Baldridge v. Cordes
85 S.W.3d 511
Ark.
2002
Check Treatment

*1 CORDES, L. BALDRIDGE Jeffrey Jana Police Arkansas State 85 S.W.3d 02-66 of Arkansas Court Supreme 26, 2002 delivered September Opinion *4 Baker, M. Cindy appellant. Gen., Moore, Mark Gen., Pryor, Att’y by: Ass’t Att’y Jill Jones

for appellee. Chief Justice. Appellant Jeffrey Arnold, W.H. “Dub” filed a Baldridge suit in the civil-rights Carroll Circuit Cordes, Court County an against Appellee Arkansas Jana State The suit stems from Trooper. arrest for Baldridge’s driving intoxicated, while insurance, no and liability careless and impru- dent The trial court driving. granted summary judgment Cordes, and Our Baldridge appealed. jurisdiction of this appeal to Ct. pursuant R. as it Sup. 1-2(a)(8) (b)(5), presents law. find no of the We clarification issues needing development error and affirm. 2000, individual were and another

On Baldridge, August eastern in the US horses Highway riding along right-of-way was became fright- riding The horse County. Baldridge Carroll ened, the animal with where car hit and shied onto Highway dark. The accident occurred after of automobile. mirror scene, determined that Bal- State Cordes At Arkansas Trooper that he smelled of her was intoxicated given perception dridge slurred, bloodshot, he intoxicants, was was his were his eyes speech loud, on his feet. and he unsteady appeared Sher- taken to the County arrested and Carroll was

Baldridge with a Cordes Baldridge iffs’s Office where Trooper provided and the of penalties statement rights regarding breathalyzer, two submitted to breathalyzer refusing breathalyzer. Baldridge tests, content one of which that blood alcohol showed Baldridge’s .007, field tests There were no sobriety was another .008. alcohol tests and no other blood given. Baldridge given, all court. by acquitted charges municipal 17, 2000, in filed a On complaint October Cordes, that L. Arkan- Carroll Circuit Court County alleging Jana Police, Federal her had violated his sas State individual capacity, and also and his rights, Constitutional State Constitutional rights a claim for defamation of his character. stated on the Cordes filed a motion for based summary judgment Bal- that her actions were covered immunity. belief Despite motions, on the and the no were held dridge’s request, hearings Cordes, trial court entered favor summary judgment suit, from was entitled to grounds were insuffi- and that the facts stated in the Baldridge complaint and affirm. cient overcome her We immunity. agree,

Summary Judgment *5 is is well that to law settled summary judgment that are no a trial court when it is clear there be by only granted the is enti- of material fact to be party issues litigated, genuine District, v. tied to as matter of law. Bond LavacaSchool judgment 300, 347 Ark. 64 S.W.3d 249 Dodson v. 346 Ark. (2001); Taylor, 443, 58, v. 57 S.W.3d 710 Wallace 331 Ark. (2001); Broyles, S.W.2d denial of 332 Ark. (1998), reh’g, supp. opinion 189, 961 S.W.2d 712 Once the has estab- (1998). moving party lished a facie entitlement to summary prima judgment, oppos- must meet with and demonstrate the ing party proof proof Bond, existence of a material fact. issue of On supra. appellate review, we determine if based summary judgment appropriate on whether the items evidentiary presented by moving party of the motion leave a material fact unanswered. Id. support We view the evidence in a most favorable light against party filed, whom the motion was all doubts and resolving inferences Id. against moving party.

QualifiedImmunity A motion for based summary judgment upon quali fied is when the immunity precluded only has asserted a plaintiff violation, constitutional demonstrated the constitutional right is clearly established and raised a issue of fact genuine as whether the official would have known that the conduct violated that Aldrich, established Smithson clearly right. v. 235 F.3d 1058 (8th court, Cir. 2000). As this doctrine of applied is akin to its federal Hartness, v. counterpart. Rainey 293, Thus, 339 Ark. 5 S.W.3d 410 an official immune if from suit his actions did not violate established clearly principles of law of which a reasonable would have knowledge. 125, Virdenv. 302 Ark. 788 S.W.2d 470 Roper, (1990); Flentje First National Bank Wynne, 340 11 S.W.3d 531 District, Rudd v. (2000); Pulaski School 341 Ark. County Special 20 S.W.3d 310 (2000) (qualified under Arkansas law on the rests same scope as under law.) federal principles

