Sonja Pennell v. Global Trust Management, LLC
990 F.3d 1041
| 7th Cir. | 2021Background
- Pennell defaulted on a loan from MobiLoans; she sent MobiLoans a letter refusing to pay and stating she was represented by counsel and requesting that communications cease.
- MobiLoans sold Pennell's debt to Global Trust, which did not have actual knowledge of Pennell's counsel or her cease-communications request when it purchased the account.
- Global Trust sent a dunning letter to Pennell; Pennell's counsel then notified Global Trust in writing that she refused to pay and demanded that communications stop; Global Trust complied and took no further action.
- Pennell sued under the FDCPA, alleging violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) and § 1692c(c), claiming "stress and confusion" as her injuries.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Global Trust, reasoning Global Trust lacked actual knowledge; the court denied reconsideration.
- On appeal the Seventh Circuit addressed Article III standing, concluded Pennell alleged only nonactionable stress/confusion, rejected a new privacy theory raised on appeal, vacated the judgment, and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Pennell have Article III standing (injury-in-fact) for FDCPA claims? | Stress and confusion from the dunning letter constituted concrete injury. | Mere stress/confusion and a statutory violation without harm are insufficient; no concrete injury. | No standing; alleged stress/confusion is not a concrete injury. |
| Does a bare statutory FDCPA violation establish concreteness? | The statutory violation itself vindicates Congress's interest and suffices. | Under Spokeo and Casillas, a procedural violation alone is insufficient without harm or appreciable risk. | Statutory violation alone is insufficient; must allege harm or risk to the concrete interest Congress sought to protect. |
| May Pennell assert an invasion-of-privacy injury raised for the first time in supplemental briefing? | Pennell invoked invasion-of-privacy by analogy to unwanted communications cases (e.g., Gadelhak). | Too late and not pleaded; standing is measured by the complaint's allegations. | Court refused to consider the new theory; plaintiff cannot broaden the complaint on appeal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (clarifies that a statutory violation does not automatically satisfy concreteness; requires concrete injury)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (establishes injury-in-fact, traceability, redressability requirements for Article III standing)
- Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (injury-in-fact is the foremost standing requirement)
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167 (explains particularized and concrete injury requirements)
- Casillas v. Madison Ave. Associates, Inc., 926 F.3d 329 (Seventh Circuit: FDCPA plaintiff must allege harm or appreciable risk of harm beyond a bare procedural error)
- Brunett v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 982 F.3d 1067 (clarifies that confusion alone is not an Article III injury absent detrimental action)
- Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., 984 F.3d 1241 (standing is decided from the face of the complaint; plaintiffs cannot expand injuries on appeal)
- Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, Inc., 950 F.3d 458 (discusses privacy interests and unwanted communications in TCPA context; relied on by plaintiff but not adopted here)
- Bazile v. Financial Systems of Green Bay, Inc., 983 F.3d 274 (reiterates that an FDCPA plaintiff must show personal harm to establish standing)