Sligh v. City of Conroe, 87 F.4th 290

Background

At 1:39 a.m. July 5, 2018, officers responded to a 911 call that Olivia Sligh was suicidal and had cut herself; callers said she was unarmed and nonviolent.
Officer Tyson Sutton (City of Conroe) arrived with K9 “Thor”; Deputy Alexis Montes (Montgomery County) also responded.
Body‑cam video (attached to the motion to dismiss and referenced in the complaint) shows Sligh arguing with officers, briefly struggling with Montes, breaking free, then Sutton commanding Thor to bite. Thor bit Sligh in the upper thigh/leg area; Sutton repeatedly commanded release and eventually pulled Thor’s collar to free her.
Sligh sued: (1) §1983 excessive force against Sutton; (2) §1983 failure‑to‑intervene (bystander) against Montes; (3) §1983 municipal/Monell claims against City of Conroe; and (4) Title II ADA and §504 Rehabilitation Act failure‑to‑accommodate claims against City and Montgomery County.
The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss (including qualified immunity for the officers); Sligh appealed. The Fifth Circuit considered the video where it contradicted allegations.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Sligh)	Defendant's Argument	Held
§1983 excessive force (Sutton)	Use of a police dog to bite Sligh (including multiple bites) was an unreasonable, excessive seizure — no crime, not a threat, and Sligh needed medical help.	Sutton contends force was reasonable because Sligh resisted, may have been evasive/unknownly armed, and a dog bite was a proportionate response; qualified immunity applies.	Court: Sutton’s deployment of the dog without warning was a Fourth Amendment violation on the pleadings, but the right was not clearly established in these facts; Sutton entitled to qualified immunity.
§1983 failure‑to‑intervene (Montes)	Montes failed to intervene while the dog bit Sligh for over a minute.	Montes argues no clearly established duty to intervene here; qualified immunity applies.	Court: Montes entitled to qualified immunity; plaintiff failed to identify clearly established law requiring intervention under these circumstances.
Monell municipal liability (City of Conroe)	City had inadequate or permissive canine policies, failed to train or supervise Sutton, and ratified his conduct by not disciplining him.	City contends its canine policy restricts off‑leash use to armed/violent/fleeing suspects; no pattern of canine misuse; no deliberate indifference.	Court: Monell claims dismissed—plaintiff failed to show the policy was the moving force, deliberate indifference, a pattern of violations, or extreme facts supporting ratification.
ADA / Rehabilitation Act failure‑to‑accommodate (City & County)	Municipality failed to accommodate Sligh’s mental‑health disability (use of dog, lack of de‑escalation/training/policies, etc.).	Defendants argue exigent circumstances and that Sligh never requested accommodations or made her disability/limitations known.	Court: Dismissed—Sligh did not allege she requested accommodations or that her disability/limitations and required accommodations were open, obvious, and known to officers.

Key Cases Cited

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity two‑step framework)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (Graham factors for evaluating excessive force)
Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517 (5th Cir. 2016) (police dog use and prolonged bite as excessive force precedent)
Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (clearly established law standard for immunity)
Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 2011) (defining clearly established right standard)
Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2020) (Graham factors and measured force principle)
Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2010) (Monell moving‑force and policymaker knowledge elements)
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) (failure‑to‑train requires pattern to show deliberate indifference)
Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2017) (elements of an excessive force claim)