Shott v. Katz
829 F.3d 494
7th Cir.2016Background
- Susan Shott, a tenured associate professor at Rush University Medical Center, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 alleging retaliation by colleague Dr. Robert Katz for her prior complaints/litigation about anti‑Jewish discrimination at Rush.
- Shott previously sued Rush (1994) for religious and disability discrimination (jury found for disability). She sued again (2011) alleging retaliation affecting salary/promotion; summary judgment for Rush was affirmed on appeal.
- While the second suit was pending, Shott sued Katz, alleging he refused to collaborate on research (hindering publication and career advancement) and delayed prescription refills unless she agreed to six‑month exams.
- The district court dismissed Shott’s complaint for failure to state a § 1981 claim: it held the medical conduct was not tied to employment and found an insufficient nexus between Katz’s refusal to collaborate and adverse employment action; dismissal was without prejudice with leave to amend.
- The Seventh Circuit held it had jurisdiction over the appeal and reviewed whether Katz’s conduct could constitute materially adverse retaliatory action under § 1981.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Katz’s refusal to collaborate on research and publication constitutes § 1981 retaliation harming Shott’s employment prospects | Katz’s refusals impeded her publications and career advancement at Rush, and were motivated by retaliation for her prior litigation | Katz’s choices about collaborators and research are not obligations and are protected academic decisions; no employment action was taken | Katz’s refusal to collaborate is not a materially adverse action under § 1981; no viable retaliation claim |
| Whether Katz’s delay/conditioning of medical care (prescription refills) is a materially adverse retaliatory act under § 1981 | Conditioning refills and delaying treatment were retaliatory and harmed her | Medical treatment decisions did not affect her employment or constitute employment‑related harm | Medical conduct did not amount to a material adverse action under § 1981 |
| Whether § 1981 requires adverse actions to be employment‑related or occur in the workplace | Shott: § 1981 retaliation need not be strictly limited to workplace acts so long as harm is caused by contracts or employment‑related events | Katz: (implicitly) actions alleged are not employment‑related and thus not actionable | Court: § 1981 can reach non‑workplace retaliation, but alleged acts here were not materially adverse; district court’s narrow focus was harmless error |
| Whether First Amendment/academic freedom protects Katz’s decisions about research collaboration | Shott: Katz’s motives were retaliatory despite academic context | Katz: Academic freedom/First Amendment protect faculty decisions about research/collaboration | Court: Academic freedom protects Katz’s discretion about research; that supports nonactionability |
Key Cases Cited
- Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (defines materially adverse action in retaliation context)
- Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888 (7th Cir.) (individual employees may be liable under § 1981 for causing employer retaliation under "cat’s paw" theory)
- Saint Francis Coll. v. Al‑Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (Jews are among identifiable classes protected under statutes concerning race/class membership)
- Carter v. Chicago State Univ., 778 F.3d 651 (7th Cir.) (individual liability under § 1981 and statutory scope)
- Davis v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., L.P., 651 F.3d 664 (7th Cir.) (standard for materially adverse retaliation under § 1981)
- Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F.3d 878 (7th Cir.) (First Amendment/academic freedom protects faculty research choices)