, the Procurement Code expressly removes from the protest procedure any right to challenge the cancellation of requests for proposals. See 62 Pa.C.S. § 1711.1(a). Appellants regard SGI’s equity action as, essentially, an effort to make an end run around such express legislative intentions.
In its brief, SGI adopts the Commonwealth Court panel’s position that jurisdiction was proper under Section 1724(d). See, e.g., Brief for SGI at 16 (“On its face, Section 1724(d) preserves parties’ ability to invoke any grants of jurisdiction to any other tribunal that would extend to contract actions against Commonwealth agencies for nonmonetary relief.”). In terms of thе general grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Board of Claims contained in Section 1724(a), SGI draws a distinction between “claims” and “issues,” positing that exclusive jurisdiction attaches to the former but not the latter. See id. (“By its express terms, Section 1724(a) confers jurisdiction upon the Board of Claims with respect to ‘claims,’ not issues.”). While recognizing that the Board of Claims’ exclusive jurisdiction attaches to “claims arising from” contracts with Commonwealth agencies, SGI contends that such jurisdiction does not necessarily attach where a litigant merely raises “an issue as to a Commonwealth agency contract.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this regard, SGI relies on the following statement from Keenheel v. Commonwealth,
In the instant action, to the extent any issue is raised as to whether the contract was executed, it is subsidiary to the primary issue of whether DGS exceeded its statutory authority. SGI argues that [the Commonwealth agencies] exceeded their authority under Section 521 because they attempted to cancel after execution of the contract. This argument raises an issue of what constitutes ‘execution’ as that term is utilized in Section 521, not under traditional common contract formation principles.
Brief for SGI at 21; accord id. at 15 (“To the extent any contract issues are presented, they are subsidiary to the primary issue of whether the Agencies exceeded their statutory authority and may be addressed by the Commonwealth Court ancillary to its jurisdiction over the claims asserted.”).
It is SGI’s position that the resolution of “these statutory issues” falls squarely within the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction under Section 761(a) of the Judicial Code and the Declaratory Judgments Act. Id. at 19. Indeed, SGI contends, “[r]esponsibility for assuring that procurements proceed in accordance with law is vested in the Commonwealth Court
SGI’s brief proceeds to an examination of the specific terms of Section 1724(d), which it describes as “broadly and generically phrased” and as lacking in words of exclusion. Brief for SGI at 23-24. SGI reasons that such features convey that the Legislature meant the provision to be interpreted very broadly, to encompass all jurisdictional grants in other tribunals relative to nonmonetary relief, whether they may be specific, express, general, or indirect. See id. at 23. In this regard, SGI highlights that Section 1724(d) does not contain the words “expressly” or “specifically,” and it challenges Appellants’ approach as an inappropriate attempt to superimpose such terms upon the statute. Id. at 26.
In terms of sovereign immunity, SGI regards the doctrine as irrelevant, since the General Assembly providеd an exception, in Section 1702(b) of the Procurement Code, for “claims against Commonwealth agencies brought in accordance with ... Subchapter C (relating to Board of Claims).” 62 Pa.C.S. § 1702(b) (footnote omitted). In this regard, SGI highlights that Section 1724(d)’s reservation of jurisdiction in other tribunals relative to non-monetary relief falls within subchapter C. Alternatively, SGI notes that sovereign immunity generally has been applied to foreclose the award of mandatory, but not prohibitive, injunctions. See, e.g., Fawber v. Cohen,
In its amicus brief, the Board of Claims does not squarely take a position on the jurisdictional question presently before us. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Board of Claims at 8 (“[T]he Commonwealth Court may arguably issue some type of declaratory judgment (e.g. a declaration of the existence of a contract or some other relationship among the parties) and may even be able to enjoin performance of such con-tráete.]”). Rather, the Board of Claims asks for a broad-based holding that the Procurement Code preserved “200 plus years of history, public policy and case law surrounding Commonwealth contract claims,” and did not alter or diminish the Board of Claims’ jurisdiction, except as explicitly enumerated in “two minor areas (i.e. by eliminating Board jurisdiction over medical assistance claims and allowing for nonmonetary relief, excluding specific performance, on state contract claims before the Commonwealth Court).” Id. at 1 (citing 62 Pa.C.S. § 1724(e), (d)). In terms of its main request, the Board of Claims centers a substantial portion of its presentation on the question of whether the amendments to the Procurement Code reconstituting the tribunal narrowed its jurisdiction only to claims for breaches of procurement contracts. See generally
II. Discussion
As noted, we are presented with issues of statutory construction, as to which our task is to determine the intent of the Legislature. The language of the statute at issue (here, the Procurement Code) is the primary guide. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a), (b). Where ambiguities exist, we may resort to principles of construction, including, among other considerations, evaluation of the occasion and necessity for the statute under review, the object to be attained, and the consequences of the particular interpretation. See id. § 1921(c)(1), (4), (6).
