Sizemore v. Deemer, 174 N.E.3d 5

On March 23, 2017, Carl Sizemore pushed his disabled 2008 Pontiac up a left turn onto Pearl Street; the street sloped downhill and the car accelerated, striking a parked Ford Escort and pinning Sizemore; he later died of his injuries.
The parked Escort belonged to Scott Deemer, who had parked on Pearl Street (allegedly within 20 feet of a crosswalk); Deemer had no insurance on that vehicle.
Paula Sizemore, as administrator of the estate, sued Deemer for negligence and also sought uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage from Sizemore’s insurer, Auto-Owners; Deemer later obtained a bankruptcy discharge, leaving Auto-Owners as the sole defendant.
Auto-Owners moved for summary judgment, arguing Deemer’s alleged parking violation could not be the proximate cause of Sizemore’s death; the estate produced an expert report asserting a “but-for” causal opinion.
The magistrate and trial court granted summary judgment for Auto-Owners, concluding any parking violation merely furnished a condition and was not a foreseeable proximate cause, and that Sizemore’s own loss of control was the intervening cause.
The estate appealed; the Third District affirmed, holding the expert’s “but‑for” opinion established only causation-in-fact and not legal proximate cause.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Deemer’s alleged illegal parking was the proximate cause of Sizemore’s death	But-for Deemer parking within 20 feet of the crosswalk, Sizemore would not have been killed; expert opines causation	Illegal parking merely furnished a condition; it was not foreseeable that a third party would push, lose control, and crash into the parked car	Court: No proximate cause; parking was only a condition that made the harm possible, not its legal cause
Whether the expert’s "but‑for" opinion raises a genuine issue of material fact	Expert report states death would not have occurred but‑for parked car, creating triable issue	Expert establishes only causation-in-fact; foreseeability (proximate cause) is a distinct legal question	Court: Expert proved only factual causation; does not satisfy proximate-cause requirement
Whether Sizemore’s actions/intervening acts break the causal chain	Estate contends Sizemore was in control while pushing and his conduct does not negate proximate causation	Sizemore lost control and was operating in violation of R.C. 4511.202; his acts were an independent intervening cause	Court: Sizemore’s loss of control was an intervening proximate cause; reasonable minds could only find against estate

Cromer v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Akron, 142 Ohio St.3d 257 (2015) (elements of negligence and summary judgment standard cited)
Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prods., Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 75 (1984) (definition of negligence elements)
Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317 (1977) (summary judgment standard under Civ.R. 56)
Mussivand v. David, 45 Ohio St.3d 314 (1989) (foreseeability as requirement for proximate cause)
Cascone v. Herb Kay Co., 6 Ohio St.3d 155 (1983) (intervening act may break causal chain)
Ackison v. Anchor Packing Co., 120 Ohio St.3d 228 (2008) (distinction between types of causation)
Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 127 Ohio St.3d 54 (2010) (de novo review of summary judgment)