Sontos Diaz-Reynoso v. William Barr
968 F.3d 1070
| 9th Cir. | 2020Background
- Petitioner Sontos Maudilia Diaz‑Reynoso, a Mam indigenous woman from rural Guatemala, suffered longstanding physical and sexual abuse by a common‑law husband and fled to the U.S.; she applied for withholding of removal (on account of membership in a particular social group) and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
- At the Immigration Judge (IJ) level she was found credible but relief was denied; the BIA rejected her proposed group—"indigenous women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship"—as not cognizable, citing Matter of A‑B‑ and a supposed circularity problem, and denied CAT on acquiescence grounds.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo the BIA’s legal determinations and under the Chevron framework considered whether Matter of A‑B‑ is entitled to deference and whether the BIA applied it correctly.
- The panel held Matter of A‑B‑ is a permissible agency interpretation entitled to Chevron deference and does not announce a categorical bar to domestic‑violence‑based claims, but it reaffirmed the requirement of a rigorous, case‑by‑case social‑group analysis.
- The court concluded the BIA misread Matter of A‑B‑ by treating any mention of feared harm as per se circular and by assuming petitioner’s inability to leave was solely due to domestic violence without conducting the required detailed analysis; it remanded the withholding claim.
- The court also remanded the CAT claim because the BIA failed to address evidence that petitioner reported abuse to local authorities (and the government conceded remand was warranted).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Matter of A‑B‑ is arbitrary/capricious and entitled to Chevron deference | A‑B‑ is arbitrary, effectively announces a categorical ban on domestic‑violence‑based withholding | A‑B‑ reasonably reiterates and enforces BIA precedent; requires rigorous case‑by‑case analysis | A‑B‑ is reasonable and entitled to Chevron; not a categorical ban |
| Whether the BIA misapplied Matter of A‑B‑ by treating any mention of harm as per se circular | Mentioning feared harm in group definition does not automatically render a group circular; group should be evaluated case‑by‑case | A group that incorporates harm is not independent of the harm and is circular | BIA misread A‑B‑: mentioning harm is not a per se disqualifier; remand for proper analysis |
| Whether petitioner’s proffered group is necessarily defined only by persecution (i.e., whether inability to leave = only domestic violence) | "Unable to leave" can reflect economic, cultural, geographic, or other factors in addition to abuse; petitioner presented such evidence | The group’s "unable to leave" element is effectively defined by abuse and therefore circular | BIA wrongly assumed domestic violence was the sole reason; remand to analyze the factual record and group cognizability |
| Whether the BIA properly assessed CAT (governmental acquiescence) | Petitioner reported abuse to local authorities who failed to act—supports acquiescence | BIA concluded acquiescence not shown | Remanded: BIA failed to address evidence of reports to local officials; government conceded remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes are entitled to deference if reasonable)
- INS v. Aguirre‑Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (withholding of removal is mandatory if persecution is more likely than not)
- Henriquez‑Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. en banc) (term "particular social group" is ambiguous; agency interpretation receives Chevron deference)
- Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 2005) (a group must share a narrowing characteristic other than the risk of persecution)
- Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. en banc) (persecutory conduct alone cannot define a particular social group)
- Donchev v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2009) (example that ethnicity can constitute a cognizable social group)
- Barajas‑Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351 (9th Cir. 2017) (defining public‑official acquiescence for CAT claims)
- Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2018) (agency must consider all relevant evidence in CAT proceedings)