A. Sovereign Immunity and Section 1724(d)
We begin with the doctrine of sovereign immunity, because we agree with Appellants that it plays an important role under the Procurement Code, which is designedly structured to accord immunity, subject only to specific and limited exceptions. See 62 Pa.C.S. § 1702.
One core subcomponent of SGI’s argument is that, because Section 1724(d) resides in Subchapter C of the Procurement Code, claims brought in accordance with Section 1724(d) are also claims brought “in accordance with ... Subchap-ter C.” Id. § 1702(b). Thus, the argument follows, such claims are subject to the salient Section 1702(b) waiver of sovereign immunity. One main difficulty with this position, however, is that Section 1724(d) does not itself establish any substantive or jurisdictional basis for a claim. Rather, Section 1724(d) only recognizes that other provisions of law may do so and preserves the independent effect of these other statutes. Along these lines, and at least in the absence of some other words evincing a wider application, a prescription commencing with the phrase “[njothing in this section shall preclude” — e.g., Section 1724(d) — cannot be read to establish a basis for judicial review or relief broader than that which is contained in the provisions of law which are to be left un-pre-cluded (here, those provisions of law which may independently -sanction claims for relief against the sovereign). From this, and since Section 1724(d) also does not itself contain any waiver of sovereign immunity, it follows that such a waiver must be found in (or specifiсally be associated with) the other, un-precluded provisions of law.
Furthermore, by its own terms, section 1724(d) only operates as a constraint on the effect of “this section,” ie., Section 1724, and, therefore, has no effect on the scope of sovereign immunity as reaffirmed in a different section of the Procurement Code, i.e., Section 1702. Indeed, consistent with the above, in fashioning the immunity waiver associated with Subchapter C, the General Assembly characterized such subchapter as “relating to Board of Claims.” 62 Pa.C.S. § 1702(b). This is entirely consonant with the understanding that the legislative purpose was to implement such waiver relative to denominated proceedings in the Board of Claims, not other tribunals. See generally XPress Truck,
The constitutionally-grounded, statutory doctrine of sovereign immunity obviously serves to protect government policymaking prerogatives and the public fisc.
We recognize that some decisions of this Court may suggest that immunity is not squarely a jurisdictional matter. See, e.g., James J. Gory Mechanical Contracting, Inc. v. PHA,
While more general clarification of the relationship between sovereign immunity and jurisdiction may be appropriate in the arena at large, for present purposes, we regard sovereign immunity as a jurisdictional concern vis-á-vis the Procurement Code. Our understanding, in this regard, is premised on the enactment’s self-contained reaffirmation of sovereign immunity, see 62 Pa.C.S. § 1702(a), and its explicit, limited waiver of such immunity (among other specified and limited waivers) in connection with a coordinate allocation of “exclusive jurisdiction” to the Board of Claims over claims arising from certain contracts entered into by a Commonwealth agency, see id. §§ 1702(b), 1724(a)(1). In this respect, we agree with Appellants that — as a matter of jurisdiction — if the General Assembly has not specifically provided by statute for such nonmonetary relief in a claim arising from a contract entered into by a Commonwealth agency under the Procurement Code, then either the claim is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board of Claims or it is barred by sovereign immunity.
Basеd on the above, we conclude that the Commonwealth Court erred in interpreting Section 1724(d) so broadly as to sanction original jurisdiction actions in a judicial tribunal over nonmonetary claims against the Commonwealth. To the contrary, nonmonetary claims against the Commonwealth are cognizable only to the extent they fall within some “specific[]” waiver or exception to immunity. 1 Pa. C.S. § 2310. As explained, no such waiver or exception is found in Section 1724(d) of the Procurement Code, and neither the Commonwealth Court nor SGI has identified any other salient and specific waiver provision within which to bring SGI’s claims.
