Simpson, Mark Twain, 2016 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 74

Simpson pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery and true to an enhancement alleging a 1984 aggravated-robbery conviction; trial court sentenced him to 25 years (range 5–99 years due to enhancement).
Arrest affidavit: Simpson was the getaway driver; co-defendant Zelaya entered the residence and Aguilar assaulted the victim; Simpson threatened to shoot and pawned the stolen PlayStation.
At punishment, Simpson admitted numerous prior convictions from a concentrated juvenile spree, recent theft/forgery arrests, and presented family testimony about his support role and need for drug treatment.
Simpson moved for a new punishment trial arguing the 25-year sentence was grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment; trial court granted a new punishment trial.
The State appealed; the Dallas Court of Appeals vacated the grant, holding Simpson had not substantiated his disproportionality claim. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the court of appeals, holding the trial court abused discretion by granting a new punishment trial absent evidence substantiating an Eighth Amendment claim of gross disproportionality.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial court properly granted a new punishment trial based on Eighth Amendment disproportionality	Simpson: 25-year sentence is grossly disproportionate given his minor role (driver), the low-value property, and co-defendant’s probation	State: Sentence was within statutory range, based on Simpson’s significant priors; new trial not warranted absent showing original proceeding was unlawful or claim substantiated	The court held Simpson’s claim was a valid legal theory but not substantiated by record evidence; trial court abused discretion in granting new punishment trial
Proper standard of appellate review for grant of new trial	Simpson: appellate courts should defer to trial court’s factual determinations about substantiation	State: Herndon/Thomas standards permit appellate reversal where record does not substantiate legal claim	Applied abuse-of-discretion standard with deference to trial court, but found trial court acted without guiding principles because claim was unsubstantiated

State v. Thomas, 428 S.W.3d 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (standard for abuse of discretion in granting a new trial)
State v. Herndon, 215 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (elements for substantiation of a new-trial claim)
Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (punishment within statutory limits generally not cruel or unusual)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (U.S. 2010) (framework for proportionality: harm, culpability, priors; comparative analysis if threshold met)
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (U.S. 1991) (Eighth Amendment does not demand strict proportionality; gross disproportionality standard)
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (U.S. 2003) (recidivism weight in disproportionality analysis)
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (U.S. 2003) (rare nature of successful disproportionality claims)
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (U.S. 1983) (historical disproportionality analysis referenced)
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (U.S. 1910) (early Supreme Court disproportionate punishment precedent)
McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1992) (discussing post-Harmelin adjustments to Solem test)
State v. Zalman, 400 S.W.3d 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (trial court abused discretion when new-trial basis conflicted with motion’s claims)
Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (appellate reversal when trial court decision lies outside zone of reasonable disagreement)