Skye Astiana v. the Hain Celestial Group
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 5833
9th Cir.2015Background
- Hain Celestial (and JĀSÖN) labeled cosmetics “All Natural,” “Pure Natural,” or similar; plaintiffs bought products alleging they contained synthetic/artificial ingredients despite those labels.
- Plaintiffs filed a putative nationwide class action under California consumer-protection and common-law theories seeking damages and injunctive relief for deceptive labeling.
- District court dismissed the quasi-contract claim and later dismissed the case under the primary jurisdiction doctrine so parties could seek FDA guidance; plaintiffs appealed.
- Hain argued FDCA express preemption of state-law claims and alternatively urged primary jurisdiction; plaintiffs argued state remedies for false/misleading labels are permitted and FDA has not defined “natural.”
- Ninth Circuit addressed (1) whether the FDCA expressly preempts state causes of action about misleading cosmetics labels, (2) whether invoking primary jurisdiction warranted dismissal rather than a stay, and (3) whether the quasi-contract claim was properly dismissed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| FDCA express preemption of state-law claims | Astiana: FDCA does not bar state-law damages for labels that are "false or misleading"; states can provide traditional remedies. | Hain: § 379s preempts any state claim that would impose labeling requirements different from federal rules. | FDCA does not expressly preempt state consumer causes of action alleging cosmetics labels are false or misleading; state remedies may proceed. |
| Primary jurisdiction — dismissal vs. stay | Astiana: Court should not have dismissed; at most stay pending FDA action; dismissal may prejudice class and tolling is unclear. | Hain: Primary jurisdiction appropriate; district court correctly deferred to FDA by dismissing to allow agency input. | Primary jurisdiction invocation was proper, but dismissal was error; court should have stayed proceedings (not dismissed) to avoid prejudice and preserve claims. |
| Whether FDA silence allows unfettered use of “natural” | Astiana: FDA’s lack of definition doesn’t permit misleading claims; FDA policy requires truthful labels. | Hain: FDA’s lack of regulation implies agency choice to allow manufacturers to use the term freely. | FDA’s failure to define “natural” is not tantamount to permitting misleading claims; § 362(a) prohibits false or misleading labeling. |
| Quasi-contract (restitution) claim viability | Astiana: Pleading supports quasi-contract seeking restitution for unjust enrichment from deceptive labeling. | Hain/district court: Restitution is not a standalone cause in California; claim nonsensical as pled. | Reversed district court: quasi-contract claim should be recognized as a vehicle to seek restitution; dismissal was improper. |
Key Cases Cited
- Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (state common-law damages remedies parallel to federal requirements are not necessarily preempted)
- Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005) (statutory preemption of labeling requirements does not bar state-law suits consistent with federal law)
- Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2008) (FDA-required ingredient lists do not shield manufacturers from liability for misleading packaging statements)
- Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2002) (primary jurisdiction is not a subject-matter-jurisdiction defense; doctrine explained)
- Clark v. Time Warner Cable, 523 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2008) (primary jurisdiction permits courts to defer to agency expertise on technical/policy questions)
- Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2007) (efficiency is the deciding factor in applying primary jurisdiction)
- Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258 (1993) (courts must consider potential delay from invoking primary jurisdiction)