Six Flags America v. Gonzalez-Perdomo, 242 A.3d 1143

On July 22, 2015, ten-year-old Daniel Gomez‑Gonzalez slipped and fell on a wooden pedestrian bridge at Six Flags America near the Shipwreck Falls ride; plaintiff (mother) sued on his behalf for negligence, alleging the park allowed water to continuously splash onto and leave the bridge dangerously slippery.
Six Flags moved for summary judgment arguing the wet condition was open and obvious (no duty to warn/cure); the trial court denied summary judgment and later denied renewed motions for judgment at trial.
Trial evidence: witnesses (including Six Flags corporate designees) testified the bridge was visibly wet from ride splashing; plaintiff’s expert testified lack of non‑skid surface and inadequate signage; a small, high "Caution Wet Floor" sign existed; prior matting had been removed.
The jury found Six Flags negligent, rejected contributory negligence and assumption of risk, and awarded $45,000 in non‑economic damages; Six Flags appealed.
The Court of Special Appeals held the trial court did not abuse discretion in denying summary judgment or in declining to add a special‑verdict question, but reversed because the court erred in refusing to give two requested jury instructions on the open‑and‑obvious doctrine and remanded for a new trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Gomez‑Perdomo)	Defendant's Argument (Six Flags)	Held
1) Was summary judgment / judgment appropriate because the wet condition was open and obvious as a matter of law?	The wet condition could be dangerous; jury should decide whether danger was perceivable; duty exists unless condition indisputably open and obvious.	The bridge was openly and obviously wet; no duty to warn or cure; judgment should be entered for Six Flags.	Denied — factual record permitted reasonable juror to find the slipperiness risk was not necessarily appreciated; issue for jury.
2) Did the court err by refusing Six Flags’ requested jury instructions stating there is no duty to warn of open and obvious conditions?	Requested instructions accurately stated Maryland law and applied; omission prejudiced defendant.	Instructions were unnecessary or sufficiently covered by pattern charges.	Reversed — trial court abused discretion by refusing two requested instructions that correctly stated the law, applied to the evidence, and were not fairly covered by other instructions; prejudice was probable.
3) Was the court required to include a special‑verdict question on the verdict sheet about the open‑and‑obvious issue?	(Gomez‑Perdomo) Not required; general verdict sufficient.	(Six Flags) A written finding on open‑and‑obvious was necessary to protect its defense.	No error — trial court’s refusal to include a separate written question was not an abuse of discretion.

Casper v. Charles F. Smith & Sons, 316 Md. 573 (Md.) (adopting open‑and‑obvious danger rationale; no duty to warn of obvious natural water hazards)
Tennant v. Shoppers Food Warehouse Md. Corp., 115 Md. App. 381 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (business owner owes invitee duty of ordinary care but no duty to warn of open, obvious, and present dangers)
Lloyd v. Bowles, 260 Md. 568 (Md.) (if injured person knew or should have known of the dangerous condition, there is no recovery)
Doe v. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co., Inc., 388 Md. 407 (Md.) (existence of duty is a legal question for the court)
Mathews v. Cassidy Turley Md., Inc., 435 Md. 584 (Md.) (summary judgment standard; construing inferences against moving party)
Dashiell v. Meeks, 396 Md. 149 (Md.) (trial court has discretion when denying summary judgment to allow full factual development)
Fleming v. State, 373 Md. 426 (Md.) (trial judge must give requested instruction that correctly states law and is not fairly covered elsewhere)
Armacost v. Davis, 462 Md. 504 (Md.) (civil jury‑instruction error requires showing prejudice is probable, not merely possible)
Gellerman v. Shawan Rd. Hotel Ltd. P’ship, 5 F. Supp. 2d 351 (D. Md.) (federal decision applying Maryland law finding some conditions open and obvious; discussed as nonbinding persuasive authority)