Shelton v. Lee, 299 Ga. 350

William Lee Shelton was convicted of malice murder and robbery by force in Pike County and sentenced to life; this Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal in 2005.
Conflicting evidence existed about where the fatal injury was inflicted, but the body was discovered in Pike County; the direct appeal upheld venue based on the body discovery.
Shelton filed a habeas petition (2013) arguing the trial jury instruction tracking OCGA § 17-2-2(c) ("it shall be considered") unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proving venue to him, violating due process.
The habeas court dismissed the claim as res judicata; the State conceded that the due process challenge was not actually litigated on direct appeal.
The Supreme Court of Georgia found the habeas court erred on res judicata but affirmed denial of relief on other grounds: Shelton procedurally defaulted by not raising the due process claim on direct appeal and failed to show cause and prejudice to overcome the default.
On the merits, the Court held the instruction correctly stated Georgia venue law (OCGA § 17-2-2(c)) and did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof; it rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s contrary view in Owens v. McLaughlin.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the habeas due-process claim barred by res judicata/procedural default?	Shelton: claim not raised on direct appeal so not barred; habeas timely.	State: claim should be barred; procedural default applies.	Court: not res judicata error by habeas court, but claim procedurally defaulted for failure to raise on direct appeal (no cause/prejudice shown).
Did the jury instruction based on OCGA § 17-2-2(c) unconstitutionally shift burden of proof on venue?	Shelton: the "shall be considered" language creates a mandatory presumption relieving the State of its burden.	State: instruction correctly states Georgia substantive venue law and requires jury factual findings; does not shift burden.	Court: instruction proper under Georgia law; did not violate due process or Sandstrom.
Can Owens v. McLaughlin (11th Cir.) change-of-law excuse procedural default?	Shelton: Owens announces a change favoring him, allowing default to be excused.	State: Owens misread Georgia venue law; no change that helps Shelton.	Court: Owens misconstrued Georgia law; no change in law that would excuse default.
Can ineffective assistance of counsel excuse procedural default (cause and prejudice)?	Shelton: appellate/trial counsel ineffective for failing to raise the venue instruction challenge.	State: counsel not ineffective because the claim lacked merit.	Court: counsel’s failure not deficient or prejudicial because the claim was meritless; ineffective-assistance route fails.

Shelton v. State, 279 Ga. 161 (affirming convictions and venue on direct appeal)
Owens v. McLaughlin, 733 F.3d 320 (11th Cir. 2013) (held similar venue instruction created an unconstitutional burden shift)
Napier v. State, 276 Ga. 769 (discussed jury instructions based on OCGA § 17-2-2(c))
Bundren v. State, 247 Ga. 180 (statute provides mechanism to satisfy constitutional venue mandate)
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (instruction creating presumption that shifts burden violates due process)
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (due process limits on legislative burden-shifting in criminal cases)