delivered the opinion of the Court.
Thе action giving rise to this appeal was a suit filed by the appellant Velma Lloyd for injuries sustained by her while leaving a beauty parlor owned by the appellee Ruby Sokolowski which was being remodeled by appellee William Bowles. A jury vеrdict for $7500 was returned in Baltimore City Court in favor of the appellant. On March 12, 1970, Judge J. Harold Grady entered judgment n.o.v. in favor of both appellees. We must decide in this appeal whether that ruling was correct.
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The facts behind the lawsuit are sоmewhat lengthy, but not involved. Before proceeding to a consideration of those facts, we note that in reviewing on appeal a defendant’s motion for judgment n.o.v., the evidence and all reasonable inferences to bе taken from that evidence must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
I.O.A. Leasing Corp. v. Merle Thomas Corp.,
Mrs. Lloyd was a long-timе weekly customer at Mrs. Sokolowski’s beauty parlor. The approach to the beauty parlor had for some time consisted of a ramp leading from the sidewalk, between two display windows, to the front door, which was recessed sоme fifteen feet from the building line. Within a week prior to the day of the accident, remodeling of the entrance had taken place. This remodeling, undertaken to enlarge the working area of the beauty parlor, had progressed to the point that the incline or ramp had been replaced with two concrete steps (consisting of two risers and one tread) leading to a new storm door which was almost flush with the front of the building. The doorsill of the new door was flush with the riser оf the top step. The former outside door was now an interior door at the end of a hallway. This remodeling was being performed by appellee Bowles.
The appellant arrived for her appointment at approximately 4:00 P.M. on April 7,1965, and entered the beauty parlor by way of the new steps. She was leaving the shop at approximately 6:00 P.M. when the accident occurred. She had finished her appointment, proceeded through the interior door which was propped open, opened the new *571 door by pulling it toward her (which placed her one or two feet from the top riser), and took one or two steps before coming to the top riser. Mrs. Lloyd testified that she was wearing hеr glasses at the time (she had had a cataract removal about six or seven years before, and could see almost nothing without them), that it was “pretty nearly dark” outside, that she looked down to see what was in front of her when she opеned the door, but that the steps and sidewalk “blended together” and “looked all like sidewalk.” She further stated that there was no lighting on the steps, that the only outside light came from across the street, and that a large canopy or awning covered the entrance to the beauty parlor. She also noted that there was a light in the ceiling behind her, but “no lights on the door.” For whatever reason, when Mrs. Lloyd passed through the doorway she thought that she was stepping directly onto the sidеwalk and stepped out instead of down. She then fell and broke her hip. On cross-examination Mrs. Lloyd stated that she “saw the street and steps both,” but reiterated in the same sentence that “they all looked alike.” 1 The appellees, through the testimony of Mrs. Sоkolowski, introduced evidence that in each of the front windows there were two spotlights which were designed to “show what was being displayed in the window,” two 70 watt bulbs between the spotlights in each window, and two other bulbs on the side of each window — “enоugh light to make it really bright.” This is the only evidence relative to the condition of the lighting in the store which the appellant could not be said to have challenged unless one were to regard her general statements concerning outside *572 lights аs precluding the possibility that the front windows were illuminated. We do not regard her statements as controverting the appellee’s evidence, and assume for the purpose of this opinion that the front windows were illuminated as Mrs. Sokolowski tеstified. Indeed, in all fairness, it may be said that this statement of Mrs. Sokolowski’s concerning the front window illumination is corroborated by the signed statement which Mrs. Lloyd gave the day following the accident in which she recalled: “It was still daylight outside and there arе lights lit in the new room being built on the shop. * * *”
This Court, not infrequently, has had occasion to repeat the general statement of the law governing the duty owed by the proprietor of a commercial establishment to a business invitee, to the effеct that the shopkeeper must take care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and give warning of latent or concealed perils.
Mondawmin Corporation, v. Kres,
In order to find liability on the part of the storeowner the jury must find, (1) that the storeowner had actual or constructive notice of a condition which created an unreasonable risk of harm to thе invitee, (2) that the store-owner should have anticipated that the invitee would not discover the condition or realize the danger, or would fail to protect herself from the danger, and (3) that the store-owner failed to take reasonable means to make the prem
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ises safe or to give adequate warning of the condition to the invitee.
Gast, Inc. v. Kitchner,
Many years ago this Court noted that different levels connected by steps is a relatively normal condition to be anticipated by persons of ordinary sensibilities, and that an owner of premises would not be liable to an invitee for injuries sustained by falling on the steps, absent something unusual about the construction or surrounding conditions of them.
Long v. Joestlein,
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This Court has, on priоr occasions, considered what is termed the “blending effect” of certain materials as being the cause of the plaintiff’s injury. See
Manor Country Club, Inc. v. Richardson,
We think a look at the testimony in the record explains better than narration the lack of any real issue on the questiоn of lighting. Mrs. Lloyd on cross-examination responded in this manner:
* * *
“Q. Could you see the street from the door when you opened it?
A. I saw the street and steps both, but they all looked alike because it was dark and cloudy, and drizzly, and it was just a miserable night.
* & *
“Q. Never tripped down a step when you missed a step ?
A. I cоuldn’t tell you. I could have tripped on the weatherstripping. It was sitting up far enough.
Q. You could have tripped on the weather stripping. When did you remember that?
*575 “A. I couldn’t say. I’m just bringing it up as a point. I didn’t remember it specially. I’m just bringing it up.
K. Well, did you see weather stripping?
A. Yes, I saw it.
Q. So it was plain enough to see it, light enough and clear enough to see the weather stripping, right? What else did you see beside the weather stripping?
A. I just saw the sidewalk, I thought.”
The evidence thus indicates that it was not yet dark outside, and that there was enough light, from whatever source, so that Mrs. Llоyd could not only see the steps in question, but the weather stripping as well. There was never any allegation by Mrs. Lloyd that she could not see where she was going. We cannot find anything in the case at bar which would have indicated to the appellees that they were creating an unreasonable risk of harm. And, even if the appellees had realized that they were creating an unreasonable risk, there is nothing in the record to indicate that they had any reason to assume that the “unreasonable risk” (if such existed) would not be discovered by Mrs. Lloyd or any other customer leaving the beauty parlor at that time of day. Accordingly, we conclude that the appellant failed to establish any primary negligencе on the part of either of the appellees, and for that reason, we need not discuss any question of Mrs. Lloyd’s contributory negligence.
There remains but one further matter to be discussed. Appellant contends that evidence which shе introduced relative to possible Building Code violations in the construction of the steps was improperly excluded. A review of the record indicates that there was never any proof that the pertinent sections of the Building Code were applicable to the building in which the beauty parlor was located, and as we have stated earlier in this opinion, it is apparent from the testimony that any alleged violations *576 in the construction of the steps were not the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by Mrs. Lloyd.
For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the lower court should be affirmed.
Judgments affirmed; costs to be paid by appellant.
Notes
. Lest one be misled, it should be noted that the appellees introduced substantial evidence which was in direct oppоsition to the appellant’s contentions, including a written statement given by the appellant the day after the accident. However, the appellant stated in her oral testimony that she “really didn’t read” the statement, that she was groggy whеn she signed it [she had undergone an operation to insert a pin in her hip that day], and otherwise disputed most of the appellees’ evidence. It is obvious from the verdict that the jury chose to believe appellant’s oral testimony, and for the reasons previously stated we assume the truth of that testimony.