*1 M. CAROLYN THE STANLEY L. AND WILLIAMSON, B. TRUST; STEVEN WATKINS individually as Personal Representative THE ESTATE OF Deceased, WATKINS, L.
STANLEY
Appellants,
Plaintiffs and
HEDMAN,
LACOSTA, ESQ.,
M.
SUSAN
Attorneys
Law,
HILEMAN
LACOSTA,
&
Respondents.
Defendants
No. 02-567.
January
on Briefs
2003.
Submitted
June
Decided
For Robinson, PLLP, Missoula. Garlington, Lohn & of the Court. Opinion JUSTICE NELSON delivered Trust, B. L. M. Watkins and Steven Stanley Williamson, Representative as Personal Estate individually and Watkins, (collectively, brought a Stanley “Appellants”), L. deceased the Eleventh Judicial action in the District Court for District, as County, damages allegedly to recover sustained Flathead drafting negligence Susan Lacosta’s a result of Respondent’s granted The District Court documents and will. was summary judgment concluding Appellant’s motion for for three-year statute of limitations time-barred under the equitable judicata, of res malpractice actions and that the doctrines claim. We reverse judicial estoppel Appellants’ barred Opinion, consistent with this proceedings and remand for further following appeal: address the issues on We f *3 standing bring 1. Whether ¶3 Respondents. against estoppel, collateral judicata, the doctrines of res Whether ¶4 Appellants’ against claims equitable estoppel judicial estoppel and bar Respondents. are barred against Respondents 3. Whether Appellants’
¶5 legal malpractice. three-year statute of limitations for Background Factual and Procedural Watkins, Stanley each stepfather, Williamson and his Steve ¶6 they In late trucking together. had built operation owned interests in a Lacosta, wife, an 1992, Stanley’s Carolyn, retained Susan early 1991 or to draft an planning, and tax emphasis whose was estate and Stanley Carolyn along partnership with for and plan estate Stanley’s At trucking operation. to the agreements related shareholder agreement included in the Trust Carolyn’s request, Lacosta to Steve Stanley’s trucking operation interest in the bequest direct Carolyn. Stanley and the death of the survivor of their wills and a 1992, Stanley Carolyn signed January ¶7 Carolyn M. Watkins Stanley “The L. and entitled agreement Trust (the Trust). time, Agreement” they Revocable Trust At the same each Trust, signed assignment virtually property an all of their to the over which they Stanley both were Trustees. suffered from a heart legally health, condition and he was blind. ill Stanley’s Because of him, Lacosta never met with nor did she plan discuss estate with Instead, him. Lacosta sent the wills and Trust documents home with and, Carolyn contrary appearing wills, to the attestations signed were presence outside of the of the purported witnesses Lacosta) (including and outside presence notary public. of a Stanley April will, died on prepared only and his a few earlier, months was admitted to probate. Although Stanley’s 1992 will was probate admitted to with knowledge, Lacosta’s Lacosta not did Carolyn disclose to or to the court that the will had been improperly executed because it signed was not in the presence of witnesses as 72-2-522, required by MCA. Lacosta Carolyn § also did not disclose to Stanley died, that when the Trust became irrevocable. Upon Stanley’s death, Carolyn became the sole Trustee under the
Trust. years, For the next three Carolyn, Trustee, as facilitated the administration of the Trust estate. In early January Steve met with Hagman, John
insurance agent, to discuss Steve’s own life insurance and estate planning needs. They reviewed the agreement, Trust but because neither of them were able decipher what agreement meant or accomplished, they met January 13,1995, with Lacosta on clarify disposition trucking operation stock through the Trust. Lacosta told them that the Trust was revocable Carolyn and that could do However, whatever she wanted with the assets. later, a few months Lacosta informed Carolyn Qualified that the Trust was a Terminable (QTIP) Property Interest trust and could not revoke the provisions of the Trust left Stanley’s trucking interest operation to Steve. In August Lacosta, Carolyn, Steve and the other Watkins’
children meeting attended a the specific for purpose discussing Trust and other related financial matters. At the meeting, Lacosta Trust, summarized the but at anyone no time did she or give any else indication that there questions were about validity of the Trust or *4 Stanley’s will. prior
