Shipp v. Schaaf, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1033

Oakland Public Works has an S.O.P. for removing homeless encampments that requires 72-hour Notice to Vacate, allows occupants to retrieve belongings before vacatur, restricts confiscation to items posing immediate health/safety or criminal evidence, itemizes collected property, posts a Notice of Collected Property, and stores collected items for at least 90 days.
Plaintiffs Brent Shipp and Eric De Guzman are unhoused residents of an Oakland encampment; they allege the City routinely violates its S.O.P. by discarding belongings and seek a preliminary injunction to stop a scheduled temporary "clean and clear."
The Court issued a 14-day TRO; Plaintiffs then moved for a preliminary injunction. The City opposed, asserting compliance with the S.O.P. and that notices were provided.
The March 29, 2019 notice at the subject site warned of an April 3, 2019 temporary closure, indicated property left would be stored unless unsafe, and repeated the 72-hour warning.
Plaintiffs rely on prior experiences and declarants who say the City discarded property; their declarations lack specific facts about item condition or why items should have been stored under the S.O.P.
The Court held an evidentiary hearing; Plaintiffs did not file a reply brief. The Court denied the preliminary injunction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Eighth Amendment (Martin claim)	Martin bars punishment for unavoidable consequences of homelessness; temporary closure could lead to citations/arrests for remaining, so Eighth Amendment is implicated.	The temporary, administrative closure does not impose criminal punishment for homelessness; Martin does not apply to short, location/time-limited cleanings absent criminal sanctions.	Denied — Martin inapplicable; no serious questions on Eighth Amendment grounds.
Fourteenth Amendment (due process re: property)	City violates its S.O.P. in practice, routinely seizing/ destroying non-abandoned property without meaningful notice or opportunity to be heard (Lavan theory), so injunction needed.	The S.O.P. on its face provides adequate notice and remedy (72-hour notice, storage, notice of collected property); plaintiffs' evidence is too general to show a pattern of noncompliance or a realistic threat of future violations.	Denied — plaintiffs failed to show serious questions or likelihood of future harm; declarations are too general to overcome City's representations.

Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir.) (preliminary injunction factors require likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balance of equities, public interest)
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (injunctive relief requires clear showing of entitlement and consideration of four Winter factors)
Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962 (9th Cir.) (threshold showing required on each preliminary injunction factor)
All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir.) (serious questions plus balance tipping sharply can support preliminary injunction when other Winter elements met)
Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir.) (Eighth Amendment prohibits criminalizing sleeping outside when no alternative shelter exists)
Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir.) (principle that state may not punish status or unavoidable consequences of being homeless)
Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir.) (seizure and destruction of homeless persons' property without notice or hearing can violate due process)
Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (standing for prospective injunctive relief requires realistic threat of repeated injury)
Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990 (9th Cir.) (standing for injunctive relief requires demonstration of realistic threat of repetition of violation)