912 F.3d 542
10th Cir.2018Background
- On Jan 16, 2006 Simpson followed a car from a nightclub parking lot and fired an assault rifle into it, killing Glen Palmer and Anthony Jones and wounding London Johnson; Simpson and two companions fled, switched cars, and disposed of the weapon.
- At trial Simpson was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder (and related counts) and the jury recommended death; the state trial and OCCA proceedings admitted extensive aggravation (including a prior armed-robbery conviction) and mitigation (PTSD diagnosis, family testimony).
- Trial court excluded Dr. Massad’s PTSD testimony at the guilt stage (allowed at sentencing); defense argued PTSD (and dissociation/intoxication) negated specific intent; prosecution used jailhouse informant Roy Collins at sentencing whose credibility was later challenged as Brady material.
- Simpson pursued state direct appeal and post-conviction petitions; OCCA affirmed convictions and death sentences (struck HAC as to one victim but found no prejudice) and denied post-conviction relief; federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 was denied by the district court.
- The Tenth Circuit granted and/or considered numerous claims on habeas: exclusion of PTSD evidence (right to present defense), Brady withholding re: Collins, prosecutorial misconduct at sentencing, jury instruction limiting mitigation, sufficiency of HAC aggravator for Palmer, multiple ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) theories, and cumulative error.
- Applying AEDPA deference, the Tenth Circuit affirmed denial of habeas relief on all claims: it upheld exclusion of the PTSD evidence, found the Brady claim procedurally defaulted (and not materially prejudicial), rejected mitigation-instruction and prosecutorial-misconduct challenges, upheld the HAC finding as to Palmer, and denied IAC and cumulative-error relief.
Issues
| Issue | Simpson's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Right to present PTSD evidence at guilt stage | PTSD (alone or with intoxication) negated specific intent; exclusion violated right to present a complete defense | Oklahoma law limits such expert testimony except in insanity/intoxication contexts; Dr. Massad lacked opinion tying PTSD to lack of specific intent | OCCA decision reasonable under AEDPA; no clearly established Supreme Court law requiring admission; exclusion upheld |
| Brady (suppression of Collins impeachment material) | Prosecution withheld Collins video, records, and expectation of deals that impeach credibility and support prejudice at sentencing | State: claim waived in state court; evidence cumulative or not material to sentence | OCCA procedural bar upheld; petitioner cannot show prejudice/materiality—no relief; discovery/evidentiary hearing denied |
| Mitigation instruction and prosecutor argument | Jury instruction + prosecutor repeatedly framed mitigators as only those that reduce moral culpability, effectively precluding consideration of mitigation | State: instruction and argument did not preclude consideration; jury was properly instructed and mitigation presented | Under AEDPA, OCCA reasonably found no unconstitutional limitation; instruction accurate in context and no reasonable likelihood jurors were precluded |
| Prosecutorial misconduct (sentencing) | Multiple rebuttal and closing comments improperly denigrated mitigation, appealed to civic duty, and compared victims to defendant, rendering sentencing fundamentally unfair | State: comments were within latitude of argument and did not affect outcome given strong aggravating evidence | Many remarks improper, but cumulative effect not so prejudicial given overwhelming aggravation; OCCA decision reasonable |
| Sufficiency of HAC aggravator (Palmer) | Evidence insufficient to show "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" (conscious physical suffering) | Evidence (four wounds, conscious statements, labored breathing, autopsy) supports conscious suffering | OCCA reasonably applied Jackson standard; HAC as to Palmer supported |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel (investigation/presenting mitigation; failure to request 2nd-degree instruction; failures to object) | Counsel failed to develop mitigating background, preserve jury-instruction issues, and object to prosecutorial misconduct/instructions | State: much mitigation was cumulative or was already presented; requested lesser-included instruction unwarranted; no reasonable probability of different result | Under Strickland + AEDPA, OCCA reasonably found no prejudice; failure to request second-degree instruction was not deficient because evidence did not support it; other IAC claims denied |
| Cumulative error | Aggregation of errors deprived Simpson of fair trial/sentencing | Errors were harmless individually; cumulative effect insufficient to undermine reliability | OCCA reasonably held errors harmless in aggregate given strong evidence of guilt and aggravation; habeas relief denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007) (state-court factual findings presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (limits federal habeas review of state-court records under AEDPA)
- Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) (constitutional right to present a defense constrained by evidentiary rules)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor must disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (sufficiency of the evidence — rational trier of fact standard)
- Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) (prosecutorial remarks judged in context; may be permissible argument about weight of mitigation)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (unreasonable application standard under AEDPA requires that no fairminded jurist could agree)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (aggravating factors function as elements requiring jury factfinding)
- Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (habeas relief impossible without clearly established Supreme Court precedent)