¶12 Sometime to this meeting, Carolyn had contacted Neil McKay, an estate and planning attorney, tax inquire to about the McKay Trust. testified in deposition his that the very Trust would be difficult average fact, for the layperson to understand. he testified spend many he had to planning expert, and tax
that even as an estate it. he could understand reading agreement before hours and the other Trust McKay wrote to Steve In December behalf, defects in Carolyn’s disclosing that there were on beneficiaries declare void an agreement their plan. sought the estate He Thereafter, Carolyn attempted to to the Trust. attempted transfer in Stanley’s and the Trust. This resulted invalidate 1992 will Carolyn and the Trust protracted litigation acrimonious and between (hereafter as the collectively referred to beneficiaries. In those cases to be Suits”), Carolyn’s found “Beneficiary the District Court time barred. 23,1997. February April On Carolyn died on damages allegedly action to recover
brought this that Lacosta committed by Appellants alleged Lacosta. caused enabling an attack on plan the estate malpractice connection with thereby damaging each of them. Because Stanley’s the Trust and will conflicting expectations among alleged malpractice created Lacosta’s survivors, Carolyn brought separate M. Watkins the Estate of Carolyn’s that in addition action wherein estate asserted will, witnessing Stanley’s Lacosta problems regarding to the Carolyn’s according Stanley’s wishes. failed to draft Trust Hedman, Lacosta, & 2004 MT v. Hileman Estate Watkins 419, _ P.3d _. 143, 321 Mont. case, summary judgment. moved for Respondents In the instant concluding that the Respondents’ Court motion granted District to run alleged malpractice began on Lacosta’s statute of limitations and that probate April admitted to the time will was untimely. The court further held this action is therefore not clients of standing because were Appellants did not judicata, equitable res and that the action was barred Lacosta Thereafter, a Motion for Appellants filed judicial estoppel. also filed a upon. Appellants that was not ruled Judgment Relief from judgment From this Motion to Alter or Amend that was denied. orders, Appellants appeal. these of Review
Standard issue of only genuine when no Summary judgment proper as a judgment moving party fact and the is entitled material exists 56(c), reviewing Rule M.R.Civ.P. Our standard matter of law. ruling is de novo. Johnson summary judgment district court’s 9, 983 176, 9, 295 Barrett, Mont. *5 372, 376, 945
Stutzman v. Ins. Co. America 284 Mont. Safeco 34). 32, 56, M.R.CÍV.P., by applied We use the same Rule criteria Johnson, Moreover, the district all court. 9. reasonable inferences ¶ which may proof be drawn from the offered must be drawn in favor of Johnson, party opposing summary judgment. Schmidt ¶ Washington 276, v. MT Group, Contractors 7).
Issue 1. Whether have standing bring ¶17 to against Respondents. Appellants contend that ¶18 District Court’s orders should be reversed and remanded because the court’s rationale on this issue is unclear. their motion for summary judgment, Respondents did not any raise issues as to Appellants’ Rather, to standing bring this action. the standing issue was raised the District Court at the close of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, based on an inquiry to Respondents’ counsel regarding the existence fiduciary of a relationship Appellants. between Lacosta and (the With regard Stanley to the Estate of Estate), L. Watkins Lacosta Stanley admits that awas client. Because the Estate stands decedent, in the shoes of the it is considered in privity to be with the attorney, and personal representative standing has prosecute Shevin, Espinosa claim. Sparber, Shapo, Rosen & (Fla. 1993), Heilbronner 612 So.2d A fact issue exists as to whether is a client or a
nonclient beneficiary. The may Trust be considered a client based provided by services Trustees, Lacosta to the Trust and its services which involved Trust assets and transactions. Because Lacosta did not raise the standing issue of summary her motion for judgment, presented she no facts as to whether the Trust was or was And, order, not a client. in its the District Court failed cite any cases and made no conclusions as duty to whether a exists to nonclients, or the extent duty However, of that if it does exist.
