Small v. City of Hollywood, 661 F.Supp.3d 1187

Mary A. Small was hired by City of Hollywood PRCA in Feb 2020 as Grants & Special Projects Manager and served a one-year probationary period.
Small identifies three allegedly discriminatory comments during her employment: (1) a “CP time”/“Mexican time” remark at a site visit (not reported), (2) a PRCA Advisory Board member’s remark about “Jamaicans” (made outside her presence; she reported it up the chain and to HR), and (3) an interview-panel remark by coworker Sandra Betton implying African Americans are "lazy" (Small did not formally complain; she reacted to HR panelist Felissa Yarns).
After early tensions and supervisory concerns about Small’s management style and performance, some duties were reassigned to others and supervisors recommended termination; HR issued a June 1, 2020 termination letter citing failure to meet probationary expectations.
Small filed charges with the FCHR and EEOC and sued, alleging hostile work environment under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act and retaliation under Title VII.
The City moved for summary judgment. The court evaluated whether (a) the alleged comments established an objectively hostile work environment and (b) Small engaged in protected activity and whether her termination was pretextual.
The Court granted summary judgment for the City, dismissing all claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Hostile work environment (Title VII & FCRA)	Three racially charged comments created a hostile, abusive workplace	Comments were isolated, not severe or pervasive; some not directed at Small	Court: Not objectively hostile; isolated/sporadic incidents insufficient — SJ for City
Reliance on PRCA Advisory Board comment	Board member’s "Jamaicans" remark can support claim (asserted as racially related)	Small is not Jamaican; comment not about her or a group she belongs to	Court: cannot rely on that comment to support claim; even if considered, still insufficient
Retaliation — protected activity (opposition clause)	Small reported the Board comment to Vazquez and Styron, emailed HR (Kittinger), and signaled HR panelist after Betton’s remark	Reports were not objectively reasonable oppositions to unlawful employer practices; some complaints were informal/confidential and not known to decisionmakers	Court: No objectively reasonable belief of unlawful practice; therefore no protected activity — prima facie fails
Retaliation — pretext for termination	Small points to Vazquez’s alleged threat and timing to suggest retaliatory motive	City articulated nondiscriminatory reasons: poor fit, performance issues, staff tension; HR made final decision and was unaware of confidential report	Court: City met low production burden; Small failed to show pretext or but‑for causation — SJ for City

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard; genuine issue requirement)
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (summary judgment review)
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (hostile work environment standard: severe or pervasive)
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (hostile environment principles)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination/retaliation)
Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 1999) (subjective and objective hostility inquiry)
Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642 (11th Cir. 1997) (factors for objective hostile work environment)
Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997) (single derogatory remark by coworker insufficient to show unlawful practice)
Butler v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2008) (opposition must target an employer practice to be protected)
Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2016) (protected activity requires good‑faith, objectively reasonable belief)
Flowers v. Troup Cnty., Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2015) (McDonnell Douglas: focus on discriminatory intent)
Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2020) (but‑for causation requirement in retaliation)