Skawski v. Greenfield Investors Property Development LLC
473 Mass. 580
Mass.2016Background
- In 2006 the Legislature enacted G. L. c. 185, § 3A, creating a "permit session" of the Land Court with original jurisdiction, concurrently with the Superior Court, over permit appeals for "major development" projects (≥25 dwelling units or ≥25,000 sq ft).
- Plaintiffs (abutters) timely appealed a Greenfield planning board special permit (retail project up to 135,000 sq ft) to the Housing Court in June 2011 under G. L. c. 40A, § 17.
- Defendants sought transfer to the Land Court permit session; that request was denied administratively. After Buccaneer (an Appeals Court decision holding § 3A deprived the Housing Court of jurisdiction over major-development permit appeals), defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
- The Housing Court judge denied dismissal (concerned dismissal would bar plaintiffs' timely review), reported the ruling, and the Appeals Court reversed, following Buccaneer.
- The Supreme Judicial Court granted further review to decide whether § 3A implicitly divested the Housing Court of jurisdiction over major-development permit appeals and, if so, whether dismissal or transfer is the appropriate remedy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether G. L. c. 185, § 3A divested the Housing Court of subject-matter jurisdiction over major-development permit appeals | Skawski: § 3A created a permit session but did not remove Housing Court jurisdiction under G. L. c. 40A, § 17 | Greenfield: § 3A implicitly stripped Housing Court jurisdiction; these appeals belong only in the permit session or Superior Court | Held: § 3A, by clear implication, limits jurisdiction for major-development permit appeals to the Land Court permit session and the Superior Court (Housing Court lacks jurisdiction) |
| Whether § 3A must express exclusivity to divest prior jurisdiction or can operate by implication | Skawski: absence of explicit repeal means Housing Court jurisdiction remains | Greenfield: implied repeal is proper where later statute comprehensively covers the field and conflicts with prior law | Held: Implied repeal found—context, legislative purpose of streamlining permitting, and specific listing of courts support exclusive allocation to permit session and Superior Court |
| Whether transfer, rather than dismissal, is the appropriate remedy when a case was timely filed in a court that lacks jurisdiction due to § 3A | Skawski: dismissal would unfairly bar timely-filed appeal; transfer is equitable | Greenfield: dismissal appropriate; plaintiffs can refile (but defendants would assert timeliness defense) | Held: Transfer is the appropriate remedy — case remanded to Housing Court so parties may seek immediate transfer to permit session or Superior Court; Chief Justice to act forthwith |
| Effect of Chief Justice's discretion to transfer to permit session on jurisdictional allocation | Skawski: discretion suggests Housing Court retains concurrent jurisdiction | Greenfield: discretion does not preserve Housing Court jurisdiction; it merely governs transfers to the specialized session | Held: The grant of discretion to transfer supports that the Legislature intended the permit session (and Superior Court) as the adjudicative fora; discretion does not preserve broad concurrent jurisdiction in Housing Court |
Key Cases Cited
- Buccaneer Dev., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Lenox, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 40 (2012) (Appeals Court held § 3A deprived Housing Court of jurisdiction over major-development permit appeals)
- Arno v. Commonwealth, 457 Mass. 434 (2010) (when jurisdiction doubtful, judge should seek transfer rather than dismiss)
- Konstantopoulos v. Whately, 384 Mass. 123 (1981) (court should request transfer to proper department rather than dismiss for lack of jurisdiction)
- ROPT Ltd. P'ship v. Katin, 431 Mass. 601 (2000) (remedy where lower court lacked jurisdiction: stay or request administrative assignment/transfer)
- Dartmouth v. Greater New Bedford Reg'l Voc. Tech. High Sch. Dist., 461 Mass. 366 (2012) (strong presumption against implied repeal; implied repeal only where clearly repugnant or comprehensive replacement)
- Palmer, 464 Mass. 773 (2013) (statutes do not repeal prior law absent express words or clear implication)
- Weems v. Citigroup Inc., 453 Mass. 147 (2009) (statutory interpretation focuses on legislative intent and purpose)
- Bagley v. Illyrian Gardens, Inc., 401 Mass. 822 (1988) (expressly granting jurisdiction to some courts can imply exclusion of others)
- Tilman v. Brink, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 845 (2009) (statutory inclusion/exclusion guides which courts may apply certain statutes)
- Bank of Am., N.A. v. Rosa, 466 Mass. 613 (2013) (principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius supports exclusion by express listing)