Skinner v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 394 S.C. 428

Skinner, employed by Westinghouse, was exposed to asbestos at the Hampton plant for years.
He developed asbestosis and COPD, with medical evidence of occupational disease linked to asbestos exposure.
Skinner filed a 2004 workers’ compensation claim alleging injury to lungs and whole body from inhalation of asbestos and other contaminants.
The Workers' Compensation Commission awarded a lump-sum under the scheduled loss provisions, §42-9-30.
Westinghouse challenged the award, arguing Skinner must pursue general disability benefits under §42-9-10/20.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding 42-11-60 governs pulmonary-disease compensation, requiring loss of wages under §42-9-10/20.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does 42-11-60 bar pulmonary-disease claims from §42-9-30?	Skinner argues disease is occupational; §42-11-60 permits compensation under 42-9-30.	Westinghouse contends §42-11-60 requires loss of wages under §42-9-10/20, prohibiting §42-9-30 awards.	Yes; 42-11-60 controls and precludes §42-9-30 unless wages are lost.

Langley v. Pierce, 313 S.C. 401 (1993) (specific over general laws; precedence rules in statutory interpretation)
Lloyd v. Lloyd, 367 S.E.2d 153 (1988) (specific vs. general statutes precedence)
Fields v. Owens Corning Fiberglas, 393 S.E.2d 172 (1990) (general disability vs. scheduled loss distinction)
Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999) (dispositive issue relief limits further discussion)
Roper v. Kimbrell's of Greenville, Inc., 99 S.E.2d 52 (1957) (foundational analysis of disability schemes)