Solomon v. Falcone
791 F. Supp. 2d 184
D.D.C.2011Background
- Solomon, a 64-year-old DC resident, refinanced her mortgage in 2007 after allegedly being promised a 3% rate with lower payments and other benefits.
- Falcone allegedly misrepresented terms and failed to provide two copies of the right-to-cancel notice; World Savings Bank, Wachovia, and Wells Fargo were connected through transfer/merger history.
- Solomon executed loan documents with World Savings Bank; World Savings Bank later merged with Wachovia, which was then acquired by Wells Fargo.
- Solomon discovered the Pick-A-Payment loan carried an 8.1% fixed rate, not the promised 3%, and later received a smaller settlement check than promised.
- Solomon attempted to rescind within the three-day window but could not reach Falcone; she later refinanced with a different lender, ending involvement with the original defendants.
- This action against Wells Fargo and Wachovia, as loan assignees, seeks CPPA and TILA relief and related state-law claims; other counts against Falcone/Settlement Solutions were dismissed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| TILA statute of limitations for statutory damages | Solomon's statutory damages claim not timely. | Statutory damages time-barred since settlement November 2007; suit filed 2009. | Statutory damages claim time-barred. |
| TILA rescission timeliness | Rescission claim timely under 3-year/solicit date. | Rescission limitations should apply; date-derived. | Rescission claim timely and not time-barred. |
| Rescission against former assignees | Assignees may be liable for rescission. | Only current owners/holders liable. | Former assignees may be sued for rescission under TILA. |
| CPPA claims viability | Defendants engaged in unconscionable/misleading practices in refinancing. | Arguments are insufficient or misconceived; CPA defenses apply. | Counts I–II survive to plead CPPA violations at this stage. |
| Common law unconscionability | Unconscionability supports rescission/sanctions. | Unconscionability is a defensive tool, not a remedy here. | Common law unconscionability claim dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court 2009) (plausibility standard for pleading claims)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court 2007) (two-pronged standard for pleading plausibility)
- Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2002) (limits on evidence considered at Rule 12(b)(6) stage)
- Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (integral-to-complaint documents in motion-to-dismiss)
- Pena v. A. Anderson Scott Mortgage Group, 692 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D.D.C. 2010) (limitations period for TILA claims under 1640(e))
- Miranda v. Universal Fin. Group, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 760 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (TILA right of rescission against former assignees)
- Blue v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 562 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008) (CPPA interpretations in mortgage transactions)
- Williams v. First Gov't Mortg. & Investors Corp., 225 F.3d 738 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (CPPA and mortgage-related protections)
- Modern Mgmt. Co. v. Wilson, 997 A.2d 37 (D.C. 2010) (broad CPPA reading of consumer protection)