Smith v. Daniel
2014 Ark. 519
| Ark. | 2014Background
- Daniel, a registered nurse at the Arkansas State Hospital, was terminated thirteen months after reporting abuse and neglect and lack of life-saving equipment.
- Plaintiff asserts claims under the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act (AWBA), Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and § 1981.
- Defendants Charles Smith (State Hospital Administrator) and Betty Mains (Assistant Administrator) moved for summary judgment based on sovereign and statutory immunity and other grounds.
- The circuit court dismissed Mains’ AWBA claim and all individual-capacity claims against Smith; denied summary judgment on other arguments; and did not explicitly rule on all sovereign-immunity theories.
- The issue on appeal is whether the AWBA and ACRA claims against Smith and Mains in official or individual capacities are barred by sovereign or statutory immunity, and whether summary judgment was proper on the remaining claims.
- This opinion largely addresses whether a suit against Smith in his official capacity is essentially a suit against the public employer and whether the AWBA waives immunity for such suits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does AWBA waive sovereign immunity for claims against Smith in official capacity? | Daniel's complaint includes Smith in official capacity under AWBA; AWBA defines 'public employer' to waive immunity. | AWBA only waives immunity for public employers, not individuals; Smith in official capacity is not suit against public employer here. | Affirmed as to AWBA waiver for public-employer scope; Smith in official capacity treated as public employer under AWBA |
| Are ACRA official-capacity claims against Smith and Mains barred by sovereign immunity? | ACRA waives immunities for state actors in some claims; official-capacity claims are viable under ACRA. | ACRA does not waive sovereign immunity; official-capacity ACRA claims are barred. | ACRA official-capacity claims are barred by sovereign immunity |
| Was the circuit court proper in denying summary judgment on Mains' individual-capacity ACRA/ACRA-related claims? | Daniel raised factual disputes (pretext, discrimination history) that could show malice; spoliation issue noted. | No demonstrating malice or personal involvement by Mains; dismissal proper. | Circuit court erred in denying summary judgment on Mains' individual-capacity claims; Mains entitled to immunity |
Key Cases Cited
- Ark. Lottery Comm’n v. Alpha Mktg., 2013 Ark. 232 (Ark. Supreme Court (2013)) (occurrence-based review of sovereign-immunity issues on interlocutory appeal)
- Books-A-Million, Inc. v. Ark. Painting & Specialties Co., 340 Ark. 467 (2000) (statutory interpretation and presumptions in recognizing legislative familiarity with prior decisions)
- Simons v. Marshall, 369 Ark. 447 (2007) (official-capacity suits generally plead an action against the entity; sovereign immunity considerations)
- Fegans v. Norris, 351 Ark. 200 (2002) (qualified-immunity framework for state actors under Arkansas law)
- Sullivan v. Coney, 2013 Ark. 222 (Arkansas Supreme Court (2013)) (defines qualified-immunity standard and proper legal inquiry)
- Rainey v. Hartness, 339 Ark. 293 (1999) (federal/constitutional-like approach to immunity analysis in Arkansas)
- Baldridge v. Cordes, 350 Ark. 114 (2002) (restatement of qualified-immunity standard in Arkansas)
- Goss v. State, 344 Ark. 523 (2001) (sovereign-immunity scope and official-capacity considerations)