Arkansas Code Annotated 19-10-305 1999) (Supp. provides pertinent “Officers and part: State employees suit, Arkansas are immune from from liability to the extent except be insurance, covered they may by liability damages omissions, acts or other than omissions, malicious acts or occur within the ring course and of their scope This employment.” *6 120 officers and mean that state that section to

court has interpreted the course and and within scope without malice acting employees of from an award damages are immune of their employment 293, Hartness, (1999); Ark. 5 S.W.3d 410 v. 339 Rainey litigation. 325, Etoch, 96 Cross v. (1998); 332 965 S.W.2d Newton v. Ark. Comm’n, 255, 943 328 Ark. S.W.2d Livestock& Poultry Arkansas that the immunity court has pro 230 This (1997). recognized by is similar to vided section 19-10-305 provided v. claims. Robinson Lang for federal Court civil-rights Supreme don, 292 (1998). 970 S.W.2d 333 “must issue of A court deciding qualified of has the deprivation determine whether alleged first plaintiff all, so, if to determine at and an actual constitutional right proceed the time of established at the alleged whether that was clearly right Moines, (2000); Des 201 F.3d 1050 Conn Pacev. City violation. of Gabbert, v. (1999). U.S. 286 not to be arrested or without The right prosecuted has, course, been a established con cause long clearly probable York, v. New 442 U.S. 200 (1979); stitutional Dunaway right. al., al. et. 291 Ark. 725 S.W.2d Robinson v. Beaumont et. if the officer is entitled (1987). An arresting qualified reasonable, officers of reasonable com arrest was objectively test was could whether disagree petence probable-cause If the met. 475 U.S. 341 complaint Malley Biggs, law, the established suit should con violation of clearly alleges Robinson, tinue. supra. arrest, search and asserts an unlawful unlawful detainment of the individ- (seizure

seizure unlawful (breathalyzer), cause), ual without deprivation liberty property all are of vio- without of which (arrest cause), allegations that were established at clearly lations of constitutional rights also time of the actions of occurred. Baldridge argues complained of material fact is found to to this that once a issue genuine court exist, defendant the defense immunity shielding must be denied. from trial if the moment the arrest

Probable cause exists “at . . . the facts and circumstances within was made police [a had and of which reasonably knowledge [the officer] officer’s] to warrant a man information were sufficient trustworthy prudent *7 the crime with in that the arrested committed believing” Ohio, As which he was Beckv. 379 U.S. 91 charged. clear, this standard makes there need not be actual cause probable for an officer to be shielded an immunity; objectively qualified Pace, reasonable belief that there was cause is enough. probable v. 968 F.2d 756 Cir. (8th 1992). supra; Thompson Reuting, Carmack, stated, In Walden v. Circuit “A Eighth defendant need not show that there was one reasonable con only existed, rather, clusion ... on whether cause but a court should ask whether the . . . officialsacted under settled reasonably law in the circumstances then not whether another rea existing, sonable, or more reasonable of the facts can be con interpretation structed later.” 156 F.3d 861 Cir. If there a years (8th 1998). is existed, reasonable basis to conclude that cause qualified suit, shields the officer from and courts must take cau tion not to the officer’s actions with the benefit of simply judge Stine, 20/20 Tauke v. 120 F.3d 1363 Cir. hindsight. (8th 1997). course, Of the burden remains on the proponent facts, of the to establish the relevant and at the predicate is the bene summary-judgment stage nonmoving party given fit of all Pace, reasonable inferences. Arnott v. supra; Mataya, F.2d 124 (8th Cir. In the event that a genuine dispute exists facts material to the concerning predicate immu issue, the defendant is not entitled nity summary judgment Lambert, Pace, 187 F.3d at 935. ground. What must be supra; mind, however, in is that once the kept facts have been predicate established, for the there is no purposes qualified immunity such as a issue of fact” thing “genuine as to whether an officer “should have known” that his conduct violated constitutional Pace, The conduct rights. was either reasonable supra. under set circumstances, tled law not, in the or it was and this is a determi nation of law that should be made at the earliest possible stage Pace, Whether an officer acted litigation. under supra. reasonably law, settled law in the circumstances is a and not itself question Pace, fact. “Predicate predicate facts” include supra. only relevant themselves, circumstances and the acts of the parties of those the reasonableness others about

not the conclusions Pace, actions. supra. officers, other even those of

Baldridge’s opinion, have reached such could officer reasonable or that no competent conclusion, analysis, not bear qualified-immunity does upon the court does not engage where for it is a legal inquiry purely reasonableness. determine objective polling opinion utilized in the standard qualified- reasonable-person objective it of others because the factual opinions ignores immunity analysis 226 (1991). 500 U.S. Gilley, Siegert is legal inquiry, states: 5-65-103 Annotated Arkansas Code acts. 5-65-103. Unlawful in this act for as provided It unlawful and

