Sofonias Verdugo-Morales v. Jefferson B. Sessions, III
17-3150
| 6th Cir. | Jan 5, 2018Background
- Verdugo-Morales entered the U.S. without inspection in January 2001 and pleaded guilty the same year to a California misdemeanor (Cal. Penal Code §273.5(a)) for inflicting corporal injury on his then‑girlfriend; he received probation and suspended costs.
- He later moved to Michigan, worked steadily, married the victim, and fathered a U.S. citizen son born in 2007.
- DHS initiated removal proceedings in 2013; Verdugo‑Morales conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal based on hardship and continuous physical presence.
- An Immigration Judge found the §273.5(a) conviction to be a crime of domestic violence under 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(E)(i), precluding continuous presence, and the BIA affirmed using the categorical approach.
- Verdugo‑Morales challenged (1) whether the California statute is divisible (necessitating the modified categorical approach) or instead uses alternative means (permitting the categorical approach), (2) whether §273.5(a) matches the INA’s definition of a crime of domestic violence, and (3) whether the INA’s catchall language is unconstitutionally vague.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CA §273.5(a)’s listed domestic relationships are alternative elements (divisible) or alternative means (indivisible) | Verdugo‑Morales: relationships are alternative elements so the modified categorical/ circumstance‑specific approach should apply | Government/BIA: relationships are alternative means; statute is indivisible and the categorical approach applies | Court: relationships are alternative means; categorical approach is appropriate |
| Whether a §273.5(a) conviction is a categorical match to INA §1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (i.e., a crime of domestic violence) | Verdugo‑Morales: CA’s notion of “cohabitant” is broader than INA’s “cohabitating as a spouse,” so §273.5(a) may cover conduct outside the INA definition | Government: California caselaw construes “cohabitant” as a spouse‑like relationship and INA’s catchall language covers California relationships | Court: §273.5(a) is a categorical match to the INA definition; conviction bars cancellation of removal |
| Whether the INA’s catchall clauses in §1227(a)(2)(E)(i) are unconstitutionally vague | Verdugo‑Morales: the catchall language creates a feedback loop and indistinct standards akin to the invalidated ACCA residual clause | Government: incorporation of state domestic/family violence laws was deliberate, has been implemented, and gives fair notice | Court: catchall language is broad but not impermissibly vague; survives vagueness challenge |
Key Cases Cited
- Chenery Corp. v. SEC, 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (agency can be upheld only on grounds it actually relied upon)
- Chenery Corp. v. SEC, 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (court may not substitute a new basis for an agency decision)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (categorical/modified categorical framework explained)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (how to determine whether statutory alternatives are elements or means)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (categorical approach in immigration context)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (void‑for‑vagueness analysis of residual clause)
- Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. 2016) (INA provisions subject to vagueness review under the Fifth Amendment)
- Carillo v. Holder, 781 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2015) (CA caselaw supports reading “cohabitant” as spouse‑like for §273.5 analysis)
- Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016) (discusses INA incorporation of state law in defining predicate offenses)