Shelton v. State
2025 MT 71
| Mont. | 2025Background
- Biological mother Surbrugg arranged for Utah residents Henning and Davies to adopt her child, L.S., before birth in Montana in 2016.
- Both Surbrugg and L.S. tested positive for drugs; Montana DPHHS got involved. Surbrugg and her attorney, Ridgeway, facilitated adoption and ICPC paperwork listing another man (Gleed) as father; Surbrugg was still married to Shelton.
- L.S. was taken to Utah; once Sheldon was notified of the adoption case, he intervened, established paternity, and sought to stop the adoption in Utah courts.
- Utah courts terminated Shelton's parental rights based on his criminal and substance abuse history but required further findings on compliance with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC).
- Utah trial court ultimately found Montana complied with ICPC; Shelton and Shelton’s parents (the Costas) then brought suit in Montana against the State, Ridgeway, and others with various claims related to alleged ICPC violations and attorney conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Duty of care by Ridgeway/Axilon (adoption attorney) | Ridgeway owed duty as adoption was non-adversarial, and parental consent statutes applied | Ridgeway owed duty only to client, not to nonclient third parties, and proceedings were adversarial | No duty owed to nonclients in adversarial/adoption context |
| Collateral estoppel from prior Utah litigation | Utah courts didn’t apply Montana law or fully litigate DPHHS ICPC compliance; Costas were not parties | Utah courts found Montana’s ICPC compliance; issues already fully litigated; Costas were in privity with Shelton | Collateral estoppel applies to bar relitigation; Utah decision controls |
| Negligent misrepresentation by DPHHS attorney | Promise to act on paternity was actionable statement of fact | Statement about future action not actionable misrepresentation of existing fact | Dismissed — statement was not about a past/existing material fact |
| Full and fair opportunity to litigate in Utah | Plaintiffs didn’t fully litigate ICPC compliance/Vicky & Todd Costa not parties | Plaintiffs had ample chance; full hearings and decisions in Utah; Costas in privity | Plaintiffs received full/fair opportunity; preclusion applies |
Key Cases Cited
- Plouffe v. State, 66 P.3d 316 (Mont. 2003) (standard for 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss)
- Anderson v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., 407 P.3d 692 (Mont. 2017) (elements of negligence claims and attorney duty)
- Watkins Trust v. Lacosta, 92 P.3d 620 (Mont. 2004) (duty of attorney to nonclient, limited to intended beneficiaries in nonadversarial context)
- Harrison v. Lovas, 234 P.3d 76 (Mont. 2010) (attorney duty does not extend to potential beneficiaries absent intent)
- Redies v. Attorney's Liab. Prot. Soc., 150 P.3d 930 (Mont. 2007) (duty to nonclients in some nonadversarial settings)
- Morrow v. Bank of Am., 324 P.3d 1167 (Mont. 2014) (elements of negligent misrepresentation; must concern existing/past facts)
- Denturist Ass’n of Mont. v. State, 372 P.3d 466 (Mont. 2016) (privity for collateral estoppel)