377 P.3d 1003
Ariz. Ct. App.2016Background
- Two petitioners charged with sexual conduct with a minor under 15 were denied bail under A.R.S. § 13-3961(A)(3); one remained detained, the other later obtained high bail after a renewed hearing.
- § 13-3961(A)(3) bars bail upon a showing that "proof is evident or the presumption great" of guilt for listed offenses (including sexual conduct with a minor <15), with no mandated inquiry into whether release conditions could protect victims/community.
- By contrast, § 13-3961(D) (and related provisions) permits denial of bail only after the State proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is dangerous and that no release conditions can reasonably assure safety.
- Petitioners brought a facial due-process challenge arguing § 13-3961(A)(3) is unconstitutional because it denies the individualized dangerousness inquiry required by Salerno.
- The court accepted special-action jurisdiction, considered Salerno controlling, and concluded the statute is facially unconstitutional because it omits the Salerno third-prong individualized inquiry into whether release conditions can manage dangerousness.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether A.R.S. §13-3961(A)(3) is facially unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause for denying bail without considering manageability of danger | §13-3961(A)(3) is facially unconstitutional because it bars bail upon likely guilt alone and never permits a court to determine if release conditions could protect victims/community | Arizona argues offense-based categorical denial is historically accepted and procedural protections (hearing, cross-examination) suffice; statute serves compelling regulatory purpose to protect children | Court: §13-3961(A)(3) is facially unconstitutional because it fails Salerno’s required individualized inquiry that no conditions can reasonably assure safety |
| Whether Salerno requires the government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no release conditions can assure safety before pretrial detention for dangerousness | Petitioners: Salerno’s safeguards (probable cause + clear and convincing proof in adversary hearing that no conditions can assure safety) are constitutionally required | State/dissent: Salerno did not mandate identical procedures in all contexts; offense-based rules can be narrowly tailored and constitutionally permissible | Court: Salerno’s third prong (individualized, manageability inquiry) is a constitutional minimum here; absence of that inquiry is fatal |
| Whether petitioners should instead receive hearings under A.R.S. §13-3961(D) (clear-and-convincing dangerousness standard) | Petitioners: Because (A)(3) is unconstitutional, defendants charged with dangerous crimes against children must get §13-3961(D)-style hearings | State: (implicit) (A)(3) process and its hearing suffices; §13-3961(D) is distinct and not raised directly | Court: Relief granted—(A)(3) and corresponding constitutional provision violate due process; petitioners’ bail-entitlement hearings should be governed by §13-3961(D) |
| Whether this is a proper facial challenge and the court has jurisdiction | Petitioners: Special-action jurisdiction proper; appeal is inadequate because issue becomes moot post-trial and question is recurring/statewide | State: (implicit) challenge is difficult and statute may be valid in some applications | Court: Accepted special-action jurisdiction and granted relief; found facial invalidity because statute lacks required hearing in all applications |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (U.S. 1987) (upholding pretrial detention statute that required probable cause and clear-and-convincing proof that no release conditions could assure safety)
- Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (invalidating a different Arizona categorical-bail provision and discussing limits on offense-based detention)
- Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (U.S. 2003) (upholding mandatory detention in immigration context while applying a different, deferential analysis)
- Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (U.S. 1992) (emphasizing that detention requires a careful, limited scheme tied to current dangerousness)
- Simpson v. Owens, 207 Ariz. 261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (addressing Arizona’s "proof is evident or presumption great" hearing procedures; court clarifies Simpson I did not resolve Salerno’s third-prong issue)
- Segura v. Cunanan, 219 Ariz. 228 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming procedural protections for no-bail hearings but not resolving the individualized dangerousness requirement at issue here)