[tjhe agree courts attorney-client existence of the relationship, the contractual scope duty, the causation of damages damages usually the extent of are issues for the trier of fact.... A common dispute factual is whether there an was attorney-client relationship. Jeffrey Smith,
Ronald E. Mallen & Legal M. Malpractice, Vol. § (5th 2000) Mallen). (hereafter, 33.11 ed. beneficiary of the estate standing as a nonclient Steve claims beneficiary is a matter of first duty owed to a nonclient
plan. 12-13, Adams, 73,MT ¶¶ in Montana. See Rhode v. impression However, 12-13, 12-13. ¶¶ ¶¶ in cases jurisdictions supports standing majority rule other attorneys. against drafting involving actions named beneficiaries (Haw. 2001), 452; Mallen, 32.4 Vol. Cf., Ing § Blair v. majority or privity prevailing statements that strict is (“Despite rule, by beneficiaries of brought is true of actions just opposite the mutual duty implied A to a third because is wills. client.”) intent of the Moreover, duty existing is consistent with Montana finding *6 balancing adopted that a multi-factor test
law. This Court has noted
may
deciding
duty
owed
juris
appropriate
in other
dictions
be
Rhode,
Additionally,
attorneys
planning.
nonclients in estate
¶
to
liability
professional
to nonclients in other
recognized
we have
See,
(1990),
138,
243 Mont.
Issue 2. judicata, estoppel, equitable collateral Whether the doctrines res ¶24 against Appellants’ bar estoppel judicial estoppel and Respondents. concluding Court erred in Appellants contend that the District judicial estoppel and judicata, equitable
that the doctrines of res Instead, Appellants argue claims. estoppel Appellants’ barred and injury loss or to estate attorney’s planning when an estate causes litigation and to resort to requires trust assets and clients beneficiaries assets, subsequent a only resolving disposition as the means of judicata, the doctrines of res not barred under necessary to the elements judicial estoppel as equitable estoppel or are those defenses absent. establish estoppel are based on and collateral judicata The doctrines of res
439 judicial a policy favoring litigation. Skyline definite end to Kullick v. Ass’n, 137, 17, 146, 17, Homeowners 2003 MT 316 Mont. 69 P.3d ¶ ¶ 225, 123, 14, 382, (citing Hogan, Rausch v. 2001 MT 305 Mont. ¶ ¶ 14). 14, 460, judicata 28 P.3d Res bars a party relitigating ¶ from ¶ matter party already opportunity litigate. has had an Kullick, 284, 22, (citing Daughenbaugh, Olson v. 2001 MT ¶ ¶ 22). 371, 22, Mont. ¶ Collateral is a form of res ¶ judicata and reopening litigated bars the of an issue that has been Kullick, resolved in a prior (citing suit. Finstad v. W.R. Grace & ¶ Co., 28). 240, 28, 2000 MT ¶ ¶ ¶ judicata The doctrine of res if the applies following four elements (1) (2) parties been satisfied: or privies same; their are the (3) subject present matter of the and past same; actions is the (4) issues are the matter; same and relate to the subject same capacities persons are the subject same reference to the Kullick, matter and to the issues between them. Hall ¶ Heckerman, ¶
13). Here, the Beneficiary Suits were not malpractice actions and it is undisputed that Respondents parties Thus, were not litigation. to that judicata res is not applicable this case. The same is true as to the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Collateral estoppel only applies
following
if the
three elements have
(1)
been satisfied:
the identical issue
previously
raised was
decided in
(2)
prior adjudication;
judgment
final
on the merits was issued in
(3)
prior adjudication;
the party against
plea
whom the
is now
asserted
was a
or in privity with a party
prior
to the
adjudication. Kullick,
Appellants point
18. As
out in their brief on
*7
appeal, this Court has recognized that parties who are
into
drawn
litigation as a result of a professional’s malpractice
right
have a
bring
subsequent
separate
against
and
suit
professional.
the
See
(sellers
Cody (1997),
89,
Fadness v.
