Smrtka v. Boote
2017 Ohio 1187
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Philip Smrtka was a patient at defendant Dr. Gary Domanick’s chiropractic office and, while leaving, approached a dog (Luke) in the waiting room and was bitten on the hand.
- The Bootes (owners) and their dog Luke were also patients/visitors at the office; Luke had been present at the office on prior occasions.
- Smrtka sued Domanick for common-law negligence, chiropractic malpractice, and negligence per se (based on alleged unlawful treatment of an animal outside chiropractic scope).
- Both parties filed summary-judgment motions: Smrtka sought partial summary judgment as to duty and breach; Domanick moved for summary judgment on all claims.
- Trial court denied Smrtka’s partial motion and granted Domanick’s motion; the appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Domanick owe a common-law duty to protect Smrtka from the dog? | Smrtka: Domanick had a duty to keep premises safe (including keeping Luke out) and had superior knowledge of the danger. | Domanick: Luke’s presence was open and obvious; no superior knowledge of a special danger; no duty to warn or protect. | Held: No duty — dog’s presence was open and obvious and defendant had no superior knowledge. |
| Is there a viable chiropractic malpractice claim? | Smrtka: The dog bite is derivative of chiropractic care and experts dispute standard of care. | Domanick: No expert evidence that his chiropractic treatment of Smrtka breached the standard of care; experts only opine about animal-related recordkeeping/office practice. | Held: No genuine issue as to malpractice — no expert showing breach of care in treatment of Smrtka; dog-bite not a derivative chiropractic claim. |
| Is negligence per se established by violating statutes governing chiropractic/veterinary practice? | Smrtka: Violations of R.C. chapters (scope and veterinary practice) constitute negligence per se. | Domanick: Those statutes do not create civil liability to third parties like Smrtka; plaintiff lacks standing under those statutes. | Held: No negligence per se — statutes regulate licensing/board enforcement and do not impose civil duties for Smrtka’s benefit. |
| Was summary judgment improper because the court weighed evidence or made credibility determinations? | Smrtka: Trial court improperly weighed evidence and resolved factual disputes against him. | Domanick: Court’s ultimate rulings were correct on legal grounds (duty, lack of malpractice proof, statutory structure). | Held: Any evidentiary missteps were harmless — court correctly concluded no duty, no malpractice proof, and no negligence per se; summary judgment affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102 (Ohio 1996) (standard: de novo appellate review of summary judgment)
- Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prods., Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 75 (Ohio 1984) (elements of negligence)
- Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317 (Ohio 1977) (summary-judgment standard)
- Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 (Ohio 1996) (movant’s burden and nonmovant’s reciprocal burden at summary judgment)
- Paschal v. Rite Aid Pharmacy, Inc., 18 Ohio St.3d 203 (Ohio 1985) (shopkeeper duty and open-and-obvious doctrine)
- Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 99 Ohio St.3d 79 (Ohio 2003) (open-and-obvious doctrine as bar to negligence)
- Simmers v. Bentley Constr. Co., 64 Ohio St.3d 642 (Ohio 1992) (open-and-obvious condition functions as its own warning)
- LaCourse v. Fleitz, 28 Ohio St.3d 209 (Ohio 1986) (superior knowledge exception to open-and-obvious rule)
- Debie v. Cochran Pharmacy-Berwick, Inc., 11 Ohio St.2d 38 (Ohio 1967) (liability predicated on superior knowledge of danger)
- Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St.2d 127 (Ohio 1976) (elements required for medical malpractice)
- Rome v. Flower Mem. Hosp., 70 Ohio St.3d 14 (Ohio 1994) (when injuries during medical care may constitute derivative medical claims)
- Neuenschwander v. Wayne Cty. Children Servs. Bd., 92 Ohio App.3d 767 (Ohio Ct. App.) (statute must be intended to protect plaintiff class for negligence per se)
- Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 161 Ohio St. 367 (Ohio 1954) (negligence per se principles)
- Chambers v. St. Mary’s School, 82 Ohio St.3d 563 (Ohio 1998) (negligence per se still requires proximate cause and damages)
- Hill v. Wadsworth-Rittman Area Hosp., 185 Ohio App.3d 788 (Ohio Ct. App.) (post-discharge injuries on premises not necessarily medical claims)