On January 9, 2008, Buccaneer Development, Inc. (Buccaneer), commenced an action in the permit session of the Land Court, appealing the denial of its application for a special permit by the zoning board of appeals (board) of the town of Lenox (town). G. L. c. 185, § 3A, inserted by St. 2006, c. 205, § 15. The special permit application sought permission to build a retirement community of twenty-three single-family homes on vacant land in the town. In its complaint, Buccaneer alleged that the board had erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in denying the special permit.
Buccaneer filed a motion to remand the case to the permit session of the Land Court on February 21, 2008, which was denied by a judge of the Housing Court (motion judge). Two years later, following a bench trial in the Housing Court, the board’s denial of the special permit was affirmed. Buccaneer appeals from the ensuing judgment.
Discussion. The sole issue before us is whether the Housing Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
We begin our inquiry with the language employed by the Legislature in G. L. c. 185, § 3A (permit session law or statute). See Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Morrison,
General Laws c. 185, § 3A, provides that the “[pjermit session shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the superior court department, over civil actions in whole or in part: (a) based on or arising out of the appeal of any municipal, regional or state permit . . . , or the denial thereof, concerning the use or development of real property, . . . [and] arising under . . . chapters 30A, 40A to 40C inclusive ... or any local bylaw or ordinance.” A case can be filed in the permit session “only if the underlying project or development involves either 25 or more dwelling units or the construction or alteration of 25,000 square feet or more of gross floor area or both.”
For actions not commenced in, but within the jurisdiction of, the permit session, the statute authorizes any party to file a motion with the chief justice of the trial court to transfer the action
In denying Buccaneer’s request to remand the case to the Land Court, the motion judge ruled: “Prior to the adoption of G. L. c. 185, § 3A (c. 205, § 15 of St. 2006) this court had subject matter jurisdiction over this residential zoning case. G. L. c. 185C, § 3; G. L. c. 40A, § 17. Nothing in c. 185, § 3A purports to change this court’s jurisdiction. Rather, that statute adds a new forum to the existing scheme.” We disagree with the motion judge’s ruling.
The legislative purpose of the permit session law is readily apparent from its title
General Laws c. 185C, § 3, confers general jurisdiction on the Housing Court over G. L. c. 40A appeals, concurrently with the District Court and Superior Court, and G. L. c. 40A, § 17, authorizes appeals of final decisions of a permitting authority to the Land Court, Superior Court, or, if the land is in Hampden Country, “to the division of the housing court department for said county.” In contrast, in G. L. c. 185, § 3A, the Legislature did not grant authority to the Housing Court to adjudicate the types of actions specified by the statute. The statute does not allow any necessary inference to the contrary, and “[w]e will not expand or limit the meaning of a statute unless such is required by the ‘object and plain meaning’ of the statute.” Norfolk &
The legal conclusion to be drawn from the Legislature’s omission of the Housing Court from the permit session law’s jurisdictional designation is clear. “If the omission was intentional, no court can supply it. If the omission was due to inadvertence, an attempt to supply it. . . would be tantamount to adding to a statute a meaning not intended by the Legislature.” Mitchell v. Mitchell,
It is also readily apparent that the Legislature has covered the field of permit-based actions arising from large-scale projects with its enactment of the permit session law. “It is a general principle that, where a statute covers the whole subject to which it relates, including means for redress for wrongs arising in connection with it, other provisions of law are superseded.” Knowlton v. Swampscott,
The fact that this case was tried in the Housing Court is of no consequence. “Consent or waiver by parties cannot confer jurisdiction over a cause not vested in the court by law.” Maley v. Fairhaven,
Conclusion. The corrected judgment dated December 14, 2010, is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the Housing Court, where the order denying Buccaneer’s motion to remand to the Land Court is to be reversed, and a new order is to be entered allowing such motion.
So ordered.
Notes
General Laws c. 185C, § 20, as amended through St. 1992, c. 379, § 56, provides in relevant part, “Any civil action within the jurisdiction of the housing court department which is pending in another [trial] court department may be transferred to the Housing Court by any party thereto.”
Apart from the threshold jurisdictional question, Buccaneer raises other assignments of error related to the merits of the case, which we do not address.
The preamble provides: “The deferred operation of this act would tend to defeat its purpose, which is to forthwith expedite the permitting process in the commonwealth, therefore it is hereby declared to be an emergency law, necessary for the immediate preservation of the public convenience.”
The statute sets out strict time standards for actions filed in the permit session. For an “A” case, the track designation of Buccaneer’s action, a trial must commence no later than twelve months from the filing of the action. G. L. c. 185, § 3A, sixth par. Matters assigned to the “F” track must be tried within nine months of commencement; and “X” track cases must be tried within six months. Ibid. The Legislature also directed the Land Court to establish a procedure for mediation, subject to court rules, that promotes the “expeditious resolution” of cases “within the time periods provided in this chapter.” G. L. c. 185, § 3A, ninth par.
A plaintiff initiating an action for review in the permit session must complete and file a specific civil cover sheet, the terms of which require the plaintiff’s counsel to certify that the action satisfies “the threshold requirements for the permit session.” Buccaneer filed the necessary cover sheet.
The title of an act is helpful in interpreting the language of a statute, though it is not conclusive. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund v. Safety Ins. Co.,
The case shall be adjudged in light of the town by-law as it existed in December, 2007. We see no merit in the board’s suggestion that Buccaneer’s notice of appeal was untimely.