Sonntag v. Stewart
53 N.E.3d 46
Ill. App. Ct.2015Background
- Glenn L. Sonntag, a certified shorthand reporter since 1978, pled guilty in 2007 to three counts of possession of child pornography stemming from a 2004 search; he received 24 months’ probation, fines, counseling, and sex-offender registration and completed probation in 2009.
- The Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation filed an administrative complaint in 2010 alleging Sonntag was no longer of good moral character under the Illinois Certified Shorthand Reporters Act, and an ALJ recommended license revocation after a 2011 hearing.
- The Board adopted the ALJ’s recommendation and the Department revoked Sonntag’s license in 2012; Sonntag obtained a stay from the trial court (relying on Kafin) and sought administrative review.
- On remand from the trial court, the Department imposed an indefinite suspension with a two-year minimum before petitioning for reinstatement; the trial court later reversed that sanction as overly harsh and reinstated Sonntag’s license.
- The Appellate Court reviewed whether the Department abused its discretion in revoking the license and reversed the trial court, reinstating the Department’s original revocation as not an abuse of discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Department abused its discretion by revoking Sonntag’s license for his felony conviction | Revocation is unduly harsh given long, unblemished career, completion of sentence, rehabilitation, passage of time, and character testimony | Revocation is permissible for felony convictions under the Reporters Act; offense is serious, repeated over years, and revocation protects public confidence | Department did not abuse its discretion; revocation reinstated |
| Whether the sanction was unrelated to statute’s purposes | Sonntag: possession of child pornography unrelated to reporter competency; sanction fails to promote efficiency, proficiency, competency | Department: statute authorizes sanctions for felonies regardless of relation to practice and protecting public confidence is a statutory purpose | Sanction relates to purposes (public confidence, integrity); revocation permissible |
| Whether Kafin controls and required a lesser sanction | Sonntag: Kafin (medical-license context) shows revocation is overly harsh and trial court remand was proper | Department: Kafin not controlling; different statutory scheme and high deference owed to agency sanction decisions | Kafin did not require reversal; agency’s sanction reviewed for abuse of discretion and was upheld |
| Whether delay between conviction and discipline renders sanction abusive | Sonntag: lengthy delay (about 8 years) and continued practice made revocation unfair | Department: delay unfortunate but does not make sanction an abuse of discretion given seriousness of offense | Delay noted and troubling but insufficient to find abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill.2d 76 (1992) (courts defer to agency expertise in sanction decisions)
- Kouzoukas v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, 234 Ill.2d 446 (2009) ("clearly erroneous" standard and when reviewing courts may overturn agency fact-findings)
- Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (defines mixed question of fact and law standard)
- Bultas v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners of the City of Berwyn, 171 Ill. App.3d 189 (1988) (courts should not reweigh evidence or substitute their judgment for administrative sanctions)
- Yeksigian v. City of Chicago, 231 Ill. App.3d 307 (1992) (an administrative decision is not arbitrary merely because a court might prefer a different sanction)
- County of Cook v. Illinois Local Labor Relations Board, 302 Ill. App.3d 682 (1998) (agency findings of cause merit deference)
- Ranquist v. Stackler, 55 Ill. App.3d 545 (1977) (licensing aims to protect public by excluding those unworthy of trust)
- In re Cohen, 100 A.3d 529 (N.J. 2014) (professional discipline for possession of child pornography can include lengthy suspension)
- In re Grant, 317 P.3d 612 (Cal. 2014) (disbarment appropriate where professional continuation would undermine public confidence)