Identity of issues is the most crucial element of collateral estoppel. satisfy element, In order to this the identical issue or “precise question” must been litigated prior the action.
... The fact that each action from the arises same transaction mean that each involve the same issues. does not (citations omitted). 96-97, 951 We Fadness, P.2d at 588-89 287 Mont. at to the by professionals] “[t]he [the that duties owed noted Fadness decided, by jury the in the first nor even considered [plaintiff] were not Fadness, 97, 951 Similarly, at in the case 287 Mont. at P.2d case.” were not considered or judice, by Respondents the duties owed sub Stanley L. Beneficiary Suits. See In the Matter prior decided in the (Toole County Agreement Revocable Trust M. Watkins 96-016); Stanley Matter Estate L. Cause No. DV In the the (Toole 92-DP-020). County Watkins Cause No. estoppel Equitable in this case. equitable applicable Nor is cannot, through party that “a his upon principle is based silence,’ ‘conduct, actions, induce another language, or intentional detrimentally alter his and then unknowingly position party consequences of his intentional subsequently deny just Wallace, 307, 43, Mont. Kelly 1998 MT ¶ acts.” v. ¶ 1117, 43. P.2d ¶ by convincing clear and following proved elements must be (1) conduct, acts, estoppel: to show there must be equitable
evidence to a or a concealment language, amounting representation or silence (2) fact; party be known to the to be of a material the facts must conduct, or at least party’s at the time of that estopped necessarily of the facts is knowledge circumstances must be such that (3) be unknown to the other imputed party; to that the truth must (4) representation upon; the time the was acted party that expectation must be made with the intent or the representation (5) by representation other must be party; it will be acted on it; and by leading party upon that to act party, relied the other (6) so as to rely representation must in fact on the other Pump, City Troy Town change position its for worse. of Whitefish 84, 90, 943 (1997), 284 Mont. Billings Dept. Post No. 1634 v. Revenue 520). case, attorneys Respondents wrote to In the instant Steve’s that be held liable for put October them on notice would notify them to faulty Lacosta’s work and to advise damages caused erroneously The District Court concluded their carrier. letter by representations was created equitable estoppel merit and barred various claims were “without Carolyn’s However, previously we have legal principals.” general statutes and the conduct inapplicable when equitable estoppel held that
441 complained solely legal representations. City of Whitefish, of consists (citing (1997), 154, Elk Park Ranch County ¶ v. Park 282 Mont. 1131). P.2d Moreover, party asserting equitable estoppel has (citations omitted). duty proving
affirmative its Kelly, elements. 43¶ Here, Respondents any have not submitted evidence to that establish they relied on they changed the letter or that their position for the Thus, worse because of the letter. equitable estoppel applicable not in this case. Likewise, judicial estoppel has application no in this case. The judicial
doctrine of party judicial binds a to their declarations precludes party from taking position inconsistent with previously made declarations in a subsequent proceeding. action or Kauffman, 15, 238, 45, 2001 MT 307 Mont. ¶ ¶ Kauffman-Harmon (1994), 15 (citing Fiedler v. ¶ Fiedler 266 Mont. 679). A party claiming judicial that estoppel bars (1) party another re-litigating from an issue must estopped show: party had knowledge of the facts at the time he original or she took the (2) position; estopped party succeeded in maintaining original (3) position; position presently taken is inconsistent with the (4) original position; and original position misled the adverse so that allowing the estopped party to change position its would injuriously affect the party. Kaufman, adverse ¶ re Raymond Trust, George 223, 51, W. 51). Here, the record is any devoid of evidence that Respondents were
misled and the District Court did any not make findings or conclusions that Respondents Furthermore, were misled. judicial
[a] admission is binding not unequivocal unless it is an Hence, statement of fact. judicial “[f]or a admission to be binding party, the admission must be one of fact rather than a conclusion of law or the expression opinion.” of an Trust, George (quoting 37¶ DeMars v. Carlstrom 248-49). 334, 337-38, Thus, judicial applies admission facts, not positions. theories or The District Court determined in the instant case position that took the the provisions Trust and will correctly were properly drafted and that Steve prevailed Beneficiary Suits. However, event, in that it legal position would have been a and not an unequivocal statement of fact. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court erred in estoppel, judicata, collateral the doctrines res
concluding Appellants’ judicial estoppel barred equitable estoppel against Respondents.
