Sister Michael Marie v. American Red Cross
771 F.3d 344
6th Cir.2014Background
- Sisters Michael Marie and Mary Cabrini, Catholic nuns, volunteered for the First Capital District Chapter of the American Red Cross and the Ross County Emergency Management Agency (RCEMA) for years but received no regular salary, W-2/W-4/I-9 treatment, or traditional employee benefits.
- They performed administrative and disaster-relief–related tasks, occasionally received training, incidental reimbursements, and eligibility for certain contingency insurance coverages; they sought (unpaid) promotions but were denied and then had their volunteer status terminated in November 2009.
- Sisters filed charges with state and federal agencies; OCRC dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; Sisters then sued in federal court asserting Title VII and Ohio Civil Rights Act religious-discrimination/retaliation claims and § 1983 and Bivens constitutional claims against RCEMA, Bethel, Red Cross, and McCord.
- District court dismissed § 1983 claims against Red Cross and McCord for lack of state action, granted summary judgment to defendants on Title VII and OCRA claims (finding Sisters were not employees), and granted summary judgment to RCEMA/Bethel on § 1983 claims (no First Amendment retaliation or equal protection violation). Magistrate’s denial of further discovery extensions was upheld.
- Sixth Circuit affirmed: volunteers did not fairly approximate employees under the Darden common-law agency factors as applied in this Circuit (Bryson); constitutional claims failed for lack of state action or insufficient evidence; Bivens claims were not pleaded adequately; discovery denial not an abuse of discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sisters were "employees" under Title VII | Sisters argued long-term volunteer relationship, organizational evaluations, access to benefits/training, and role in regular business made them employees | Defendants argued no salary, tax treatment, traditional benefits, or meaningful control; relationship was volunteer-only | Court held Sisters were not employees under Darden factors as applied in Bryson; summary judgment for defendants on Title VII and OCRA claims |
| Whether financial/remuneration factors should be threshold for volunteer-employee analysis | Sisters urged downweighting remuneration because volunteers rarely receive pay | Defendants relied on weight of remuneration, benefits, and tax treatment to show non-employee status | Court followed Bryson: weigh all Darden factors (remuneration is relevant but not dispositive); here financial factors weighed against employee status |
| First Amendment retaliation (§ 1983) against RCEMA/Bethel | Sisters claimed termination retaliated against protected religious expression (habits, volunteer activity) | RCEMA/Bethel said termination was management decision unrelated to religion; no causal link shown | Court held Sisters failed to show protected conduct was a motivating factor or causal nexus; summary judgment for RCEMA/Bethel |
| Equal Protection (§ 1983) against RCEMA/Bethel | Sisters alleged discriminatory disparate treatment based on religion | Defendants showed mass volunteer database update and widespread terminations; no evidence Sisters were singled out for religion | Court found no evidence of disparate treatment tied to religion; claim failed |
| § 1983 / state-action and Bivens claims vs. Red Cross and McCord | Sisters alleged Red Cross acted under color of state/federal law because of federal charter and disaster-response role | Defendants argued Red Cross is private; mere government funding/cooperation not state action; Bivens not pleaded and not available against private/federal entities in these forms | Court dismissed § 1983 claims for lack of state action under public-function, nexus, and entwinement tests; Bivens claims not pleaded and would be improper against these defendants |
| Denial of additional discovery time | Sisters argued they needed more discovery; delays partially due to pending motions and Red Cross cooperation issues | Defendants noted Sisters were dilatory and court already granted extensions; magistrate’s timeline reasonable | Court held district court did not abuse discretion: Sisters were not diligent and extensions would be unwarranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Darden v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (adopts common-law agency factors to determine employee status)
- Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 656 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 2011) (apply Darden factors to volunteer context; weigh all factors, remuneration relevant but not dispositive)
- Thaddeus‑X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999) (test for First Amendment retaliation causation and remedies)
- Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard for plausible claims under Rule 12(b)(6))
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading standard requiring factual plausibility)
- Rendell‑Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (government funding/cooperation does not automatically create state action)