41 F. Supp. 3d 927
E.D. Cal.2014Background
- Plaintiffs challenged California Penal Code §§ 26815(a) and 27540(a) (10‑day waiting period) as applied to three categories: (1) purchasers who already lawfully possess a firearm recorded in the Automated Firearms System (AFS); (2) holders of a valid CCW license; and (3) holders of a valid Certificate of Eligibility (COE) who also have a firearm recorded in AFS. Plaintiffs sought relief only as‑applied, not facially, and did not challenge background checks.
- Bench trial held in March 2014 with testimony about California’s DROS/CFIS/BFEC background‑check process, AFS, APPS, and rap‑back systems; evidence showed many checks auto‑approve quickly but most applications require analyst review and a backlog exists.
- Government defended the 10‑day rule as (a) allowing completion/refresher of background checks, (b) providing a “cooling‑off” period to reduce impulsive violence/suicide, and (c) facilitating investigation/interception of straw purchases.
- Court found no historical evidence of waiting periods at or near 1791/1868 and concluded waiting periods are a relatively recent development, present in only a minority of states.
- Applying Ninth Circuit two‑step Second Amendment framework, the court held the 10‑day waiting period burdens Second Amendment rights and evaluated the statute under intermediate scrutiny.
- Holding: the 10‑day waiting period violates the Second Amendment as applied to (1) purchasers who already possess a firearm recorded in AFS and pass BFEC before 10 days, (2) valid CCW holders who pass BFEC before 10 days, and (3) COE holders who also have an AFS‑recorded firearm and pass BFEC before 10 days; relief stayed 180 days to permit compliance adjustments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 10‑day waiting period burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment | Waiting period prevents timely possession/use of lawfully purchased arms and is not historically rooted; as‑applied relief appropriate for categories of proven responsible owners | Waiting period is a longstanding, presumptively lawful condition on commercial sales and does not meaningfully burden the right; it advances public safety | Court: Law burdens Second Amendment rights; defendant failed to show it is historically presumptively lawful |
| Appropriate level of scrutiny | If burdened, intermediate scrutiny should apply and the law will fail that test | Law is not a severe burden; intermediate scrutiny applies and can be satisfied as a reasonable fit | Court applied intermediate scrutiny (did not decide strict scrutiny) |
| Whether the 10‑day requirement is a reasonable fit to background‑check interests for approved applicants who already demonstrate trustworthiness | Plaintiffs: passing BFEC before 10 days shows background‑check purpose satisfied; mandatory wait is speculative and unnecessary; systems (AFS/APPS/rap‑back) mitigate post‑approval risk | Defendant: 10 days allows time for non‑automated checks, dispositional chasing, and possible new prohibiting events; refresher during waiting period can catch late hits | Court: For approved applicants who already possess an AFS‑recorded firearm, CCW holders, and COE+AFS owners, holding firearms after BFEC approval until day 10 is not a reasonable fit; violates Second Amendment |
| Whether cooling‑off and straw‑purchase rationales justify mandatory 10‑day wait for the three as‑applied classes | Cooling off irrelevant for those who already possess firearms; straw‑purchase investigations are targeted, not basis for universal delay | Waiting period reduces impulsive violence/suicide risk and gives time to investigate straw purchases before delivery | Court: Evidence insufficient that 10‑day cooling off or straw‑purchase prevention materially justifies mandatory wait for the identified classes |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amendment protects individual right to possess firearms for lawful purposes)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (Second Amendment incorporated against the States)
- Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2014) (two‑step Second Amendment framework adopted in Ninth Circuit)
- United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013) (Second Amendment analysis and scrutiny discussion)
- Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussion of historical scope and intermediate scrutiny fit)
- Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting Heller language on conditions on commercial sale)
- National Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012) (Second Amendment framework and application)
- Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) (two‑step approach and scrutiny discussion)
- United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010) (Second Amendment burden/scrutiny framework)
- Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012) (remedial stay approach cited by court)
- Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (government must show regulation materially advances asserted interest; cannot rely on speculation)
- Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 107 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 1997) (regulation must alleviate harm to a material degree)