Sneed, David Ray
PD-0645-15
Tex. App.Jul 9, 2015Background
- Defendant David Ray Sneed was indicted for aggravated assault of a public servant for allegedly threatening Deputy Ronald Schmidt by firing a firearm in his direction while Schmidt was performing official duties.
- Earlier the same evening Deputy Steve Sands (in uniform, marked unit) attempted to serve a warrant on Sneed, who was confrontational; Sands left and called for backup.
- Deputies (including Schmidt) returned; Schmidt, in an unmarked vehicle, heard someone yell derogatorily at officers and then heard multiple gunshots and observed muzzle flashes he perceived as directed toward him.
- Schmidt could not positively identify who fired or who shouted; later shell casings and matching ammunition were recovered on Sneed’s property and in his truck/home.
- The trial court instructed the jury on transferred intent, including an application paragraph allowing conviction if Sneed intended to threaten Sands but actually threatened Schmidt; jury convicted and assessed 15 years.
- The Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed; Sneed petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals arguing the jury charge unlawfully expanded the theory of conviction by permitting an unindicted/unproven victim via transferred intent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Sneed) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence that Sneed knew victim was a public servant | Evidence (Sands in uniform earlier; Schmidt heard insults and saw muzzle flashes) supports reasonable inference Sneed knew he was confronting officers | Insufficient proof Sneed knew Schmidt was a public servant or acting in duty at time of shooting | Court of Appeals: evidence sufficient; affirmed conviction |
| Jury charge use of transferred intent | Transfer permitted where defendant intended to harm one person but harmed another; instruction appropriate given testimony linking threats to officers and shots fired | Transferred-intent instruction expanded indictment by effectively substituting an unindicted/unproved victim (Sands vs. Schmidt), broadening theory of conviction | Court of Appeals: no error—transferred intent instruction proper; affirmed |
| Whether transferred intent can be used to substitute an unnamed or uncharged victim | State: transferred intent doctrine applies when mens rea aimed at one person is transferred to another harmed person | Sneed: doctrine cannot be used to broaden indictment so the jury can convict on a theory not alleged (unnamed/uncharged target); indictment should have alleged both victims if intended | Court of Appeals did not adopt Sneed’s variance-based objection; held transferred intent applicable here |
| Alleged jury-charge error requiring reversal/harm analysis | State: even if charge contained theory of transferred intent, any error was not harmful | Sneed: charge egregiously harmful because it enlarged the indictment’s theory of conviction | Court of Appeals: found no reversible error; affirmed judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App.) (standards on discretionary review and related principles)
- Byrd v. State, 336 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. Crim. App.) (variance between indictment and proof)
- Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. Crim. App.) (Jackson sufficiency standard and reasonable inferences)
- Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App.) (circumstantial evidence sufficiency)
- Martinez v. State, 844 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. App.—San Antonio) (discussion of transferred intent/bad-aim scenarios)