Lead Opinion
The sole issue before this court is whether the term “medical claim” as defined in R.C. 2305.11 includes a claim fоr a hospital employee’s negligent use of hospital equipment while caring for a pаtient which allegedly results in an injury to the patient. For the following reasons, we find that these cases involve “medical claims” and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
Ordinarily a plaintiff has two years to file a lawsuit for personal injury (R.C. 2305.10). Nevertheless, if the injury is basеd on a “medical claim,” the plaintiff
“ ‘Medical claim’ means any claim that is asserted in any civil action аgainst a physician, podiatrist, or hospital, against any employee or agent of a physician, podiatrist, or hospital, or against a registered nurse or physical therapist, and that arises out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person. ‘Medical сlaim’ includes derivative claims for relief that arise from the medical diagnosis, care, or trеatment of a person.”
In Browning v. Burt (1993),
Appellees Rome contend that the act of placing a patient upon a table for radiological purposes does not constitute “medical diagnosis, care, or treatment” within the meaning of R.C. 2305.11(D)(3), but is rather a claim of common-law negligence which should be governed by the two-year statute of limitаtions found in R.C. 2305.10 for bodily injury. However, we find that the process of securing Barbara Rome to a radiology table is ancillary to and an inherently necessary part of the administration of the X-ray рrocedure which was ordered to identify and alleviate her medical complaints. Furthermore, at the time of her injury, Mrs. Rome was a patient at Flower and was being assisted by an employеe of Flower, which employee was required to exercise a certain amount of рrofessional expertise in preparing the patient for X-ray. Accordingly, we conclude that Rome’s claim arises out of “medical diagnosis, care, or treatment” relating to the identification and alleviation of a physical or mental illness, disease, or defect. Thus, her claim is a medical claim and is barred by the one-year statute of limitations, R.C. 2305.11(B)(1).
Appellee Hаrold Eager was a patient at St. Vincent Medical Center who was injured when his wheelchair collapsed while he was being transported from physical therapy. This therapy was ordered by his рhysician as part of his rehabilitation from knee surgery. Following standard practice, a hospital employee took Eager to and from the physical therapy department in a whеelchair. Thus, we find that the transport of Eager from physical therapy was ancillary to and an inherently necessary part of his physical therapy treatment. Furthermore, Eager was a patient of St. Vincent Medical Center and was assisted by an employee of St. Vincent who was required to use a certain amount of professional
Accordingly, the judgment of thе court of appeals is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I dissent from the majority’s holding that these cases involve medical claims. According to R.C. 2305.11(D)(3), a medical claim is a claim that “arises out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person,” and the causes of the injuries in these two cases are at least onе step removed from diagnosis, care, or treatment. While being placed on an X-ray tablе and being transported in a wheelchair are tangentially related to medical carе, they do not constitute medical care themselves. A claim sounding in negligence does not bеcome a medical claim simply because the injury arises in a hospital. Thus, I would hold that the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to the claims brought in these cases.