Issue 3 Respondents are against Appellants’ Whether ¶36 legal of limitations for three-year the statute barred malpractice. for technical that the statute of limitations Appellants argue
¶37 run begin does not to complex planning defects in documents estate malpractice, the discover or should have discovered laypersons until argue further precluding summary judgment. Appellants a fact issue Additionally, attorney also tolls the statute. that concealment the damages until begin does not to run Appellants argue that the statute 1995, because they not have sued before are suffered and that could their properly and to plan operating until that time the estate was upon. benefit, damages have had no to sue thus would legal malpractice provides: action The statute of limitations for attorney practice An licensed to law against by an employed intern paralegal legal or a assistant or Montana negligent alleged professional upon person’s based must be person’s practice act or for error or omission through years plaintiff after the discovers or commenced within act, should have discovered diligence the use of reasonable last, may error, omission, but in no case or whichever occurs act, error, years from the date ofthe action be commenced after 10 or omission. 27-2-206, MCA.
Section determining when whether The first issue to address run. begins the statute to by the of limitations is when barred statute actions, have held that both legal malpractice we the context statutorily binding. “accrual rule” are “discovery rule” and the rule”); “discovery Johnson, statutory adoption of (confirming 11-20 ¶¶ 1297, 1300-03 195-200, (1994), Uhler v. Doak Mont. rule”). “accrual (confirming statutory adoption of “discovery rule” the statute oflimitations begins Johnson, 27-2-206, ; 11- Section MCA discovery ¶¶ ofthe act. negligent begins limitations that the statute of provides 20. The “accrual rule” Uhler, claim, occurred. including damages, have all ofa when elements “accrual rule” 195-200, (adopting at 1300-03 MCA). 27-2-102(l)(a) (2), Thus, the law in Montana pursuant §§ legal malpractice for actions is that the statute of limitations does not begin “discovery to run until both the rule” and the “accrual rule” have Hence, been satisfied. the statute of in limitations begin was, action does not run until negligent act or should been, discovered, legal claim, and all elements of the including damages, have occurred.
Discovery Rule
Appellants’ failure to discover
purported negligence may
Lacosta’s
be excused
complexity
because of the
of the legal transaction involved.
In Young Datsopoulos
we held
legal
that if a
beyond
transaction is
the understanding of a layperson
and the “date of discovery” is disputed, summary judgment
is not
appropriate.
