893 F.3d 962
7th Cir.2018Background
- Simpkins worked exclusively for DuPage Housing Authority (DHA) from Nov. 2009 to May 2015 under agreements labeled "Independent Contractor Agreement," performing carpentry and maintenance at DHA properties, later primarily at Ogden Manor.
- He submitted invoices, was paid by paper check biweekly, received 1099-MISC forms (not W-2s), lacked fringe benefits, and repeatedly requested conversion to employee status which was denied.
- DHA supervisors assigned tasks, prioritized the order of work, and set his schedule; Simpkins asserts limited autonomy in how tasks were performed.
- Contracts initially required Simpkins to carry his own insurance (which he had until Jan. 2012); a second contract listed an expected completion date that was later crossed out and replaced with "To Be Determined."
- After a 2015 car accident the relationship ended; Simpkins sued alleging FLSA, IMWL, IECA, IPWA, and FMLA violations; district court granted DHA summary judgment on federal claims, relinquished state claims; Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Simpkins was an employee or independent contractor under the FLSA | Simpkins: economic reality shows dependence on DHA (exclusive work, DHA control, minimal investment in tools, no benefits) | DHA: labeled contracts, 1099s, asserted autonomy over work means independent contractor | Reversed district court: genuine disputes of material fact exist; not appropriate for summary judgment — trial required |
| Weight of written contract labels and terms | Simpkins: label not dispositive; parties' conduct matters more than contract caption | DHA: the "Independent Contractor Agreement" and its terms (insurance requirement, invoicing) show intent for independent-contractor relationship | Court: contract language is relevant but factual disputes about performance, duration, and insurance exist and preclude summary judgment |
| Degree of control over work performance | Simpkins: DHA controlled schedule, assignments, and task order showing employer-like control | DHA: Simpkins had autonomy to determine how tasks were done after assignment | Court: factual disputes about control must be resolved by factfinder; control may favor employee status when viewed favorably to Simpkins |
| Investment in tools and materials / specialized skill | Simpkins: DHA supplied most tools/materials and work was not highly specialized | DHA: Simpkins had prior carpentry skills and tax returns show he purchased materials | Court: disputed facts about tools, materials, and skill weigh into economic-reality test and cannot be resolved on summary judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Lauritzen v. Sec'y of Labor, 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987) (multifactor economic-reality test for employee status; legal conclusion reviewed de novo, underlying facts for clear error)
- Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992) (directs expansive construction of "employee" under FLSA and totality-of-circumstances analysis)
- Darden v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (Supreme Court on employee/employer definitions under FLSA; focus on economic reality)
- Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, 814 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1987) (distinguishes factual findings types in status inquiry; discussed in context of trial findings)
- Berger v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016) (cautions against rote multifactor tests when they fail to capture true relationship)
- Selective Ins. Co. of S.C. v. Target Corp., 845 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 2016) (standard that summary judgment is reviewed de novo and facts construed for nonmovant)