Sherman v. Corcella, 2020 WL 4035064

Background

Pro se plaintiff Frank Sherman, formerly at Corrigan-Radgowski, sued twelve Corrigan DOC officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Eighth Amendment claims (deliberate indifference re: arthritis, bone degeneration, a 2nd-degree burn; also alleged excessive force and retaliation).
Sherman moved for a preliminary injunction and TRO while incarcerated at Garner Correctional Institution, seeking to bar Garner officers from issuing disciplinary reports for covering his cell window (which he says causes migraines/mental anxiety), to dismiss a June 13, 2020 disciplinary report, and to obtain outside neurological/mental-health evaluation.
The defendants named in Sherman's complaint are Corrigan officials; the Garner officers targeted by the motion are not parties and had not been served or appeared.
The court treated the motion on the papers, applying the Second Circuit preliminary-injunction standard and law governing TROs, and resolved factual issues without a hearing.
The court denied the motion for three independent reasons: (1) the requested relief concerned non-parties and issues outside the scope of the complaint; (2) Sherman failed to show irreparable harm (courts generally find headaches/migraines insufficient); and (3) he failed to plead facts showing defendants acted with the subjective, culpable state of mind required for deliberate indifference. The court also noted prisoners cannot demand a specific form of care and security concerns limit window coverings.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Can the court enjoin Garner officers who are not parties and grant relief unrelated to the complaint?	Sherman asks injunction/TRO against Garner officers to permit covering his cell window and to dismiss a D.R.	Relief must relate to the conduct giving rise to the complaint; non-parties are not properly enjoined.	Denied — injunctive relief must relate to underlying complaint and defendants; cannot enjoin non-parties.
Does Sherman show irreparable harm warranting a TRO/prelim. injunction?	Bright light causes migraines/mental anxiety; requests immediate relief and outside specialists.	Headaches/migraines are not typically irreparable; no evidence of concussion or serious head injury.	Denied — migraines insufficient to establish irreparable harm; no proof of concussion.
Do the facts show deliberate indifference (subjective awareness and disregard)?	Officers knew or should have known light triggered his migraines and nevertheless issued D.R.s.	No factual showing that officers were aware of and disregarded a substantial risk to Sherman.	Denied — plaintiff failed to show subjective culpability required under Eighth Amendment.
Is Sherman entitled to specific medical providers or to cover his cell window?	Requests outside neurologist/mental-health doctor and permission to cover window.	Prisoners cannot dictate specific providers; security interest limits window coverings.	Denied — prisoner must seek care through prison medical services; security needs outweigh window-covering request.

Key Cases Cited

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate indifference standard for prisoner medical care)
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (defendant must know of and disregard an excessive risk)
Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2017) (awareness and inference requirement for subjective knowledge in prison medical claims)
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (Eighth Amendment harm and state-of-mind discussion)
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (prisoner privacy interests vs. institutional security)
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (deference to institutional security in prison regulations)
Proctor v. LeClaire, 846 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 2017) (institutional safety and security as paramount considerations)
Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, 943 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 2019) (preliminary injunction standards in the Second Circuit)
Kelly v. Honeywell Int'l, 933 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2019) (articulating preliminary injunction framework)
Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698 (2d Cir. 1998) (disagreement over treatment does not by itself state an Eighth Amendment claim)