Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86898

Background

Petitioner challenges Fla. Stat. § 893.13 as amended by § 893.101, which eliminates mens rea as an element of drug offenses.
Petitioner was convicted of delivery of cocaine (Count IV) after the 2002 amendment, with the jury instructed only on delivery and substance, not knowledge.
Petitioner was sentenced as an Habitual Felony Offender to 18 years’ imprisonment.
Florida appellate decisions affirmed without merits-based analysis, and per curiam affirmances stated no merits review; AEDPA standards were raised but questioned due to lack of merits analysis.
The court grants habeas relief on the facial challenge to § 893.13, holds the statute unconstitutional on its face, and issues a conditional writ directing vacatur and new sentencing proceedings for Count IV.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is § 893.13 facially unconstitutional for lack of mens rea?	Shelton: elimination of mens rea renders the offense void for due process.	State: statute governs possession/delivery with no knowledge element; permissible as a general-intent regime with an affirmative defense.	Yes, statute facially unconstitutional for due process.
Does the tripartite Staples framework render § 893.13 invalid as a strict liability offense?	Shelton: penalties, stigma, and regulation of innocent conduct violate due process without mens rea.	State: knowledge may be addressed as an affirmative defense and penalties are permissible.	Invalid as to penalties, stigma, and the nature of conduct; statute fails Staples framework.
Can knowledge be read into § 893.13 despite explicit legislative language?	Knowledge is not element and cannot be shifted to defense; statute remains strict liability.	Affirmative defense could render some knowledge relevant.	No; the affirmative-defense mechanism cannot cure the facial invalidity; statute remains unconstitutional.
Are Shelton’s remaining claims about sentence and counsel merits-based after the facial finding?	Various ineffective-assistance and sentencing challenges warrant relief.	Most claims are procedurally defaulted or lack prejudice.	Claims two through nine are denied; count-one relief controls the outcome.
What is the appropriate remedy for Count IV if § 893.13 is unconstitutional on its face?	Vacate Count IV conviction and re-sentencing consistent with due process.	Follow state procedures for relief; arguments limited by constitutional failure to sustain count-one.	Writ granted conditionally; vacate Count IV and initiate new sentencing proceedings.

Key Cases Cited

Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (U.S. 1994) (tripartite analysis for strict liability: penalty, stigma, and conduct)
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (U.S. 1985) (strict liability concerns for conduct not inherently regulated)
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (U.S. 1957) (due process limits on strict liability criminal statutes for innocuous conduct)
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (U.S. 1977) (limits on shifting burden to defendant in statutory defenses)
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (U.S. 1952) (general principle that crime requires a 'vicious will' and mens rea)
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (U.S. 1994) (knowledge as to age of performers in some contexts via statutory construction)
United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (U.S. 1971) (strict liability limits when activity inherently dangerous; not applicable to innocuous conduct)
International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (U.S. 1971) (shipping-regulation context and knowledge of hazardous materials)
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (U.S. 1978) (strict liability scrutiny in public welfare offenses)
United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 1985) (penalty level factors in strict liability offenses)
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (U.S. 1922) (dangerousness and knowledge in narcotics provision context)