*1 UNITED STATES v. INTERNATIONAL MINERALS
& CHEMICAL CORP. No. Argued April 26, 1971 June Decided J., delivered the opinion of Douglas, Court, in which Burger, J.,C. Black, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which HarlaN and Bren- Stewart, NAN, JJ., joined, post, p. 565.
John F. Dienelt argued the cause for the United States pro hac vice. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wilson, and Beatrice Rosenberg.
Harold E. Spencer argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Charles J. McCarthy. Douglas opinion delivered
Mr. Justice *2 Court. sul- shipped appellee charged information
The com- in interstate acid hydrofluosilicic and furic acid shipping the on fail to show knowingly and “did merce wit, property, of said classification required the papers P. R. 173.427.” of 49 C. in violation Liquid, Corrosive Com- Interstate (a) gives C. 834§ Title 18 U. S. for regulations “formulate power to merce Commission 18 and liquids” “corrosive transportation” the safe vio- “knowingly states that whoever (f) §C. 834 U. S. imprisoned. be fined or any lates such shall regulation” by (a) regu- 834 power § granted Pursuant to the already cited latory regulation agency1 promulgated in part: which reads any haz- transportation for shipper offering
“Each this subject material ardous shipping on the shall describe that article chapter, prescribed in 172.5 of by shipping § name paper by prescribed the classification chapter this and de- chapter, may 172.4 this add a further § Abbreviations scription not inconsistent therewith. 49 173.427. § must not be used.” CFR Boyce Motor Court, primarily on relying The District S, Lines, States, Inc. v. 337, 342 ruled that the U. did not violation” of the charge “knowing information the information. accordingly dismissed appeal The filed a notice of to the Court United States C. and in reliance on that Appeals, 3731, § U. S. certify moved to section later the case this Court which regulatory authority originally granted the Interstate Com Department Transporta merce Commission was transferred to the (e) (1964 ed., V). Supp. tion 80 Stat. 49 U. S. C. 1655 § the Court of Appeals did; and we probable noted juris- diction, 400 U. S.
Here as in United States Freed, v. 401 U. S. 601, which dealt with possession of hand grenades, strict or abso- lute liability is not imposed; knowledge of the shipment of the dangerous materials is required. The sole and narrow question is whether “knowledge” of the regulation is also required. It is in that narrow zone that the issue of “mens rea” is raised; and appellee bears down hard on the provision in 18 U. S. C. 834§ (f) that who- ever “knowingly any violates such regulation” shall be fined, etc. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, supra,
on which the District Court relied, is not dispositive of the issue. It involved a regulation governing transport- ing explosives, inflammable liquids, and the like and re- quired drivers to “avoid, so far as practicable, and, where feasible, by prearrangement of routes, driving into or through congested thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled, street car tracks, tunnels, viaducts, and dangerous crossings.” The statute punished whoever “knowingly” violated the regulation. Id., at 339. The issue of “mens rea” was not raised below, the sole ques- tion turning on whether the standard of guilt was uncon- stitutionally vague. Id., at 340. In holding the statute was not void for vagueness we said:
“The statute punishes only those who knowingly violate the Regulation. This requirement of the presence of culpable intent as a necessary element of the offense does much to destroy any force in the argument that application of the Regulation would be so unfair that it must be held invalid. That is evident from a consideration of the effect of the requirement in this case. To sustain a conviction, the Government not only must prove that petitioner could have taken another route which was both (in safer appreciably commercially practicable etc.) than thoroughfares, of crowded its avoidance be shown must also It follow. did the one it practicable, such a there was knew that petitioner more dan- deliberately took the yet route safer petitioner or that tunnel, through route gerous under the duty exercise its willfully neglected availability of such into the inquire Regulation route. an alternative peti- point argument, to its give effort to
“In an route its practicable was no that there asserts tioner pass did not followed which might trucks If it to avoid. they required were places through the lower surrounding congestion is true way crossing practicable was no there Hudson points of avoided such would have which River extent than substantially greater danger has not violated the petitioner taken, then route proof for a matter plainly But that Regulation. with all are not so conversant trial. We at the with no facts may, we area that in that routes us, allegations assume the before the record distort We will not thus to be false. indictment a regula- down concept notice to strike judicial *4 with those after much consultation adopted only tion knowingly those who penalizing only affected and Id., at 342-343. prohibition.” its violate foregoing rea” in the dis- emerged “mens knowl- of the but knowledge regulation not cussion was that were less safe routes and those of the safer edge Mr. Justice Jack- meaning regulation. within himself, in dissent for writing son, Black, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, correctly said: and Mr. Justice suppose the Court intends to suggest “I do not of the petitioner nothing if knew existence 562
such a ignorance
its
would
constitute
defense.”
There no issue in present case of the propriety power delegation establish regulations and of the validity of regulation at issue. We there- fore why see no reason the word “regulations” should not as a construed shorthand designation for specific acts or omissions which violate the Act. The soAct, viewed, does not an signal exception to the rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse and is wholly consistent with the legislative history.