(a) punishable *8 or be in actual physical to operate who is intoxicated any person vehicle. of a motor control in this act for as provided It is unlawful

(b) punishable a control of motor or be in actual physical to operate any person concentration in person if that time the alcohol vehicle at or more based (0.08) upon breath or blood was eight-hundredths breath, blood, in 5- and urine concentration the definition of § 64-204. Arkansas Code Anno- 1997). Ann. 5-65-103 (Repl.

Ark. Code § tated further states: — No reduced charges Personsarrestedto be tried charges 5-65-107.

n — citations. Filing shall be tried on 5-65-103 (a) violating Persons arrested § and no such shall charges to such charges, those or charges plead be reduced. Furthermore, a law enforcement officer issues when

(b) 5-65-103, be filed with the citation shall citation for violating § as soon as possible. court Therefore, 1997). 5-65-107 persons Ark. Code Ann. (Repl. § law shall be tried on those the Arkansas DWI arrested violating shall be and no such charges to such or charges, charges plead under Arkansas was Baldridge required reduced. Consequently, intoxicated, because he law to be tried for while was driving arrested on those charges.

However, Cordes’s at the of Baldridge given perception accident, of the she had to arrest him for scene cause in Annotated: Arkansas Code drinking According public. 5-71-212. public. Public intoxication Drinking —

(a) A commits the offense of if he intoxication public in a under the influence of alco- appears public place manifesdy hol substance or controlled to the and under circum- degree stances such he is or likely himself other endanger persons he or that property, annoys persons his unreasonably vicinity. Code Ann. is no 5-71-212 There (Repl. compe-

tent evidence before this court that rebuts Cordes’s perception Cordes determined that Baldridge’s was sobriety. Baldridge intoxicants, intoxicated her that he smelled his given perception bloodshot, loud, slurred, were eyes his he was and he speech behavior, feet. on his Given this appeared unsteady arrested and had a to remove from the duty Baldridge highway. Circuit Court of has held Eighth Appeals offense,

that “where a defendant is arrested for the wrong arrest is still valid if cause existed to arrest the defendant Rambo, related offense.” United States v. 789 F.2d closely Prouse, 1294 (8th 1986); Cir. United Statesv. 945 F.2d 1017 *9 Cir. (8th It is that was on the 1991). undisputed Baldridge high after dark when he was involved way in an accident with a car. Further, behavior and demeanor at given the Baldridge’s physical scene, Cordes had cause to arrest for probable Baldridge public Further, intoxication. once established cause is for the probable offense, arrest the accused on one it then becomes irrelevant whether existed cause for other offenses for which the probable Garcia, accused was Linn v. 531 F.2d 855 Cir. charged. (8th So as Cordes had cause to arrest long DWI Baldridge intoxication, the fact that he also cited for public was other violations becomes immaterial. Cordes on DWI Baldridge charges,

After arresting the to drink to her error by amending charge remedy attempted Ann. 5-71-212 in violation of Ark. Code (Repl. in ing public § a that Cordes was with letter stating was served 1997). Baldridge However, have the did not Cordes the “amending charges.” once to the charge amend driving-while-intoxicated authority 5-65-107. under Ark. Code Ann. had been arrested Baldridge However, immu is still entitled Cordes qualified had the duty As an State Cordes right Arkansas Trooper, nity. was the after Baldridge to remove from highway under in accident. Cordes did arrest Baldridge involved an once citation, this but she amend charges attempted wrong lose because the realized. not her immunity was Cordes does law. not be amended under Arkansas could charges Affirmed. Brown, Thornton, concur. JJ.,

Corbin, Glaze, J., dissents. have a L. I hard Brown, concurring. Jus e,e, does, that officers

