Smith v. City of Troy Ohio, 3:15-cv-00054

On Feb. 11, 2014 Victor L. Smith (who has epilepsy) drove into a yard, exited the vehicle and steadied himself on a 3-foot chain link fence while exhibiting erratic behavior; 9‑1‑1 reported suspicious activity.
Deputy Phillip Osting (Miami County) arrived first, ordered Smith to show his hands; Smith did not comply and pulled his right arm under his body while on the ground.
Officer S.A. Gates (City of Troy) arrived, warned Smith and used his Taser in drive‑stun mode repeatedly while officers restrained Smith; Taser logs show multiple activations over a recorded 53‑second period (48 seconds of exposure recorded across cycles).
Smith was handcuffed and taken to a hospital; he later sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force and failure to intervene), Monell municipal‑liability theories (failure to train/ratification), the ADA, and state claims for assault/battery/IIED. Ohio Medicaid filed a cross‑claim for medical costs.
The officers’ internal investigation found no policy violations; officers testified they perceived active resistance and that use of the Taser was within training; Smith’s recollection of events is inconsistent and limited.
The Court granted summary judgment to the officers, City of Troy, and Miami County on all federal claims, and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims (dismissed without prejudice). The Medicaid cross‑claim was also dismissed without prejudice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Excessive force (Fourth Amendment)	Smith contends repeated drive‑stunning was unreasonable and excessive.	Officers argue Smith actively resisted (arm under body), posed a threat, and Taser use was proportionate and within training.	Court: No excessive force; tasing reasonable given active resistance and perceived threat.
Qualified immunity	N/A (argues officers violated clearly established rights).	Officers: Even if force were excessive, qualified immunity applies because conduct did not violate clearly established law.	Court: Qualified immunity would apply (no clearly established violation).
Monell municipal liability (failure to train/ratification)	City/County failed to train and ratified conduct via inadequate investigation.	Municipalities: No pattern of similar constitutional violations, no deliberate indifference, and no causative policy.	Court: Summary judgment for municipalities; plaintiff failed to show policy, pattern, or deliberate indifference.
ADA (disability discrimination)	Smith argues County should be liable for failing to accommodate/recognize his seizure disorder.	Defendants: They did not know Smith was disabled and did not act because of a disability; no notice or discriminatory motive.	Court: Summary judgment for defendants; Smith cannot show defendants knew his disability or acted because of it.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (use‑of‑force objective reasonableness standard)
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (pretrial detainee excessive force standard turns on objective reasonableness)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qualified immunity framework)
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires policy or custom as moving force)
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (failure‑to‑train liability requires deliberate indifference)
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (municipal notice/deliberate indifference in training claims)
Kent v. Oakland County, 810 F.3d 384 (6th Cir.) (tasing cases assessing threat and reasonableness)