The failure to change the language § 834 in 1960 should not lead contrary to a conclusion. The Senate approved an amendment deleting “knowingly” and sub- stituting therefor the language “being aware that Interstate Commerce Commission has formulated regula- tions for the safe transportation explosives and other 2 dangerous articles.” But the House refused to agree. As the House Committee stated, its version would “retain the present providing a person must ‘know- ingly’ violate the regulations.”
The House Committee noted there
“judicial
was a
pronouncement as to the standards of conduct that make
a violation a ‘knowing’ violation.”
In St. Johnsbury
Trucking
States,
Co. v.
3 Id., at 2. 4 Ibid.
5See the HEW Staff Memorandum, id., at 16-19.
563 Committee The Senate not intended. liability was strict posi- the rejected thus and stringent be too would felt it But de- Commission.6 Commerce Interstate of the tion the Senate liability avoiding strict of protestations spite liability because in strict result likely to very was version unnecessary and been would facts the of knowledge dangerous shipping of business in the anyone involved of the likely know very would materials House the version Senate the rejecting in Thus involved. much too it But liability.7 strict rejecting was was House liability the strict rejecting in that conclude that rule general to the exception out an carving also excuse. is no law the of ignorance defense is no the law ignorance that principle promul- duly aor statute be a the whether applies these In the context regulation. published and gated to attribute we decline 1960 amendments proposed requires Act that that view inaccurate Congress facts, and as law, as well of the knowledge proof by retain- interpretation that endorse it intended that the mea- conclude We “knowingly.” the word ing makes amendments history of the legislative ger the' abandoned Congress conclusion unwarranted facts both knowledge of required rule general could conviction criminal law before pertinent Act. this under be sustained is concerned sulfuric acid say, of possession, far as So require- made a has been “mens rea” requirement word of the by the use Act as evidenced ment he faith good thinking person A “knowingly.” shipping was fact he when water distilled shipping was Sess., Cong., 1st 3. 901, 86th Rep. No. S. absolute almost might create an “well language The Senate supra, at No. Rep. H. R. liability for violation.”
some dangerous acid would not be covered. As in stated Morissette v. States, U. 250: S.
“The contention that an injury can amount to a only crime when by inflicted intention provin- is no cial or transient notion. It is as and per- universal sistent in systems mature of law as in belief freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.” is leeway
There
for the exercise of congressional dis
cretion in applying the reach of “mens rea.” United
States
Balint,
v.
“He whose conduct is defined as criminal is one who ‘willfully’ fails pay the tax, to make a return, keep the required records, or to supply the needed information. Congress did not intend that a by person, reason of a bona fide misunder- standing as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make return, or as to the adequacy of the he records maintained, should become a criminal his mere failure to up measure to the prescribed standard of conduct. And the requirement that the omission in these instances, must be willful, to be criminal, is persuasive that the same element essential to the offense of failing to supply informa- Id., tion.” at 396.
In Balint the Court was dealing with Freed drugs, with hand grenades, in this case with sulfuric and other dangerous acids. Pencils, dental floss, paper clips may also be regulated. But they may be the type prod- ucts which might raise substantial due process ques- if tions Congress did not require, as in Murdock, “mens as where, But offense. ingredient to each rea” as deleterious or Freedl, dangerous in Balint as here and in- are materials waste or obnoxious products or devices any- great is so probability volved, or of them possession he is is aware one who be aware must be presumed them with dealing regulation.
Reversed. Har- Justice whom Stewart, with Justice Mr. Mr. dissenting. join, Brennan Mr. Justice lan and the togo that questions questions large stirs case This — postu- law. Whether criminal the of foundations moral “willfulness,” rea,” of “mens problem a lated as “scienter,” the infliction or of responsibility,” “criminal long has the unaware upon punishment of criminal g., e. See, justice. administration the fair troubled v. Lambert 246; States, U. S. 342 v. United Morissette States, 367 v. United 225; Scales 355 S. California, U. States, F. 2d 862. 214 Durham v. United 203. Cf. U. S. this with here for involvement no is occasion But there is evident for it jurisprudence, of criminal problem root vio- only knowing punishable made Congress me the is what That in question. the regulation lations of held, courts federal clearly what the says, quite history confirms. legislative the and what hardly complex. Section statutory language regulatory agency the C., gives 18, U. Title S. (a) of 834 transporta- the safe for “formulate power liquids.” Sec- things, other “corrosive among of, tion” vio- knowingly provides (f) “[w]hoever tion 834 than not more shall fined any such lates year, or both.” than one not imprisoned more or $1,000 did in this because it information case the dismissing In knowing with violation appellee shipper charge not Judge Porter District labeling regulation, the applicable 566
did no more than give effect to the ordinary meaning of the English language.
