SMITH v. OWENS, 5:16-cv-00122

Plaintiff Donald Frank Smith Jr., a state prisoner, filed a pro se § 1983 complaint and sought to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP).
Court records showed Smith had at least three prior federal dismissals as frivolous or for failure to state a claim, qualifying him as a "three-striker" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Smith invoked the § 1915(g) imminent-danger exception, alleging risk from a prior October 23, 2015 inmate assault and subsequent housing near members of the assailants' gang.
Facts include an assault where Smith was injured, disciplinary reports for inmates involved, Smith's request for protective custody while in segregation, and his return (Oct. 29, 2015) to the same side of the compound as some attackers.
Smith reported a vague December 2015 comment by an inmate and alleged an ongoing conspiracy of retaliatory disciplinary actions and threats tied to his prior litigation.
The magistrate judge concluded Smith's allegations were too vague and historical to establish "imminent danger," denied IFP, and recommended dismissal without prejudice under § 1915(g).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Applicability of § 1915(g) three-strikes bar	Smith conceded prior dismissals but claimed imminent danger to invoke the exception	Defendants argue § 1915(g) bars IFP because no plausible imminent danger is alleged	Court: § 1915(g) applies; IFP denied
Imminent-danger exception standard	Smith alleged ongoing risk from housing near attackers and a December threat-like comment	Defendants: allegations are vague, remote in time, and describe past injuries, not imminent harm	Court: allegations insufficient to show an ongoing or proximate threat; exception not met
Sufficiency of conspiracy allegations	Smith claimed defendants conspired to retaliate and create danger due to prior litigation	Defendants: no specific facts showing a meeting of the minds or causal link to physical harm	Court: conspiracy allegations are conclusory and lack specificity; do not establish imminent danger
Proper disposition after IFP denial	Smith sought to proceed without paying fees	Defendants: dismissal without prejudice is appropriate under controlling precedent	Court: recommended dismissal without prejudice (noting statute-of-limitations may bar refiling of some claims)

Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2004) (court must accept factual allegations as true at screening)
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 1998) (pro se pleadings construed liberally)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must allege enough factual matter to state a claim)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (labels and conclusions insufficient to state a claim)
Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2001) (complaint must contain direct or inferential allegations to identify material elements)
Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 1999) (definition and effect of a "strike" under § 1915)
White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1998) (vague, conclusory danger allegations insufficient for imminent-danger exception)
Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 2002) (imminent-danger exception reserved for genuine emergencies)
Bailey v. Board of County Comm'rs of Alachua County, Fla., 956 F.2d 1112 (11th Cir. 1992) (conspiracy claims require a meeting of the minds)
Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2002) (when IFP denied under § 1915(g), complaint should be dismissed without prejudice)