Sherman v. Development Authority
324 Ga. App. 23
Ga. Ct. App.2013Background
- Georgia sought validation of taxable revenue bonds issued by the Development Authority of Fulton County (DAFC) under OCGA § 36-62-1 et seq.; the Fulton County Superior Court ultimately validated the bonds.
- John S. Sherman filed a "Notice of Becoming Party to Bond Validation Petition Proceeding" 13 days after the state’s petition, asserting his objections and claiming party status.
- DAFC moved to strike Sherman’s notice, arguing he was required to follow intervention procedures in OCGA § 9-11-24(c) to become a party; the trial court denied the motion, relying on Hay v. Dev. Auth. of Walton County.
- The trial court validated the bonds; Sherman appealed the validation order.
- After the appeal was docketed, this Court decided Sherman v. Dev. Auth. of Fulton County, overruling Hay and holding that OCGA § 9-11-24 intervention procedures are required to become a party in a bond validation proceeding.
- The Court here applied Sherman retroactively, concluded Sherman had not properly intervened and therefore lacked standing to be a party and to pursue the appeal, and dismissed the appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a unilateral “Notice of Becoming Party” suffices to become a party in a bond validation proceeding | Sherman: his notice made him a party entitled to litigate objections (relying on Hay) | DAFC: Sherman had to follow OCGA § 9-11-24(c) intervention procedures; notice alone insufficient | Court: Notice alone insufficient; intervention under OCGA § 9-11-24(c) required (Hay overruled) |
| Whether the intervenor-rule announced in Sherman v. Dev. Auth. of Fulton County applies retroactively to this case | Sherman: implied argument that prior rule (Hay) controlled his case | Appellees: the new rule should apply, and Sherman failed to intervene properly | Court: Applied Sherman retroactively under Chevron Oil factors; retroactive application appropriate |
| Whether Sherman has standing to appeal the bond-validation judgment | Sherman: as a self-declared party, he may appeal the validation order | Appellees: because he never properly intervened, he lacked standing to be a party and thus to appeal | Court: Sherman lacked standing to be a party and therefore lacks standing to appeal; appeal dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Hay v. Dev. Auth. of Walton County, 239 Ga. App. 803 (1999) (prior Court of Appeals precedent allowing party status by notice)
- Sherman v. Dev. Auth. of Fulton County, 321 Ga. App. 550 (2013) (whole court) (overruling Hay; holding OCGA § 9-11-24 intervention procedures required)
- Sherman v. City of Atlanta, 293 Ga. 169 (2013) (standing is prerequisite to have court decide merits)
- St. John’s Melkite Catholic Church v. Commr. of Revenue, 240 Ga. 733 (1977) (standing may be considered sua sponte on appeal)
- Blackmon v. Tenet Healthsystem Spalding, 284 Ga. 369 (2008) (standing is part of subject-matter jurisdiction inquiry)
- Findley v. Findley, 280 Ga. 454 (2006) (judicial decisions are generally retroactive unless Chevron factors counsel otherwise)
- Griffin v. Bankston, 302 Ga. App. 647 (2009) (overruling precedent is generally applied retrospectively)
- Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971) (three-factor test for prospective vs. retroactive application of judicial decisions)