Shelley Walker v. State
12-12-00379-CR
| Tex. App. | Oct 19, 2016Background
- Kenneth and Shelley Walker (grandparents and cohabitants) were tried jointly for intentionally or knowingly causing serious bodily injury to their nearly‑3‑year‑old granddaughter, B.W., who suffered symmetric second‑degree burns to both feet and ankles after exposure to scalding water in the master bathtub.
- Emergency responders found the tub nearly full of very hot water, a trickling hot spigot, and two pairs of children’s underwear at the tub base; later testing of the heater produced spigot temperatures of ~120–131°F and pooled tub water ~128–129°F at max setting.
- State experts (Drs. Wolf and Cox) opined the uniform burn pattern and clear ankle demarcation were most consistent with forcible immersion (sustained contact ~10–20 seconds) rather than a child moving through water; defense expert (Dr. Lawrence) testified forcible immersion was difficult and that the injuries could be accidental or caused with N.W. blocking egress.
- Kenneth and Shelley gave multiple, inconsistent accounts to family, medical staff, CPS, and police; Shelley at one point estimated Kenneth had been in the back of the house for “two or three minutes” before B.W. emerged with burns. Neither appellant admitted to immersion; no trial objection challenged the experts’ admissibility.
- Juries convicted both Walkers and sentenced each to 25 years. The Twelfth Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted discretionary review; the present opinion is a concurring and dissenting opinion that (a) agrees Shelley’s conviction is legally insufficient and should be acquitted, and (b) would vacate Kenneth’s conviction and remand for consideration of possible lesser‑included offenses rather than the Court’s outright acquittal of Kenneth.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Walker's Argument | Held (concurring/dissenting) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether medical evidence establishes injury was inflicted (not accidental) | Uniform burn pattern and expert testimony permit a rational jury to infer forcible immersion | Experts’ opinions are speculative; physical difficulties and alternative accidental scenarios (child movement, blocked egress) make forcible immersion unlikely | Medical testimony was sufficiently probative for a rational jury to find injury inflicted (not accidental) when evidence is viewed favorably to prosecution |
| Identity — whether evidence sufficiently links Kenneth or Shelley as perpetrator | Inconsistent statements, opportunity (Shelley’s time estimate placing Kenneth in back for minutes), and experts’ forcible‑immersion opinion support conviction of Kenneth and party liability for Shelley | Evidence is speculative as to which adult (if either) caused the immersion; Shelley’s statements insufficient to prove her as actor or party; physical limitations undercut Kenneth theory | Evidence legally insufficient to convict Shelley (acquittal warranted). Evidence sufficient for a rational jury to find Kenneth caused the injury (but not necessarily with required mens rea) |
| Mens rea — whether evidence proves Kenneth acted intentionally or knowingly to cause serious bodily injury | Intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence (punishment motive, conduct) | No proof he knew water temperature or was substantially certain his conduct would cause serious bodily injury; inconsistent statements do not prove intent to cause serious injury | Evidence insufficient to prove Kenneth had the conscious objective or substantial certainty to cause serious bodily injury; conviction for first‑degree offense unsupported; remand appropriate to consider lesser‑included offenses |
| Reliability/admissibility of expert medical testimony in sufficiency review | Experts admissible; juries may credit competing medical opinions | Reliability and analytical gap arguments could undermine the experts’ probative value | Although courts may consider reliability, here experts’ opinions were based on observable facts and experience and were not so unreliable as to preclude a rational jury from crediting them |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for legal sufficiency review: whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (discussion of legal‑ vs factual‑sufficiency review and related standards)
- Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (permitting multiple reasonable inferences; caution against the unhelpful term "inference stacking")
- Winfrey v. State, 323 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (legal sufficiency can consider reliability of certain evidence where appropriate)
- Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2 (2011) (jury determinations between competing medical expert theories are entitled to deference)
- Gharda USA, Inc. v. Control Solutions, Inc., 464 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. 2015) (expert opinion may be unreliable where an analytical gap exists between data and conclusion)
- Easter v. State, 536 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (accessory after the fact is not a party under Texas law)
- Urtado v. State, 605 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (further explanation that accessory conduct is not party liability under Texas law)
- McKay v. State, 474 S.W.3d 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (distinguishing intent issues and consideration of lesser‑included offenses)
- Thompson v. State, 236 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (discussion of jury instructions and transferred intent concepts)