It is true, as Court today points out, issue now before us was Boyce directly not involved Lines, Motor States, Inc. v. United 342 U. S. which dealt with a claim that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. But in holding the statute valid, the Court bottomed its reasoning upon proposition that “the presence of culpable intent necessary [is] element of Id., offense.” at Other federal courts, faced with the precise issue here presented, have held that the statute means exactly says what it the words —that “knowingly any violates such regulation” mean no more and no less than “knowingly any violates such regula- tion.” St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. States, F. 2d (CA1 1955); United States v. Chicago Express, 235 F. 2d (CA7 1956). Chief Judge Magruder filed a concurring opinion in St. Johnsbury case, and he put the matter thus:
“If it be thought that the indicated requirement of proof will seriously hamper effective enforcement of the Interstate Commerce Commission regulations, the answer is that Congress is at liberty fix to that up by striking out . . . prescribed the element of mens 'knowingly'—as applied to violation rea — of regulations of the sort here involved. . . .
“If a statute provides that it shall be an offense 'knowingly' to sell adulterated milk, the offense is complete if the defendant sells what he knows to adulterated milk, even though he does not know of the existence of the criminal statute, on the time- honored principle of the criminal law that ignorance of the law is no excuse. But where a statute pro- vides, as does 18 U. S. C. 835, § that whoever know- ingly violates a regulation of the Interstate Com- merce Commission shall be guilty of an offense, it vio- knowingly not could person a that would seem of terms the of knows he unless regulation late a is doing he is what and knows the defini- Here the again regulation. the contrary to discre- control the within offense is tion of the Id., at legislature.” tion of to brought were decisions judicial In these Congress committees appropriate attention Con- asked Commission, which Commerce the Interstate law, by amending impact their to gress overcome or, alter- “knowingly” the word deleting by simply either aware “being the words therefor by substituting natively, formu- has Commission Commerce Interstate explosives transportation the safe for regulations lated passed The Senate articles.”1 dangerous other a com- based on alternative, the second adopting bill report that stated: mittee of the Commission’s for violations
“Prosecution been has explosives transportation in sec- requirement extremely difficult because knowl- must violators of the act that tion 835 regula- the Commission’s they violated edge every believes that the committee tions. While for provide be taken precaution should reasonable purpose a statute violating whose those punishing of an absolute safety, creation promote stringent.”2 too liability is deemed accept however, refused the Senate’s House, “knowingly,” the word its resubstituted language and report stating: committee *9 Act Transportation Explosives present
“The ‘knowingly’ violation committed requires may be inflicted for violation. penalty before such 1975, Cong., Sess., 2d 10-11. Rep. H. No. 86th 1 See R. Sess., 901, Cong., 2-3. Rep. 86th 1st S. No. Under present law judicial there is pronounce- as ment standards of conduct that make a violation a 'knowing’ violation. instant bill would change substantially the quantum proof prove necessary to a violation provides it since ‘any person who being aware that the Interstate Commerce Commission has formulated regulations for the safe transportation explosives and other dangerous is guilty articles’ if there is a noncompli- ance with the regulations. Such language may well an create almost absolute liability for violation. . . . Since the penalties prescribed for violation of the Explosives Act are substantial and proof since re- quired to sustain a charge of violation of such regu- lations under bill would require little more than proof that the violation occurred, it is the con- sidered opinion of the committee that such a sub- stantial departure present law is not warranted. It is the purpose of this amendment to retain the present providing a person must ‘know- ingly’ violate the regulations.” Three days later the Senate agreed to the resubstitution of the word “knowingly” by passing the House version of the bill. today
The Court thus grants to the Executive Branch what Congress explicitly refused to grant in 1960. It effectively deletes the word “knowingly” from the law. I join cannot the Court in this exercise, requiring it as does such a total disregard of plain statutory language, established judicial precedent, and explicit legislative history.
A final word is in order. Today’s decision will practical little impact upon prosecution of interstate motor carriers or institutional shippers. For interstate
3H. Rep. R. No. Cong., 86th 2d Sess., 2. *10 and industry, regulated of a members are motor carriers required by are employees and officers, agents, their As question.4 in regulations with the conversant to be species under a they are matter, therefore, a practical despite regulations liability for violation absolute doubt, is as This, no requirement. “knowingly” Dotter United States v. it to be. Cf. intended Congress Balint, States v. weich, 277; 258 U. S. 320 U. S. shippers for vio prosecution regular Likewise, hardly impeded by be could lations of for triers of fact would requirement, “knowingly” in on the difficulty inferring knowledge whatever have no know, despite it is to their those whose business part of contrary. only impact real to the protestations upon shipper, might will the casual who of this decision be person in Nation. A any man, woman, or child make a regulation might never heard of the who had by in the shipment of an covered it course single article wholly It natural for him to as of a lifetime. would be article the common that he could deliver the sume it depend upon carrier and the carrier see that was papers properly shipping labeled were today’s person Yet decision holds that a order. who punishable of a criminal just guilty does offense year prison. perversion This seems to me a criminal purpose law. opinion from the respectfully judgment I dissent of the Court.
4 49 CFR 397.02. §