Simmons v. State, Dept. of Corrections, 426 P.3d 1011

David Simmons was convicted of multiple felonies in 1995 and was incarcerated and on parole supervision in later years.
Alaska created a DNA identification registration system effective Jan. 1, 1996; the statute was expanded in 2003 to require DNA samples from persons convicted of many felonies, including those incarcerated or on supervision as of July 1, 2003.
In January 2014 a parole officer requested a DNA sample; Simmons refused and was charged in a prison disciplinary proceeding with an infraction (reflecting a class C or B felony refusal to provide DNA).
Simmons invoked his right to counsel for the disciplinary hearing; the Department of Corrections did not provide counsel, found him guilty, and imposed punitive segregation.
Simmons appealed administratively and to superior court, raising ex post facto, jurisdictional, double jeopardy, due process, right-to-counsel, and related claims; the superior court found a constitutional violation for denial of counsel but deemed the error harmless and affirmed the disciplinary decision.
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed: it held the 2003 statutory extension required Simmons to provide a DNA sample and that the DNA requirement is non-punitive (not ex post facto); it also held the denial of counsel was constitutional error but harmless here because no disputed material facts existed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Simmons)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Applicability of DNA statute	DNA requirement is prospective and does not apply to convictions before Jan. 1, 1996	2003 amendment applied to persons convicted earlier who were incarcerated or under supervision on July 1, 2003	DNA requirement applied to Simmons under 2003 statute because his convictions are felonies under AS 11 and he was incarcerated on/after July 1, 2003
Ex post facto challenge	Retroactive imposition of DNA-sample requirement increases punishment for past crimes, violating state and federal ex post facto clauses	DNA registry is regulatory (identification), not punitive, and serves public-safety purposes	Statute is non-punitive under intent-effects test; not an ex post facto law under Alaska or U.S. Constitutions
Right to counsel in disciplinary hearing	Denial of counsel violated Simmons’s constitutional right for major disciplinary charges constituting a felony	Department erred in not providing counsel but the error did not prejudice outcome	Denial of counsel was unconstitutional under Alaska precedent but was harmless on these facts
Prejudice from denial of counsel	Lack of counsel prejudiced ability to contest forfeiture/punishment	No disputed material facts (Simmons admitted he refused) and claims were purely legal, so no prejudice	No prejudice shown; disciplinary result affirmed despite constitutional error

McGinnis v. Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1975) (establishes inmate right to counsel in major disciplinary proceedings when felony prosecution may result)
Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008) (applies intent-effects test to assess whether registration statute is punitive)
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (U.S. 2003) (federal intent-effects framework and upholding nonpunitive character of offender registry statute)
Anthony v. State, 816 P.2d 1377 (Alaska 1991) (discusses ex post facto principles)
James v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 260 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2011) (standards for appellate review of prisoner disciplinary proceedings)