Robert ti ti c c holding, majority police of whether reasonable would on issue disagree competence while intoxi- horsebackwhile intoxicated constitutes driving riding motor vehicle. cated. horseback not a driving Clearly, riding Nevertheless, arrest, did her remove Trooper had been and who was on 62 from who drinking Highway For that rea- interest. This certainly highway. public son, I that in she was not conclude arresting Jeffrey Baldridge, incompetent. plainly has set the federal standard United States Court Supreme immunity: qualified evolved, it

As defense has provides ample who to all but the or those know- plainly incompetent protection law, where violate law. At common cases ingly cause to arrest was witness’ lacking, complaining malice, turned the issue of which was Under jury question. standard, U.S. (1982)] the Harlow Fitzgerald, [Harlow hand, malice sufficient to on the other an is not allegation *10 if the acted in an reasona- objectively defeat defendant immunity ble manner. The Harlow standard is specifically designed “avoid excessive and the resolu- disruption government permit on we tion insubstantial claims and many summary judgment,” be believe it serves this Defendants will not sufficiently goal. if, basis, it objective reasonably immune on an is obvious no would officer have concluded that warrant should competent issue; but if officers of could reasonable competence disagree issue, immunity this should be recognized. 475 U.S. I am more comforta- Malley Briggs, ble in this case the test of than rather using “plainly incompetent” reasonableness.” “objective concluded that Cordes is entitled

Having Trooper quali- claim, fied for the federal I anal- question majority’s of the state civil ysis claim. The rights state statute pertinent under state granting qualified law reads: (a) and Officers of the State of are employees Arkansas suit, immune from liability and from to the extent that except insurance, they be covered may by liability for acts or damages omissions, omissions, other than malicious acts or occurring within the and course of their scope employment. Ann. Code 19-10-305(a) We do not know (Supp.

from the whether majority Cordes opinion was covered Trooper and, not, insurance if by whether liability malice Baldridge alleged on the of the in his part trooper Bal- complaint. My reading this, that malice was not dridge’s complaint Because of alleged. I conclude that Cordes is also entitled to immu- Trooper for the state claim. nity

I concur in the result reached majority. Thornton,

Corbin join. JJ., Glaze, The facts are not dis- dissenting. Justic e,e, 9, 2000, Tom puted. August Officer Cordes arrested Jana intoxicated, Jeffrey Baldridge motor vehicle driving while vehicle, careless of a driving no of insurance to having proof a motor vehicle. operate with these charged Baldridge traffic offenses as a result of Baldridge’s horse riding alongside 62 in Carroll when Highway his horse saw County something *11 126 the of a car the and hit mirror traveling onto road it to shy

causing the highway. that two tests breathalyzer had submit to Cordes Baldridge .008, be and weE content to .007 alcohol Baldridge’s showed a motor vehicle. for a under the .08 limit person operating the scene of the a field test at did not administer sobriety Cordes the dismissed charges accident. The Court BerryviEe Municipal horse, a involved which because the violations Baldridge, against vehicle as found was not a motor contemplated by the court Arkansas’s laws. traffic offense charges, Baldridge’s

During pendency Cordes, of his filed suit violation against aEeging Baldridge and 42 1983 and the Fourth Fourteenth under U.S.C. rights Amendments. she was immune from Cordes stating responded, insurance and she was extent she was covered by suit except under The cir- under federal law. qualified protected favor, for her sum- request cuit court ruled in Cordes’s granting had reason and sufficient mary finding judgment cause arrest offense of Baldridge driving probable decision, vehicle while intoxicated. motor appeals as I this the circuit court. As hard I am try, court affirms — to understand how much less state unable anyone simply — can believe a horse be character- officer can reasonably police Therefore, law. I ized as a motor vehicle under Arkansas respect- dissent. fuEy “reasona

It settled that law enforcement who is weE officials is conclude that are but cause bly mistakenly present” v. 483 U.S. 635 (1987). entitled to Anderson immunity. Creighton, are from in civil officials liability Government immune qualifiedly their does not violate estab clearly actions to the extent conduct of which reasonable per lished or statutory rights constitutional Harlowv. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). son would have known. Fitzgerald, “aE but defense plainly protects violate the law.” v. those who knowingly Malley incompetent Thus, acts a manner U.S. 335 if an officer in 475 Briggs, officers of reasonable would disagree, about which competence officer be immune from Sec- liabEity. should Accordingly,

