31 F.4th 905
5th Cir.2022Background:
- Constable Herschel Smith (Waller County) was driving a county vehicle with exempt plates on a Harris County tollway and flashed his emergency lights at another motorist.
- A 911 caller reported that Smith had pointed a gun at the caller after signaling; Harris County deputy constables searched for and effectuated a felony-style traffic stop of Smith.
- Deputies approached with guns drawn, ordered Smith out, handcuffed him briefly (about 1:47), asked about his service weapon, then released him; no physical injury was alleged.
- Smith (who is Black) held a press conference accusing racial discrimination and sued Harris County, the deputies, and Harris County Constable Ted Heap (in both capacities) for § 1983 claims, IIED, and defamation; Smith alleged Heap either ordered or ratified the stop and later called Smith a "suspect."
- Heap moved to dismiss individual-capacity claims asserting qualified immunity for the federal claims and Texas statutory immunities for state torts; the district court denied the motion. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding Heap immune and dismissing all individual-capacity claims.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Qualified immunity for federal § 1983 claims (unreasonable seizure/excessive force) | Smith: Deputies' stop and handcuffing were unreasonable and excessive; Heap is liable for ordering/ratifying or failing to prevent it | Heap: He was not present; the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and any force was minimal and objectively reasonable | Held: QI applies — no plausible constitutional violation pleaded (stop lawful; brief, routine detention; no injury), so federal claims dismissed |
| Whether the stop amounted to a de facto arrest requiring probable cause | Smith: The detention was effectively an arrest (guns drawn, handcuffs, attempted placement in patrol car) | Heap: Measures were routine for a felony investigative stop of an armed suspect and lasted only minutes | Held: Not a de facto arrest — measures are consistent with investigatory Terry/felony-stop practice and were brief |
| Excessive-force claim under the Fourth Amendment | Smith: Use of guns, handcuffing, and detention caused psychological injury and was excessive | Heap: Force was objectively reasonable given report that Smith pointed a gun; no physical injury alleged; de minimis force | Held: No excessive-force claim pleaded — plaintiff failed to allege qualifying injury and force was objectively reasonable |
| State-law statutory immunity under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.106(a) and (f) | Smith: Heap acted outside scope of employment or personally ratified illegal conduct (so immunity shouldn’t apply) | Heap: Suit names county and Heap in individual and official capacities; his acts (supervising deputies, public statements) were within scope of employment, so § 101.106 bars individual claims | Held: Texas statutory immunities apply — § 101.106(a) and (f) bar the individual-capacity tort claims against Heap |
Key Cases Cited
- Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270 (5th Cir. 2021) (standard of review for denial of dismissal on immunity grounds)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified-immunity framework and discretion to decide merits or clearly-established prong)
- Windham v. Harris County, 875 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2017) (de facto arrest requires restraint associated with formal arrest)
- United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 2008) (durational limit on Terry stops; prolonged detention can become de facto arrest)
- Ratliff v. Aransas County, 948 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2020) (elements of excessive-force claim and injury requirement)
- Alexander v. City of Round Rock, 854 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2017) (objectively reasonable force typically causes only de minimis injury)
- Garza v. Harrison, 574 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2019) (scope-of-employment inquiry under § 101.106(f) focuses on job function, not lawfulness)
- Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. 2011) (official-capacity suit is a suit against the governmental employer)
- Molina v. Alvarado, 463 S.W.3d 867 (Tex. 2015) (application of § 101.106(a) precluding suit against individual when governmental unit sued)
- Alexander v. Walker, 435 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2014) (application of § 101.106(f) immunity)