500 S.W.3d 791
Ky.2016Background
- In 2012 James L. Sneed, Jr. was indicted on charges of first-degree rape, sodomy, and incest based on allegations by his granddaughter (pseudonym "Sarah").
- At the July 29, 2014 trial, defense counsel in opening accused Sarah’s father (a Commonwealth witness) of using untruthfulness for revenge; Commonwealth moved for mistrial. The court denied the mistrial and admonished the jury to decide credibility.
- Minutes later, defense counsel again referenced Sarah’s therapist notes indicating Sarah had “issues with lying”; Commonwealth renewed its mistrial motion and the trial court granted a mistrial. Retrial was scheduled.
- Sneed moved to prohibit retrial and dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds; the trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals denied a writ of prohibition; Sneed appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court.
- The Supreme Court reviewed whether retrial was barred by double jeopardy (jeopardy had attached) by assessing whether the mistrial was supported by "manifest necessity," and whether defense counsel’s statements were improper and prejudicial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether retrial is barred by double jeopardy after the mistrial | Commonwealth: mistrial was manifestly necessary because defense counsel’s comments improperly attacked witness credibility and prejudiced the Commonwealth’s right to a fair trial | Sneed: counsel’s opening statement asserted a defense (that victim lied); statements concerned impeachment evidence and were permissible — retrial would violate double jeopardy | Held: Retrial allowed; court affirmed denial of writ. Mistrial was within trial court’s sound discretion due to prejudicial, improper statements and inadmissible evidence referenced |
| Whether defense counsel’s opening statements (calling witnesses liars) were permissible | Commonwealth: labeling witnesses as liars improperly usurps the jury’s exclusive role to determine credibility and risks panel-wide taint | Sneed: defense has right to present impeachment evidence and to argue the victim is not credible | Held: Impermissible; attorneys may not assert a witness is "lying" in opening — credibility determinations are for the jury; counsel’s statements violated Moss and KRE 608 limits |
| Admissibility of therapist notes and scope for impeachment | Commonwealth: therapist notes were privileged (KRE 506/507), hearsay, and inadmissible without exception; introducing them would be improper | Sneed: the therapist and aunt were available for impeachment; KRE 608(b) allows cross-examination about truthfulness | Held: Notes likely inadmissible: KRE 608(b) forbids extrinsic contradiction of specific acts; counselor-client and psychotherapist privileges bar the notes absent recognized exceptions (unmet here) |
| Standard of appellate review for mistrial decisions | Commonwealth/trial court: trial judge’s mistrial determination (manifest necessity) is reviewed for abuse of discretion and entitled to deference (Arizona v. Washington) | Sneed/dissent: mistrial is an "extreme remedy" — appellate courts must ensure trial court applied the high standard and consider whether admonition would cure prejudice | Held: Appellate review is abuse-of-discretion with close record examination; here trial court did not abuse discretion in declaring mistrial given repeated defiance of admonition and risk of jury taint |
Key Cases Cited
- Cardine v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 641 (Ky. 2009) (jeopardy attaches when jury is impaneled and sworn; retrial barred absent manifest necessity or defendant consent)
- Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) (scope of "manifest necessity" and deference owed to trial judge on mistrial decisions)
- Moss v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1997) (witnesses and experts may not testify that another witness is lying; credibility is for jury)
- Grimes v. McAnulty, 957 S.W.2d 223 (Ky. 1997) (improper evidence that prejudices the Commonwealth may justify mistrial)
- St. Clair v. Roark, 10 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 2000) (double jeopardy may be addressed by writ of prohibition but is discretionary)
- Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554 (Ky. 2003) (circumstances where defendant’s right to compulsory process may overcome psychotherapist-patient privilege)