127 arrest, held tion 1983 cases we have involving charges improper that “the not cause fact issue immunity purposes Morris, but cause.” v. 810 F.2d arguable probable Myers City of see also v. (8th 1987); Cir. F.3d City Fargo, Habiger Schneiderheinz, Cir. (8th 1996); 102 F.3d 340 Cir. (8th Johnson *12 Circuit, Moines, The in Pace v. Des F.3d 201 Eighth City of 1050 held a can defeat a motion for (2000), recently plaintiff on the of a summary judgment grounds qualified-immunity defense if the three elements are if the following 1) present: plain- tiff has a anof actual constitutional 2) if alleged deprivation right; the was established at the right time of the viola- clearly alleged tion; and issue of fact as to whether the 3) genuine officer would have known that conduct his/her would have violated alleged plaintiffs rights. bar,

In the case at several of his Baldridge alleged deprivations i.e., Fourth Amendment Cordes’s actions of rights, Trooper stop citation, him, to him issue the ping Baldridge, detaining arresting him to submit to the him requiring to breathalyzer, requiring attend The court. not be to arrested without right prosecuted cause is a established constitutional Dun probable clearly right. York, Beaumont, v. New 442 U.S. away 200 Robinsonv. 291 (1979); 477, 725 S.W.2d 839 (1987). Probable cause exists if “at the moment the arrest . . was made . the facts and circumstances within and of which police knowledge [a officer’s] [the officer] had were reasonably information sufficient to trustworthy warrant man in that the arrested committed prudent believing” Ohio, crime the with he which was Beckv. 379 U.S. 89 charged. There need not be actual cause for an officer to be shielded an by qualified immunity; reasonable belief objectively that there was cause is Hunter enough. Bryant, U.S. 224 (1991).

The Pacecourt stated that courts of deciding questions quali- fied must also “that whether recognize summary judg- ment on of is from a grounds qualified immunity appropriate set facts is a of law.” Pacefurther particular states the question following: however, mind, is that once predicate be

What must kept established, immu- purposes qualified facts have been fact” as a issue of as “genuine such thing there no nity have that his conduct vio- an officer “should known” whether conduct was either rights. constitutional lated “reasonablfe] Hunter, circumstances,” at U.S. in the under settled law not, a determination of law at or it was and this is 112 S. Ct. stage litigation. be at the earliest possible that should made Also, Pace, facts” include only at 201 F.3d 1056. “predicate themselves, and and the acts of the relevant circumstances parties of those the reasonableness the conclusions of others about not as there is no parties actions. When among dispute facts, determine as a mat- be able to relevant court should always an immu- law not officer is ter of whether or eligible — is, officer acted under that whether or not the reasonably nity of facts. settled law set given particular The relevant facts in this case are that arrested *13 while rid- and with three motor vehicle traffic violations charged it was The issue boils down to whether reasonable for horse. ing had that committed the believe Baldridge Trooper mentioned, him. offenses with which she As charged previously DWI, a Ann. was with violation Ark. Code charged “It and Section 5-65-103(a) 5-65-103. provides, § unlawful in this act who is intoxicated as any provided punishable of a motorvehicle.” or be in actual control physical (Empha- operate State, 122, 874 (1993), In Fitchv. 313 Ark. 853 S.W.2d sis added.) at when a court looked the issue as a matter of first impression this was DWI an all-terrain vehicle. man with while charged operating that “a motor vehicle is The Fitch court concluded generally not defined wheeled that does run on conveyance as self-propelled Ed. Under (2d rails.” American Dictionary, Heritage and Title chapter Licensing, Transportation Registration 1991) Ark. Code Ann. defines term 27-14-207(b) (Supp. “ as Vehicle’ means vehicle “motor vehicle” follows: ‘Motor every which is and vehicle which is self-propelled every propelled wires, from but not electric obtained overhead trolley power oper- term vehicle” is defined same ated rails.” The “motor upon Title, the various throughout chapters Transportation e.g., 27-19-206, 27-49-219(b) see 27-16-207(b), §§ sum, view, In have violated some law my Baldridge may because he was a horse but I suggest riding alongside highway, that not she Cordes was reasonable when acting competently with a motor-vehicle offense. The most she charged Baldridge intoxication, could have with charged Baldridge public even the facts are much in charge, very question. with

Laveris Darnell TOWNSEND v. STATE Arkansas CR 01-822 85 S.W.3d 526 Court of Arkansas

Supreme delivered Opinion September denied October rehearing [Petition 2002.]