Sherry Moore v. Secretary United States Depart
17-1544
| 3rd Cir. | Dec 4, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Sherry Moore, an African‑American DHS Immigration Enforcement Agent, sued alleging race discrimination and retaliation after filing a 2004 discrimination complaint against supervisors.
- The contested events are four Camden, NJ assignments in 2006: a nighttime release/return of a breastfeeding detainee and three surveillance/ankle‑bracelet monitoring trips.
- Supervisor Croteau ordered the detainee return, explaining it was an urgent, unusual situation (a mother separated from a breastfeeding infant) and selected Moore because she was an experienced female agent; surveillance trips were tied to an alternatives‑to‑detention ankle‑bracelet program.
- Moore asserts these tasks were dangerous, routinely assigned only to African‑American women, and constituted discrimination/retaliation; she offered other background incidents as context.
- DHS investigated and an EEOC administrative judge found Moore failed to establish discrimination or retaliation; DHS implemented that decision. Moore sued in district court; the district court granted summary judgment for DHS, and Moore appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Administrative exhaustion | Moore contends her claims were exhausted and actionable | DHS contends many allegations were unexhausted | Court assumed exhaustion for appeal but resolved case on the merits |
| Existence of adverse employment action | Camden assignments were adverse because dangerous and punitive | Assignments were within job duties and routine law‑enforcement risk | Court: assignments were not shown to be adverse employment actions for Title VII purposes |
| Pretext for race discrimination (Camden tasks) | Croteau fabricated urgency and deviated from policy to target African‑American women | Croteau had legitimate, non‑discriminatory reasons (urgent breastfeeding concern; program needs; proximity/experience; female agent appropriate) | Court: Moore failed to show Croteau’s reasons were pretextual; no evidence of discriminatory animus |
| Retaliation causation | Moore says 2004 complaint led to 2006 assignments | DHS: lack of temporal and evidentiary connection; legitimate business reasons | Court: but‑for causation not shown (two years elapsed; no unusual proximity or other evidence); summary judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2014) (standard of appellate review for summary judgment)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment and genuine‑issue standard)
- St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (elements of discrimination prima facie case)
- Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (burden‑shifting framework)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (framework for proof and burden shifting in discrimination cases)
- Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331 (3d Cir. 2006) (elements for retaliation prima facie case)
- Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) (standards for proving pretext)
- Univ. of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (but‑for causation required for Title VII retaliation)
- LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2007) (temporal proximity and proof of causation)
- Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 814 F.3d 660 (3d Cir. 2016) (non‑movant may not rely on speculation to oppose summary judgment)