90 F.4th 34
2d Cir.2023Background
- From 2017 to early 2020, two transgender female athletes (Yearwood and Miller) competed in Connecticut high school girls’ track events under rules permitting students to compete according to their gender identity.
- Four non-transgender female athletes (Soule, Mitchell, Smith, Nicoletti) sued, seeking to bar transgender girls from competing, correct past meet records by removing the transgender athletes' results, and recover monetary damages under Title IX.
- The COVID-19 pandemic mooted the request for forward-looking injunctive relief (future competitions were cancelled and all plaintiffs graduated before the case was heard).
- The plaintiffs’ request narrowed to changing athletic records and nominal/compensatory damages, which the district court dismissed for lack of standing and on Pennhurst notice grounds.
- The majority reversed and remanded, finding standing for some record-correction relief and disagreed with the district court’s sequencing of the Pennhurst notice issue; this is a dissent arguing the district court’s approach and findings should be upheld.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held (in this dissent) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing for Injunctive Relief to Correct Records | Record correction would remedy ongoing harm (loss of recognition, resume impact). | Such relief is speculative, remote, or purely for psychic satisfaction; not redressable. | No standing because redress is too speculative or merely emotional. |
| Redressability of Injunction for Past Injury | Plaintiffs need public recognition for past accomplishments; public records matter. | Correction would not change the past, affect future opportunities, or redress injury; only damages could. | No redressability—psychic relief is insufficient. |
| Damages under Title IX and Pennhurst Notice Requirement | Damages allowed for intentional discrimination (policy is intentional, so notice not required). | No clear federal notice such policy violated Title IX; liability not clear or intended. | Damages barred: CIAC had no notice its policy violated Title IX. |
| District Court Sequence (Merits vs Pennhurst first) | Court erroneously prioritized Pennhurst before merits. | ||
| Court had discretion to address clear, dispositive Pennhurst issue first. | District court's sequence was discretionary, not reversible error. |
Key Cases Cited
- Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (Congress must provide unambiguous notice to states for Spending Clause conditions)
- Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (standing requires actual, non-psychic redressability for injunctive relief)
- Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (Title IX damages liability requires intentional conduct and clear notice)
- Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (damages under Title IX permitted for deliberate indifference to known harassment, given notice)
- Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (intentional actionable discrimination under Title IX permits damages)
- Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (damages under Title IX for retaliation where notice is sufficient)