In Young, the
family
decedent’s
hired defendants
probate decedent’s estate. The family claimed that defendants
committed
malpractice by misadvising
family
concerning
removal of a co-personal representative;
possible
defense
lack
consideration to a claim against the
*10
promissory notes;
estate on several
and abandonment of several potential
lawsuits. Young,
client a duty to understand technical defects in a instrument in order to defeat a malpractice claim. In Magana, Olney, Neel v. Levy, Cathcart (Cal. 1971), & 421, 428, the Supreme California Gelfand Court judicially adopted a “discovery” rule for statutes of limitation in legal malpractice cases stating:
Corollary to attorney’s] expertise [the inability is the of the layman to detect misapplication; may its the client recognize not the negligence professional of the when he sees it. He cannot be expected to know the relative medical merits of alternative anesthetics, legal exceptions nor the various hearsay to the rule. If he incidence, must ascertain at the moment of its the client professional must hire a second to observe the work of first, expensive the an impractical duplication, clearly relationship destructive the confidential between the practitioner and his client. within the field, may lie concealed injury In the
... contract;... or terminology of a will obtuse pour- with created wills Here, by Lacosta plan the estate created plan estate complexity of this trusts. The and several provisions over Hagman, understand. John experts for it difficult even made in estate experience substantial financial advisor with insurance and was an irrevocable the Trust not determine whether planning, could ultimately able McKay was attorney Neil QTIP Although trust. spent that he deposition testified in his plan, he comprehend estate plan. and understand attempting to unravel numerous hours understand estate inability professionals of these Given beyond Appellants’ clearly that it was plan, we conclude Furthermore, no facts to show presented Lacosta understanding. discovered, the use of through or Steve, the Estate either the Trust or discovered, the defects in have diligence should reasonable probated. was when will documents in 1992 discovers, the use through or addition, plaintiff whether discovered, act, error, or should have diligence of reasonable defect, but also on only complexity on the depends omission not end, Court has held To that this defect is concealed. whether the actions for three-year oflimitations statute [t]he defendant’s fraudulent mechanism for a tolling a built-in contains is, oflimitations That a statute injury. a plaintiffs concealment of discovers, or with plaintiff run until begin to does not act, error, discovered, or diligence should reasonable omission. 198, 15, Garnaas,
Joyce exists a nexus Thus, legal malpractice, in the context question and the concealment fraudulent between a defendant’s negligent the defendant’s discovered should have plaintiff whether act. issue, courts have this other yet ruled we have not Although can be fraudulent information to reveal
held that “mere failure
*11
duty
a
who has
fiduciary,
a
such as
by
person,
concealment
(1st
1999), 170
Wyatt & Co. Cir.
& Co. v. Watson
Knight
Geo.
disclose.”
omitted).
(citation
Thus,
or confidential
“if a trust
210, 215
F.3d
duty
imposes
which
parties,
exists between
relationship
constitutes
duty
that
silence,
one under
disclose,
by the
mere
statute
applicable
thus tolls
fraudulent concealment
(S.D. 1998),
Theeler,
Petersen
Cogley&
Morgan,
limitations.” Greene
omitted).
(citation
457, 575 N.W.2d
attorney’s
recognizes
This rule
that a client’s failure to discover
duty by
from “a
breach of
malpractice often results
second
fiduciary, namely, a failure to disclose material facts to his client.”
Neel,
Neel,
Supreme
Accrual Rule 27-2-102, MCA, Section provides pertinent part: (1) When action commenced. the purposes For of statutes relating to the time within which an action must be commenced:
(a) a claim or cause of action accrues when all elements of the occurred, claim or cause exist or have the right to maintain an complete, on the claim or cause is and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction action; of the
(2) statute, provided by Unless otherwise period begins limitation when the claim or cause of action accrues. Lack action, accrual, of knowledge of the claim or cause or of its to whom it postpone has accrued does not the beginning period of limitation. We have held that this “accrual applies rule” actions and that the statute of begin limitations does not to run until claim, Uhler, all including damages, elements of a have occurred. 195-200, Mont. at specifically, 1300-03. More we stated legal malpractice, [i]n order to establish a cause of action for there showing duty must be a that the owed his client a care, duty by there was a breach of this a failure to use skill, care and proximate reasonable and that the breach was the *12 446 damages. injury and resulted in cause the client’s
Uhler,
Merzlak v. Purcell
Mont. at
statute of limitations could have
her
Stanley’s
probate
was admitted to
and when
acted to
will
However,
explain
Carolyn’s
how
alleged
later
detriment.
this fails to
by treating
seeking
probate
it as valid and
its
reliance on
will
Steve,
any
contrary,
On the
the Estate
damaged Appellants in
fashion.
Respondents in 1992
against
and the Trust could not have filed suit
will were
complaining
agreement
documents,
benefit,
their
operating
testamentary
as valid
short,
there
exactly
planning
operate.
as estate
documents should
Stanley’s will was admitted
damages
precisely
were no
in 1992
because
1995, no
Prior to
probate
being implemented.