B. Prohibitive Injunctions and the Role of Equity
As noted, SGI argues, in the alternative, that prohibitive injunctions function as an exception to sovereign immunity. See Fawber,
While SGI references the general axiom that equity will fashion a remedy where there otherwise may be none, this principle is not universally applicable in the statutory realm, particularly if it can be determined that the Legislature intend
C. Section 521 and Statutory Versus Contract Claims
Turning to SGI’s argument that it is pursuing a statutory violation per Section 521 rather than a contract claim, we find as follows. The Legislature has deliberately excluded Section 521 cancellations from the scope of the right of protest. See 62 Pa.C.S. § 1711.1(a) (prescribing that bidders, offerors, and certain others “aggrieved in connection with the solicitation or .award of a contract, except as provided in section 521 (relating to cancellation of invitations for bids or requests for proposals), may protest to the head of the purchasing agency in writing” (emphasis added)). Neither the Commonwealth Court panel nor SGI has offered a persuasive reason why the Legislature would have wished to foreclose protests to cancellations (which would be subject to the Commonwealth Court’s appellate review, see id. § 1711.1(g)), while simultaneously sanctioning original jurisdiction actions in the Commonwealth Court to challenge such cancellations. It is far more plausible, in our view, and consistent with the statutory scheme, that the General Assembly wished to rely on the immunity reaffirmed in the Procurement Code to foreclose these challenges altogether. This approach avoids protracted litigation relative to abandonment of, or re-solicitation for, a public project, when the cancellation is believed by a Commonwealth agency to be in the best interests of the citizenry. See 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(c)(1), (4), (6) (authorizing consideration of the occasion for and object of the statute and consequences of its inter
If a contract between the Department of Revenue and SGI was consummated, the Procurement Code also establishes a remedial avenue through a claim process, subject to review in the Board of Claims. See 62 Pa.C.S. § 1712.1. SGI’s arguments appear to suggest that there may be some narrow margin between “execution” of a contract, for purposes of Section 521, and attainment of “contractor” status, for purposes of Section 1712.1, and that those with claims falling within that category may invoke the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction for redress. In line with our analysis above, we conclude that the Legislature intended the protest, claims, and review procedures it prescribed to be the exclusive avenues available to those aggrieved in procurement controversies by a Commonwealth agency.
The Procurement Code establishes administrative processes to address disputes arising in the procurement setting. On account of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, however, contractors, bidders, and of-ferors have limited recourse and remedies. Relative to controversies in matters arising from procurement contracts with Commonwealth agencies, the Board of Claims retains exclusive jurisdiction (subject to all jurisdiсtional prerequisites), which is not to be supplanted by a court of law through an exercise of original jurisdiction.
As to challenges to cancellations of solicitations asserted under Section 521 of the Procurement Code, the Legislature did not implement any waiver of sovereign immunity and afforded no remedy to aggrieved bidders and offerors which have not yet entered into an executed contract with a Commonwealth agency. For those attaining the status of contractor — which we find should be deemed to occur at the time a contract is executed by all parties (as that event is also understood for purposes of Section 521) — the remedial procedure is via Section 1712.1, subject to review within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board of Claims. Our holding in this case is limited to the Procurement Code arena, in which the scenario before us has arisen.
The order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for dismissal, consistent with this opinion.
Justice ORIE MELVIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Chief Justice CASTILLE, Justice EAKIN and BAER, Justice TODD and Justice McCAFFERY join the opinion.
Notes
. Act of May 15, 1998, P.L. 358, No. 57 § 1 (as amended, 62 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-2311).
. See Act of Dec. 3, 2002, P.L. 1147, No. 142.
.The authorization for the Genеral Assembly to provide for sovereign immunity has been derived from Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Pa. Const, art. I, § 11 (“Suits' may be brought against the Com
. See Act of Dec. 3, 2002, P.L. 1147, No. 142 (inter alia, adding 62 Pa.C.S. §§ 1721-1726, to replace the former Board of Claims Act).
. Under the Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act, 4 Pa.C.S. §§ 1101-1904 (the "Gaming Act”), the Department of Revenue is the Commonwealth agency charged with the responsibility for controlling and monitoring gaming operations. See 4 Pa.C.S. § 1323(a).
. Per the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, 73 P.S. §§ 2260.101-2260.503, "[i]f a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law.” 73 P.S. § 2260.303(d). Notably, however, unless otherwise provided by law, the effect of an electronic signature is determined by the context and surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation, execution or adoption. Id. § 2260.305(b).
