Simpson v. Carpenter, 912 F.3d 542

Background

On Jan 16, 2006 Simpson shot into a car with an assault rifle after an earlier altercation at a club; two passengers (Palmer, Jones) died and one (Johnson) survived. Simpson was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death after a bifurcated trial.
Defense presented PTSD diagnosis (Dr. Massad) and mitigation witnesses at sentencing; trial court excluded Dr. Massad’s PTSD testimony at the guilt phase as improper to negate specific intent outside intoxication/insanity contexts.
Sentencing-stage aggravators found: prior violent felony, risk of multiple deaths, HAC, and continuing threat; HAC as to Jones was later stricken by the OCCA but the death sentences remained.
Key contested points on federal habeas: (1) exclusion of PTSD/dissociation evidence at guilt phase; (2) alleged Brady suppression of impeachment evidence about jailhouse witness Roy Collins; (3) prosecutorial misconduct and jury instruction limiting mitigation; (4) sufficiency of evidence for HAC as to Palmer; (5) multiple ineffective-assistance claims; and (6) cumulative error.
The OCCA rejected Simpson’s direct and post-conviction claims; the federal district court denied §2254 relief but granted limited COA; the Tenth Circuit affirms under AEDPA deference, applying the §2254(d) standards.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Exclusion of PTSD expert at guilt phase (right to present defense)	Simpson: Dr. Massad’s PTSD testimony was relevant to negate specific intent and to explain interaction with intoxication; exclusion violated right to present a defense.	State: Oklahoma law bars diminished-capacity-type testimony absent intoxication or insanity; Massad’s opinion lacked linkage to mens rea.	AEDPA deference: OCCA reasonably found testimony irrelevant to intent and to intoxication; no relief.
Brady suppression re: Roy Collins impeachment evidence	Simpson: Prosecutors withheld impeachment (video showing gang ties and similar prior statements, arrest/conviction records, expectation of assistance), which was material to sentencing (continuing threat).	State: Evidence was either disclosed in part or cumulative and not material; claim procedurally defaulted in state court.	OCCA found claim waived; on habeas court applies cause/prejudice analysis and finds no Brady materiality — no reasonable probability of different sentence.
Jury instruction on mitigation + prosecutorial argument limiting mitigation	Simpson: Instruction + repeated prosecutor statements narrowed jurors’ ability to consider mitigation (must reduce moral culpability).	State: Instruction read in context with other instructions and mitigation list; prosecutor’s remarks were within advocacy or not sufficiently prejudicial.	OCCA’s merits denial reasonable under AEDPA; overall instructions and mitigation evidence meant no unreasonable likelihood jury was precluded from considering mitigation.
Prosecutorial misconduct (sentencing-phase comments)	Simpson: Multiple improper comments (moral-culpability framing, denigration, victim comparisons, civic-duty appeals) so infected sentencing it was fundamentally unfair.	State: Comments must be judged in context, strength of evidence, and jury instructions; errors were harmless.	Under AEDPA the OCCA reasonably concluded misconduct did not render sentencing fundamentally unfair given overwhelming aggravating evidence.
HAC aggravator sufficiency as to Palmer	Simpson: Insufficient evidence that Palmer suffered conscious physical suffering beyond the brief that would support HAC.	State: Testimony showed Palmer was shot multiple times, conscious, struggling to breathe, fearful — a rational juror could find conscious suffering.	Reviewing for Jackson + AEDPA deference, OCCA reasonably concluded evidence supported HAC as to Palmer.
Ineffective assistance of counsel (investigation, objections, jury instructions, failure to request lesser offense)	Simpson: Counsel failed to investigate/present more mitigation, failed to object to prosecutorial misconduct and instructions, and failed to request a second-degree depraved-mind instruction.	State: Many omissions were strategic or would be cumulative; omitted mitigation was largely cumulative or might have invited damaging rebuttal; second-degree instruction not supported by evidence.	Under Strickland and AEDPA, OCCA reasonably denied relief—either no deficient performance or no resulting prejudice.
Cumulative error	Simpson: Even if individual errors are harmless, their aggregate effect denied a fair trial/sentencing.	State: Errors were either non-constitutional or harmless; aggravating evidence was compelling.	OCCA’s cumulative-harmlessness determination was reasonable; no entitlement to habeas relief.

Key Cases Cited

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007) (state-court factual findings presumed correct on federal habeas absent clear and convincing rebuttal)
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (AEDPA review limited; evidentiary hearings and scope of review constrained)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (§2254(d) contrary/unreasonable-application framework)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (reasonableness standard for state-court decisions under AEDPA)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor’s duty to disclose favorable impeachment/exculpatory evidence)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) (right to present a defense)
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) (instructions and prosecutorial argument judged in context)
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (aggravating factors function as elements requiring proof)
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (sentencer must consider any aspect of character or record proffered as mitigating)