Sindicato Puertorriqueño de Trabajadores, Seiu Local 1996 v. Fortuño, 699 F.3d 1

Three labor unions and one SEIU-affiliated nonprofit challenge Sections 6.007–6.010 of Law 222, Puerto Rico’s campaign finance statute, alleging a First Amendment burden on political speech by juridical persons.
Law 222 requires a restrictive procedural scheme (membership meetings, majority-vote approvals, and informed consent) before a juridical person may make election-related expenditures or establish segregated funds; violations carry criminal and civil penalties.
The challenged provisions were enacted in 2011 to align Puerto Rico law with Citizens United, and predecessors limited union political expenditures under Law 45.
Plaintiffs began implementing political proposals shortly after Law 222’s passage and purportedly spent funds promoting the proposals; discovery and motion practice proceeded slowly, with two mandamus petitions to this court urging timely rulings.
The district court denied a preliminary injunction; this court granted an appellate injunction pending appeal and later remanded to enter a narrow injunction, which is dissolved here with guidance on prospective relief.
The court’s analysis centers on whether the First Amendment is violated by the law’s internal-governance restrictions and whether strict scrutiny applies.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
What standard applies to Law 222’s restrictions?	Law 222 triggers strict scrutiny against core political-speech restrictions.	Law 222 should be reviewed under exacting scrutiny for disclosure-like controls.	Strict scrutiny applies.
Do the unions have likelihood of success on the merits?	Law 222 facially burdens juridical-person political speech and is not narrowly tailored.	The defenses were not adequately briefed; merits not addressed below.	Strong likelihood of success on First Amendment claim.
Is there irreparable injury without injunction?	Loss of First Amendment rights constitutes irreparable harm; chilling effect is present.	Irreparable injury not shown due to delay and lack of concrete plans.	Irreparable injury established.
Are the balance of harms and public interest in favor of injunction?	Public interest favors robust political speech and informed electorate; restrictions exceed minimal necessity.	Maintenance of governmental informational tools and orderly regulation argued to favor denial.	Public interest and balance of harms favor injunction pending appeal.

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (strict scrutiny vs. disclosure for independent expenditures; speech protections strong)
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (recognizes distinctions between direct contributions and speech)
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (unconstitutional impairment of First Amendment freedoms constitutes irreparable injury)
Respect Maine PAC v. McKee, 622 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2010) (ripeness and public-interest considerations in political-financing challenges)
New Eng. Reg'l Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2002) (facial challenges present pure questions of law)
Daggett v. Daggett, 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000) (detailing exacting scrutiny framework for certain campaign-regulation issues)
El Día, Inc. v. Hernández Colón, 963 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1992) (First Amendment concerns and chilling effects in speech cases)
Maceira v. Pagan, 649 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1981) (irreparable injury concept in First Amendment context)