Skinner v. Switzer
131 S. Ct. 1289
| SCOTUS | 2011Background
- Skinner was convicted of murder in Texas in 1995 and sentenced to death.
- Texas law Article 64 allowed limited postconviction DNA testing; two threshold criteria existed.
- Skinner twice sought DNA testing under Article 64; both motions were denied by Texas courts.
- Texas courts found Skinner failed the required no-fault and probability-based showings; trial strategy defense noted.
- Skinner filed a §1983 civil action alleging a due process violation for denial of DNA testing; Fifth Circuit upheld habeas-only approach.
- This Court granted certiorari to decide whether §1983 can support postconviction DNA testing claims and the role of related doctrines.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction: Is Skinner’s §1983 claim cognizable? | Skinner asserts §1983 is proper for postconviction DNA testing. | Switzer argues claim must be habeas corpus under established doctrine. | §1983 claim is cognizable; not barred by Rooker-Feldman. |
| Rooker-Feldman applicability | Skinner's suit uses state-law procedures, not the state court judgment itself. | Switzer contends state-court judgment review bars federal action. | Rooker-Feldman does not bar the §1983 action. |
| Habeas vs. §1983 framework | Skinner’s claim seeks postconviction DNA testing without necessarily seeking release. | Switzer contends claim would necessarily imply invalidity of conviction, requiring habeas. | Skinner’s §1983 action is permissible because relief need not necessarily imply release. |
| Effect of Osborne on §1983 claims | Osborne limits substantive due process but leaves room for §1983 challenges to state procedures. | Osborne narrows federal action in DNA-testing context and limits grounds for §1983 relief. | Osborne does not bar Skinner’s §1983 challenge to state postconviction DNA-testing procedures. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U. S. 74 (2005) (parole-due-process claims may proceed under §1983 when no speedy release is sought)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994) (claims necessarily implying the invalidity of conviction are not §1983)
- Osborne v. District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist., 557 U. S. 52 (2009) (limits due-process theory in DNA-testing; narrow path for relief)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U. S. 280 (2005) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine confined; parallel state-federal actions analyzed)
- Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413 (1923) (original articulation of the Rooker-Feldman principle)
- District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462 (1983) (state-court judgments generally not reviewable by federal courts)
- Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973) (initial limits on §1983 to challenge of underlying confinement)
- Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U. S. 74 (2005) (distinguishes claims based on whether relief would speed release)