Smith v. Obama
217 F. Supp. 3d 283
| D.D.C. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff Nathan Michael Smith, a U.S. Army Captain formerly deployed to the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (counter‑ISIL operations), sued President Obama seeking a declaration that the Operation is illegal because Congress did not authorize it under the War Powers Resolution and that the President violated the Take Care Clause by failing to publish a sustained legal justification.
- Plaintiff contends neither the 2001 AUMF nor the 2002 AUMF authorized the Operation; he seeks a judicial declaration and an order requiring withdrawal of forces if Congress does not authorize within 60 days.
- Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing non‑justiciable political question, lack of Article III standing, sovereign immunity, and that equitable relief against the President is unavailable.
- The court considered that plaintiff supported the mission substantively, did not claim physical or liberty injuries from deployment, and did not allege he was compelled to disobey orders; his complaint sought certainty about legality to satisfy his oath.
- The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding plaintiff lacked standing (no concrete, particularized injury) and that the claims presented non‑justiciable political questions committed to the political branches.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing: whether Smith alleged a concrete, particularized injury | Smith says his officer oath and uncertainty about legality force a dilemma: either disobey orders (risk punishment) or violate his oath; thus he suffers legal injury | Obama argues Smith has only a generalized grievance and no concrete, particularized injury; he was not required to disobey orders or risk punishment | No standing: plaintiff’s asserted injuries are abstract; oath uncertainty and speculative risk of punishment do not meet injury‑in‑fact requirements |
| Duty to disobey orders based on alleged lack of Congressional authorization (Little v. Barreme) | Smith reads Little to require officers to disobey orders beyond Congressional authorization | Obama contends Little only limits immunity for unlawful acts and does not create a duty for soldiers to refuse orders on such grounds; military law does not permit unilateral disobedience absent manifestly unlawful orders | Court rejects Smith’s reading of Little; no duty to disobey here and thus no forced choice producing injury |
| Oath‑of‑office standing (analogies to Allen) | Smith relies on oath cases: taking an oath creates standing when an official must choose between violating the Constitution/statute and suffering concrete harm | Obama points out Allen involved an immediate, concrete choice to take unconstitutional action or suffer removal; Smith alleges only uncertainty, not compelled unconstitutional acts | Court finds Smith unlike Allen; he is not asked to commit unconstitutional acts and his uncertainty is insufficient for oath‑based standing |
| Political question: whether courts can adjudicate if 2001/2002 AUMFs authorize force against ISIL | Smith frames the dispute as statutory interpretation of the AUMFs and War Powers Resolution requiring judicial resolution | Obama argues foreign‑policy and military determinations (necessity/appropriateness) are textually committed to political branches, involve non‑judicial standards, sensitive facts, and no interbranch impasse exists | Court holds claims present political questions: matters are committed to political branches, lack judicially manageable standards, require sensitive factual/military inquiries, and Congress has funded/engaged on the Operation so no constitutional impasse exists |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (Article III standing requires concrete and particularized injury)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing: injury‑in‑fact, causation, redressability)
- Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (heightened standing scrutiny where relief would alter powers of political branches)
- Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (political question factors for nonjusticiability)
- Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012) (courts can decide statutory claims touching foreign policy when resolution is a familiar judicial exercise)
- Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (presidential instructions do not immunize acts unlawful under controlling law)
- Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (Little’s limited principle: federal official liable for acts not authorized by controlling law)