Trust was
Trust, Stanley’s will or the
jeopardizing
claim had been asserted
trucking operation.
bequest to Steve of the
adopted
“objectively
has
an
Supreme
The Idaho
Court
requiring
rule in
actions
damage”
ascertainable
the existence of some actual
“objective proof
support
that would
(Idaho
1992),
1298. Like
v.
damage.”
Bignall
Chicoine
Montana,
documents
requires
faulty legal
the Idaho court
more than
Instead,
caused
damage
look for some
taking final effect.
cases
See,
party.
e.g., Elliott v. Parsons
activity
damaged
adverse to the
(Idaho 1996),
faulty legal
when
(damages
¶54 consistent with Opinion. this COTTER,
JUSTICES REGNIER and LEAPHART concur. JUSTICE specially concurring. RICE I issues, concur with the holding of the Court on all but do not
agree entirety with the analysis Court’s with regard to the judicial estoppel. doctrine of The Court cites the four-part doctrine’s test as set forth in Kauffman, 238, 45, v. MT 2001 307 Mont.
Kauffman-Harmon 408, and notes that the record is devoid of evidence that Respondents were by misled the declarations made Appellants Beneficiary in the Litigation, required part as under four of test. See 34. The Court ¶ also concludes that the doctrine applies only unequivocal to statements fact, not to theories or positions by party. taken See 34.1 believe these conclusions judicial estoppel circumscribe the doctrine of ways we have been careful past, disagree to avoid and I with doing so. Although we previously employed the four-part test in cases such (1994), 133, as and Fiedler v. Fiedler 266 Mont. 879 Kauffman 675, universally we have not used the in determining test applicability.
doctrine’s applied We the doctrine in Rowland v. Klies (1986), 360, 310, test, using without Nelson, declined apply 151, the doctrine in Nelson v. 310 Mont. referencing without the test. While the four- cases, part may test helpful important be some it is to note that the “[jjudicial ....’’Nelson, estoppel equitable doctrine is 20 (quoting 28 (2000)). Estoppel Am.Jur.2d and Waiver 74 We have noted § “while this rule frequently ‘judicial is referred to as it estoppel,’ more
448 play fast-and-loose with
properly
estops
is a rule which
Rowland,
(quoting
at
[The doctrine] is intended to the courts from twice, manipulated by litigants prevail, chameleonic who seek to of the doctrine opposite purpose judicial o?i theories. legal process by forcing fraud in the to reduce *14 consistency repeating litigant. modicum of on the added) Nelson, (emphasis (quoting Estoppel 28 Am.Jur.2d (2000)). Waiver § Beneficiary Litigation that position took the in the previous judicial her estopped changing
Mrs. Watkins was from They prevail the did not assertion that 1992Will and Trust were valid. the judicial in that on the their own assertion that litigation basis of valid, yet significant Will and Trust were a subtle distinction. Furthermore, event, any position Appellants and in took Beneficiary they have Litigation position is not inconsistent with alleged taken in Here in their present litigation. complaint: duties, obligations, and implied [have]
Defendants breached their faith, by, justifiable expectations, the heirs’ and acted bad clearly and document among things, failing to determine other Stanley Stanley allowing L. properly the intent of Watkins way Ca?'olyn as to allow Watkins’ will to be executed such Trust, failing reasonably challenge his will and the including Agreement, the terms implement Trust in a manner that transferring assets into the left Watkins’ attack. ownership open the assets consequence [sic] of the Defendant’s proximate .... As a direct and Watkins was enabled to act in a manner that . negligence . . Ms. prejudiced the interests personal in favor of the Plaintiffs added.] [Emphasis interests of Ms. Watkins.
Thus, Appellants’ necessarily premised claims here are not on Trust, invalidity only of the Will or but the manner which Respondents prejudice acted allowed Mrs. Watkins to their interests. inconsistency I see no here application which calls for judicial estoppel doctrine. I concur.