While issues concerning the effect of the notation "[Signature Affixed Electronically]” have limited bearing on the jurisdictional matter presented here, the circumstances related in the text of our opinion below certainly appear to havе bearing on various collateral suggestions by SGI that the notation should be taken as evincing execution of the contract on behalf of the Commonwealth. Compare Brief for SGI at 9, 10, 33-34 ("It cannot reasonably be disputed that 'signature affixed electronically' was typed into every signature line of the written agreement when it was delivered to SGI and that this had the same force and effect as hand-signing the document under the Electronic Signatures Act.”), with infra.
. Per the Gaming Act, a person seeking to manufacture equipment associated with slot machines must obtain a manufacturer’s license from the Gaming Control Board. See 4 Pa.C.S. § 1317.1(a). It is undisputed that, at all relevant times, SGI did not possess such a license.
. Parenthetically, reasons identified by DGS for the cancellation were memorialized in a memorandum to the contract file. The document indicated that DGS had determined that certain requirements and evaluation criteria were not clearly described in the solicitation documents, and the Commonwealth wished to reevaluate the most appropriate method of procurement for the project. SGI, however, maintains that the cancellation actually was based on an inapprоpriate reevaluation of GTECH’s protest. See, e.g., Brief for SGI at 12.
. Upon such cancellation, GTECH discontinued its appeal without prejudice.
. One of the specified exceptions pertains to "actions or proceedings conducted pursuant to the act of May 20, 1937 (P.L. 728, No. 193), referred to as the Board of Claims Act.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 761 (a)( 1 )(iv) (footnote omitted). The Board of Claims Act, however, has been repealed and replaced by the salient provisions of the Procurement Code. See Act of December 3, 2002, P.L. 1147, No. 142, § 21.
Notably, however, this Court has held that Section 761(a) did not "repeal, modify, or supplant the jurisdiction” of the Board of Claims. Ezy Parks v. Larson,
. See also Shovel Transfer,
. Separately, however, the court denied the petition for a preliminary injunction via a single judge order. That decision was affirmed by this Court on later appeal. See Scientific Games Int’l, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, - Pa. -,
. In April 2012, SGI also filed a claim with the Board of Claims seeking both monetary and nonmonetary relief, which has been stayed, apparently pending this decision. See Order of May 29, 2012 in Scientific Games Int'l, Inc. v. DGS, No. 4036 (Bd.Claims).
. As one example, the Department of Revenue and DGS cite the statutory allocation of jurisdiction to the Board of Property to "hear and determine cases involving the title to land or interest therein brought by persons who claim an interest in the title to lands occupied or claimed by the Commonwealth.” 71 P.S. § 337.
. GTECH also complains, correctly, that the Commonwealth Court discussed only the review standard applicable to a demurrer; whereas, several of Appellants’ preliminary objections were couched in other terms. See, e.g., Brief for GTECH at 11-12. The panel's misapplication in this regard, however, has
. As the present matter does involve a procurement dispute, however, we are unable to accede to the Board of Claims’ request to broadly settle the jurisdictional landscape. See, e.g., Oliver v. City of Pittsburgh,
. Notably, in Shovel Transfer, this Court unequivocally indicated that "at common law sovereign immunity barred a claimant from asserting a claim against the Cоmmonwealth based upon contract[.]" Shovel Transfer,
As an aside, in his dissent in Hanover Insurance, then-Judge (now President Judge) Pelle-grini cited our decision in Meyer v. Community College of Beaver County,
. We acknowledge SGI's objection to the "insertion” of a specificity requirement into the jurisdictional analysis. On the subject of sovereign immunity, however, the Legislature has mеmorialized its intent for waivers to arise only from specific statutory language. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310 (reaffirming sovereign immunity "except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity” (emphasis added)).
We also recognize SGI’s position that waivers and/or jurisdictional allocations implicated by Section 1724(d) may be scarce or even nonexistent among the Laws of Pennsylvania, thus suggesting that Section 1724 was meant to be read more broadly. In this regard, however, we have recognized that "in the process of legislative drafting, the General Assembly is faced with a complex landscape of existing statutes, many of which are amenable to differing interpretations by litigants and have yet to be finally interpreted or construed by the courts.” Germantown Cab Co. v. PPA,
. In this regard, nothing in SGI's arguments persuades us that the core teachings of Shovel Transfer and XPress Truck have been overturned by the Procurement Code, at least as applied in the govеrnment procurement setting.
. SGI highlights, correctly, that New Foundations is a single judge opinion, which, under the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, does not serve as binding precedent. See IOPs of the Commonwealth Court § 414. The Internal Operating Procedures also recognize that the reasoning in a single judge opinion may have persuasive force, see id., which we find to be the case here.
. The present immunity scheme is based entirely on the constitutional and statutory law, since this Court has deemed the common-law justifications for sovereign immunity to be invalid. See Mayle v. Pa. Dep't of Highways,
.Accord Gregory C. Sisk, The Continuing Drift of Federal Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, 50 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 517, 562 (2008) (‘‘[Wjhen civil litigation is an appropriate response to harms caused by governmental activities, which claims are suited for the judicial venue rather than being redressed by legislation or administrative procedures, what types and theories of liability that should be recognized in suits alleging governmental wrongs, and which forms of relief that may be imposed against the government as an entity, are all questions that go to the very core of the concept of sovereign immunity and its grounding in constitutional separation of powers.”).
. See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer,
. Some of the confusion in the sovereign immunity arena may arise from attempts to conceptualize the relevant considerations as ones of subject matter jurisdiction. While this may be most consistent with the precept that the bar is non-waivable by Commonwealth agencies, see Tulewicz v. SEPTA,
. Along these lines, and again in the Procurement Code setting, we find that this enactment has changed nothing to alter the force of the Commonwealth's Court's apt explanation in Tri-State Asphalt, as follows:
Th[e] jurisdictional limitation on the power of courts to interfere under the guise of equitable relief in contract disputes with respect to which our General Assembly has vested exclusive jurisdiction in the Board of Claims is a corollary to the principle that contracts with the Commonwealth generally are not subject to specific performance. ... It also follows from the fact that, as recognized by the Supreme Court, the General Assembly amended the statute governing jurisdiction of the Board of Claims by inserting the word "exclusive” in order to avoid any implication that [the] Commonwealth Court could have jurisdiction over contract actions against the Commonwealth.
Tri-State Asphalt,
. See, e.g., Schrier v. Univ. of Colo.,
. In this regard, as well, we agree with Appellants that the Commonwealth Court panel's and SGI’s references to the Declaratory Judgments Act are unhelpful, since this enactment prescribes that "[r]elief shall not be available under this subchapter with respect to any ... [proceeding within the exclusive jurisdiction of a tribunal other than a court.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 7541(c).
. The panel based its conclusion on its determination that Section 1724(d) sanctioned such actions. See Scientific Games, 34 A.3d at 315. As we have explained, however, Section 1724(d) has the far more modest effect of sanctioning claims against the sovereign which are otherwise specifically provided for by the Legislature. See supra Part II.A. Neither the panel nor SGI has identified any relevant, specific provision of law sanctioning an action for specific performance of an asserted procurement contract against the Commonwealth. Finally, nothing in the Commonwealth Court panel opinion suggests that the Procurement Code otherwise has jettisoned the understanding, reflected in XPress Truck and elsewhere, that "specific performance generally is not an appropriate remedy for breach of contract by a public body.” XPress Truck,
. Again, it is not our task to evaluate the wisdom of the Legislature’s decision to immunize cancellation decisions from challenge, nor do we lend our approval to the cancellation of the solicitation (and/or disavowal of a contract) in the present factual scenario. In this regard, there is no doubt that SGI expended substantial time and resources to progress through the presentation of its proposal, through the contract award, and at least to the point of a full agreement as to the terms and conditions of the contract. Even to the extent it is authorized under Section 521 (that is, assuming contract execution did not occur), cancellation in the circumstances is obviously troublesome. Indeed, in another cancellation scenario, this author and Messrs. Justices Nigro and Baer favored the affor-dance of a remedy on a different theory than has been pursued in the present appeal. See DGS v. On-Point Tech. Sys., Inc.,
Above, we conclude only that the design of the Procurement Code evidences the legislative intent to immunize cancellation decisions within the scope of Section 521.
. Nоtably, this Court was not considering a Section 521 issue when it indicated in Keen-heel that "the jurisdictional predicate [pertaining to the Board of Claims] is satisfied only when the claimant relies upon the provisions of [a] contract in asserting the claim against the Commonwealth.” Keenheel,
.Similarly, nothing contained in SGI’s arguments distinguishing "claims" versus "issues” persuades us that the Legislature intended to open an avenue for bidders,
With regard to SGI’s invocation of taxpayer status, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity to permit either SGI or any other taxpayer to challenge a Section 521 cancellation on the terms SGI has advanced. SGI is not suing a state official to restrain a constitutional violation, as in the Fawber case which it cites. See Fawber,
Finally, there is no issue before us concerning a Commonwealth agency’s failure to abide by the remedial procedures, such as was the case in GTECH Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue,